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Abstract
This thesis seeks to improve our understanding of the integration of explicit 
environmental motives into innovation processes. This will be done by applying 
insights from the social shaping of technology field as well as organisation studies to 
the area of environmental innovation, which is dominated by environmental 
management literature.
The environmental innovation literature typically conflates the motives behind 
environmental innovations and the resulting technological outcomes, thus reifying 
environmental motives and causing confusion regarding the concepts of 
‘environmental innovation’ and ‘cleaner technology’. We will here disentangle 
motives and outcomes and contextualise innovations in terms of other motives as well 
as other practices than those labelled environmental. An underlying assumption in the 
literature is also that firms are monolithic, rational actors where management 
decisions are implemented by straightforward translations into technological 
solutions, neglecting any influence from other actors in the firm. We will here instead 
investigate the processual and political aspects of innovations and their environmental 
aspects. Special attention will be given to the roles and expertise of engineers, 
environmental staff and managers. Moreover, a lot of the environmental innovation 
literature is determinist in its attempts to promote ‘best practice’ and the greening of 
firms. To avoid this we will, through a focus on the processual and structural 
dimensions of firm organisation, seek to distinguish between one-off contingencies 
and longer lasting changes. We will also be sensitive to the possibility that 
organisational change may lead to worse as well as better environmental performance.
This thesis looks at chemicals industry firms since they have a long history of 
exposure to environmental regulation, and are likely to have well-developed routines 
and expertise for environmental innovations. As a comparison dairy industry firms are 
also studied. To avoid decontextualisation and environmental management 
determinism, we chose cases irrespective of whether the environmental motive was 
central to the innovation or not. The cases include both core technology and 
end-of-pipe innovations. The data was collected mainly through semi-structured 
interviews with actors in the firms. The analysis is based on comparison of cases in 
the two industrial sectors, and in Sweden and Scotland.
A central result of the thesis is that we can and should distinguish between 
‘unintentional’, ‘intentional’ and ‘ambitious’ cleaner technology innovations, 
depending on the role of environmental motives in the innovation process. We also 
saw that the environmental label could be doing purely rhetorical work independently 
of the design choices made. In fact, we saw no example of ambitious cleaner 
technology, and few cases of intentional cleaner technology, which is surprising given 
the choice of chemicals industry cases.
In terms of firm organisation, we have developed the concept of the Company Social 
Constitution to capture the structured context of environmental work in innovation 
processes. This helped us explain the roles of environmental staff as buffers and 
boundary spanners, in competition with engineers regarding technological work, and 
depending on current and past regulatory pressure. Finally, we were able to put forth a 
new theorisation of environmental championing that captures both structural and 
action aspects of organisational life to explain this behaviour.
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1 Introduction
Over the last four decades environmental issues have received increased attention. In 
spite of efforts to manage pollution from production processes, manufacturing 
industry remains an important part of the problem, as well as a focus of 
environmental policy.
Recent years have seen widespread acceptance in policy – as well as academia – of 
the concept of ‘cleaner technology’, with particular emphasis on the so-called 
‘win-win’ benefits that can stem from improvements in resource efficiency. With the 
cleaner technology concept now generally adopted by policy-makers and regulators 
it is important to understand what it entails in practice, and to address critically 
previous work on the topic. 
1.1 Background
The wider concept of ‘environmental innovation’ has been used frequently to discuss 
environmental improvement through firm-level innovation. Broadly speaking, 
‘environmental innovation’ is innovation that reduces the environmental impact of a 
manufacturing process (or of a product). Environmental innovations are often 
thought to entail either ‘end-of-pipe technology’, that is technology that collects and 
treats pollution, or ‘cleaner technology’, that is technology that reduces the 
production of pollution. 
We set out these definitions only provisionally. Indeed, a central concern in this 
thesis is to scrutinise these concepts and to show why they are problematic. This is 
especially important given their use in environmental and – to a lesser extent – 
innovation policy.
We shall here set out the background of the thesis via an introduction to the notion of 
‘environmental innovation’. First we shall make the case for the importance of this 
phenomenon. Thereafter we shall set out the history of the concept as well as its 
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current use in government policy. And finally, we shall briefly discuss theories of the 
greening of society as a further context to the study.
1.1.1 Why environmental innovations?
Environmental problems have caused concern for a long time now, with early 
examples including polluted air in urban areas in the early 1900s (Stradling and Tarr 
1999). Especially over the last 40 years such concerns have intensified with debates 
about issues such as the effect of pesticides on humans and animals, acidification of 
inland waters and, more recently, global warming and ozone holes. Concerns about 
environmental problems have been expressed in several ways, including a raised 
level of public concern, the growth of organized environmental movements and, not 
least, through government regulation of industrial activities.
The root cause of environmental problems has been traced back by different 
observers to different social structures and institutions, for example capitalism 
(Benton 1989), patriarchy (Shiva 1988) and Christianity (White 1967). A common 
trait among these explanations is a focus on the role of technology and how the 
ever-increasing use of technology means growing deleterious impacts of human 
activities on the natural environment. Early environmental advocates often expressed 
strong concern and pessimism regarding the possibility of ameliorating the negative 
effects of technology, at least without changing society radically – given the central 
role of technology in its workings (Hajer 1996:248).
In contemporary society firms have a central role in the development, distribution 
and use of resources and technology, and no small part of environmental pollution is 
produced directly by firms. Consequently, a lot of attention has been paid to the use 
of technology in industry. Society’s response to environmental degradation has for a 
long time had a focus on regulating industrial pollution, and hence (more or less 
explicitly) regulating technology use in firms. 
The environmental performance of business and the need for change have of course 
been debated, and it is possible to point to mechanisms that lead to both 
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environmental degradation and to environmental improvements. On the one hand 
there is what economists would call externalisation, that is the possibility for firms to 
let others take responsibility (pay) for the environmental harm they have caused. It is 
quite simply often easier, cheaper and more profitable for the firm not to try to 
reduce the environmental impact of its activities. On the other hand, it is also in the 
interests of a firm to strive towards resource efficiency and to minimise waste. This 
may, however, require costly investments. All in all it seems that ‘business as usual’, 
that is not taking the environment into account, is not enough to reduce the 
environmental impact to tolerable levels, and that there is need for efforts targeted at 
improving the environmental performance of firms, be it by government regulation 
or by other means such as pressure from environmental activists.
Today, a common way of talking about firms’ efforts to adapt their technologies to 
reduce their environmental impact is to talk of ‘environmental innovation’. As we 
shall see in the next section, the view of the role of technology in relation to firms’ 
environmental impacts has changed over time.
1.1.2 The history of ‘environmental innovation’
There have been changes to the scope of environmental regulation over the past 40 
years, and this has also meant changes in the kinds of environmental innovation that 
have been targeted, and how the concept of ‘environmental innovation’ has been 
understood. When modern environmental regulation began to develop in the 1960s it 
built upon existing approaches. The focus was on reducing the environmental impact 
of waste and pollution produced by industrial processes, and the technological means 
were so-called end-of-pipe technologies (Malaman 1995:9; Overcash 1997:1304-5). 
Long before the 1960s smokestacks and releases into waterways were used to dilute 
pollution, and landfills to contain waste. The regulation now introduced built on this 
approach of dealing with the pollution and waste produced ‘at the end of the pipe’, 
and new technologies were developed along similar lines. An example of such a 
technology is the use of filters to collect and contain airborne pollution.1 
1 A related category of environmental innovations introduced early on are so-called monitoring 
technologies used to measure emissions and waste.
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End-of-pipe technologies are relatively easy to add on to an existing production 
process, since they typically do not require any changes to core process technology. 
This is a reason why this type of environmental innovation was one of the first 
responses by firms to the new environmental regulation (Malaman 1995:9). On the 
other hand such innovations entail costs, but hardly any benefits for the firms, apart 
from an improved reputation among regulators and at times other stakeholders such 
as customers. Moreover, a problem from an environmental point of view is that this 
kind of solution may reduce some environmental impacts, but often at the price of 
creating new problems, since the pollution and waste is in a sense just moved around, 
or shifted from one type of pollution to another. For example, a scrubber can clean 
smoke, but the captured pollutants represent a new form of waste.
This approach to environmental regulation become increasingly discredited, and 
beginning in the late 70s (Overcash 1997:1301) more focus has been placed on 
preventing the production of waste and pollution in the first place, by modifying the 
basic production process. This approach has been labelled clean or cleaner 
technology (McMeekin and Green 1994).2
Cleaner technology appears to offer firms both opportunities and challenges. On the 
one hand waste and pollution can be seen as signs of inefficiency as they represent 
substances that could have been part of the product, or otherwise used profitably. 
‘Pollution prevention pays’ has been a slogan of the advocates of this approach, and 
part of the allure of cleaner technology for business is that it holds out the promise of 
cheaper regulatory compliance (Overcash 1997:1305). Clean technology has been 
seen to represent a ‘win-win situation’ of simultaneous environmental and economic 
improvements. 
On the other hand it may well be more difficult to introduce this kind of 
technological change to the extent that the production process is a configuration of 
2 It is worth emphasising here that we are here presenting the view of cleaner technology from the 
perspective of environmental policy. We shall later challenge the idea of cleaner technology as new, 
and as subsequent to end-of-pipe technology.
We may also note that Overcash (1997:1303) lists several concepts that he claims are more 
or less synonymous with cleaner technology, including: pollution prevention, source reduction and 
cleaner production.
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interdependent artefacts and routines. A cleaner technology innovation is likely to be 
a technologically more complex affair than adding an end-of-pipe solution. The need 
to integrate cleaner technologies into the production process is reflected in the 
alternative name of ‘integrated’ solutions or technologies (Kemp and Arundel 
1998:3). 
The belief in the win-win rhetoric of cleaner technology is also currently a part of 
government policies in both the environmental and innovation policy domains. The 
UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) identifies Sustainable Production and 
Consumption (SPC) as one of six key areas in its recent Technology Strategy, and 
states: “Innovative technologies will be one of the main tools used to achieve SPC ”. 
It continues: 
Energy- and resource-efficient technologies can reduce operating costs by 
enhancing the efficiency with which materials, energy and water are utilised,  
and through the minimisation of waste. They can also help to create new 
markets, promote competitiveness and enhance corporate reputations, whilst  
simultaneously providing social and environmental benefits (DTI, 2006).
Similarly, the Environment Agency for England and Wales (EA) writes: “Good 
environmental performance could save UK industry £5.8 billion every year, enhance 
reputation with customers and investors, drive innovation and create markets; all  
giving business a competitive edge” (EA 2006:4).
Particular attention is given to contrasting so-called cleaner technology with 
‘traditional’ end-of-pipe technology. Thus the Parliamentary Office of Science and 
Technology (POST) writes: 
The traditional way to reduce the environmental impact of industry has been to 
fit pollution control equipment to chimneys and effluent pipes. These remove or 
transform releases, can recover material for recycling or reuse, and are useful  
for cleaning-up existing industrial processes that cannot be replaced 
immediately. However, they may not be sufficient by themselves to maximise 
resource use and minimise waste. To address this, techniques have shifted to 
improving products and industrial processes so that they require less raw 
material, water and energy, and produce less waste (POST 2004). 
Along with this emphasis on cleaner technology, there has also been a shift in recent 
years to consideration of the wider societal impacts of consumerism on the 
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environment. The focus in both the end-of-pipe and the cleaner technology 
approaches is on the regulation of the environmental impact of production processes 
of individual firms, but this neglects the impact of the products produced. Increasing 
attention is now being paid to consumption in environmental policy, and the fact that 
considerable pollution, resource consumption etc. is associated with the consumption 
of products, and not just their production (Howells 2003; Shove 2004). It has 
therefore been seen as important to take a product’s entire life cycle from raw 
materials through production and distribution to consumption and disposal into 
account. This is reflected in regulations targeting products, like product liability and 
take-back requirements (at the EU level such policies are seen as part of the 
Integrated Product Policy framework, Rubik 2002). For the individual firm this has 
sometimes meant an increasing focus on taking into account the environmental 
impacts of the product in the use and disposal stages, when designing and developing 
products. 
From the regulator’s point of view this approach has created new challenges. It is 
now less obvious which particular actors should be regulated. Responsibility for the 
environmental impact of a product is somehow to be apportioned among the actors 
involved along a product’s life cycle. If end-of-pipe and cleaner technology 
innovations are mainly about the technology and organisation of firms, 
environmental product innovations are about the technology and organisation of 
supply chains, sectors, networks etc. The ‘environmental regulation front’ has thus 
now moved on to product life cycles and technological and sectoral systems (Kemp 
1994). Another trend is the inclusion of social issues and a shift to sustainability3 as 
an overall aim (see for example Griffiths and Petrick 2001). 
Whilst these developments4 are interesting and important, there are unresolved issues 
regarding cleaner technology and end-of-pipe technology at the firm level – as we 
shall see later – and this thesis will focus on the firm level and on production 
technology.
3 Although ‘sustainability’ still often refers to environmental aspects neglecting the social ones.
4 The shifts in environmental regulation and its focus on different environmental innovations 
described are not shifts in the sense of new types of regulations replacing the older ones, but rather 
additions of new types of regulations – and innovations – to the mix.
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The belief in opportunities for win-win gains through cleaner technology at the firm 
level is mirrored at the policy level by a new optimism about the possibilities of 
achieving both economic growth and reduced pollution through ‘ecological 
modernisation’. This can also be seen as part of a broader move towards economic 
and market-based instruments in environmental policy, thus emphasising the 
economic aspects of pollution and of pollution prevention. And, insofar as win-win 
opportunities are seen as implying that firms would act voluntarily to prevent 
pollution, the notion also fits well with de-regulation agendas.
1.1.3 Ecological modernisation versus green Marxism
The newfound optimism also reflects a development in the environmental movement 
from radical outsider-activism, to a more pragmatic stance including cooperation 
with government and industry. As environmental movement organisations orientated 
towards protest have been complemented with more moderate activists as well as 
mainstream political parties, a more pragmatic way of understanding the societal 
background of environmental degradation became established – and was articulated 
as ecological modernisation theory (Hajer 1996).
The academic theory of ecological modernisation embodies the belief in win-win 
solutions – both at firm and society level – with its central claim that societal 
institutions can integrate ecological with economic rationality. The theory thus 
promises to explain the societal dynamics leading to the integration of environmental 
concerns into technological decision-making.
We shall here describe the theory of ecological modernisation in somewhat greater 
detail to see what it has to say about environmental innovation in firms. To assess 
whether the optimism regarding the possibilities of integrating ecological and 
economic rationalities of ecological modernisation theory is warranted, we shall also 
contrast it with a more sceptical theory: green Marxism.
Ecological modernisation theory states that it is possible to reform institutions to 
substantially reduce environmental problems – and even that this is a probable future 
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(Spaargaren and Mol 1992:334). The mechanism through which this is to take place 
is the integration of ecological rationality, so that decisions made take the 
environment into account.5 ‘Ecological rationality’ here means a normative, 
action-orientated way of thinking, and presumably presupposes at least a degree of 
ecological knowledge.
Ecological rationality is in ecological modernisation theory seen to be compatible 
with economic rationality. The proponents of the theory want to ecologise economic 
institutions, and “economiz[e] ecology by placing an economic value on the third 
force of production: nature” (Spaargaren and Mol 1992:335). The authors are also 
optimistic regarding the possibilities of new, cleaner technologies embodying this 
integration of ecological and economic rationalities. In particular generic 
technologies like information technology, biotechnology and materials technology 
are said to offer potential for environmental improvement.
The role of the state in this theory is not clear. Some proponents have varyingly 
stressed the voluntary adoption of ecological rationality by industry, whereas others 
have claimed a role for the state in regulating industry, although through flexible, 
market-based policies rather than more heavy-handed command and control policies 
(Spaargaren and Mol 1992:335, 340). Murphy and Gouldson (2000:33), applying 
ecological modernisation theory to a study of regulation and industrial innovation, 
found support for the idea that regulation can stimulate innovation, and they stressed 
the knowledge contributions of pollution inspectors to firms.
Ecological modernisation theory has been criticized at a theoretical level by green 
Marxists for neglecting structural barriers to environmental improvement in society 
(Mol and Spaargaren 2000:22). Drawing on empirical work (on the UK refrigeration 
industry), and backed by Marxist theory, Purvis et al. (2001:154) criticized 
ecological modernisation theory for over-stating the rational behaviour and the 
potential of knowledge access and cooperation of firm actors. 
5 Ecological modernisation is in this sense not dissimilar to the reflexive modernisation concept of for 
example Ulrich Beck (1994).
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Green Marxism is not the only theoretical approach that is sceptical of the ecological 
modernisation view of the relationship between the environment and society. 
However, other approaches (for example ecofeminist theory and risk society theory) 
do not deal with industry as central to society. ‘Green Marxism’ is here used as a 
label for a variety of texts, written over a period of about 30 years. There are large 
variations within this school of thought, and we shall here certainly not try to give a 
comprehensive overview. This is, however, not necessary to give an effective 
contrast to ecological modernisation theory.
Most green Marxist contributions conceive a more problematic relationship between 
the environment and the economic sphere than does ecological modernisation. At the 
core of green Marxism are (ecological) contradictions between the capitalist 
requirement for profit (Benton 1989:72) and ecological considerations. As early as 
1972 Commoner traced industry’s propensity to cause environmental damage back to 
its ability to externalise environmental costs (Commoner 1972:252). Gorz – writing 
in a different strand of Marxism – sees the hegemony of instrumental rationality in 
industrial society as the core problem (Gorz 1993:56-57). Both contributions share a 
sceptical view of industry’s voluntary adoption of ecological rationality.
Where ecological modernisation sees an alliance between moderate greens and state 
bureaucracy as an important locus of the new ecological rationality, green Marxism 
would place more hope with radical green movements struggling outside the 
establishment, preferably in alliance with labour (O’Connor 1996:201).
As compared to ecological modernisation, and in line with a weaker belief in 
voluntarism, green Marxists tend to stress more firmly the importance of state 
intervention (O’Connor 1996:2001) (although again this varies, depending on 
whether the state is seen as an instrument of capital, or a more free-standing arena).
Green Marxist writers have varying views of technology and its potential 
contributions to solving environmental problems. Few green Marxists would be as 
optimistic about technology as ecological modernists, however. Perhaps Bridge, 
writing based on an empirical study of copper mining in the US, best captures a 
typical Marxist position. He asserts that innovations – technological, organisational, 
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or institutional – do not transcend the ecological contradictions, but rather serve to 
generate more effective ways of managing them (Bridge 2000:253).
Neither ecological modernisation nor green Marxism is very explicit about 
organisational issues, about what goes on inside firms. But from our description of 
the theories above we may extrapolate. Ecological modernisation is more likely to 
support a smooth (and perhaps even voluntary) uptake of ecological rationality in 
firms, and sees no inescapable limits to this integration. In green Marxism we would 
expect to see clashes with, the ultimately dominant, profit rationale.
This raises questions about how ecological rationality6 is taken up by firms; how it 
fits or clashes with other – particularly economic – rationalities; and whether there 
are limits to the uptake of ecological rationalities. Moreover, a view of cleaner 
technology as embodying win-win solutions – and thus the integration of ecological 
and economic rationalities – is highly compatible with ecological modernisation. If, 
however, cleaner technology does not deliver on this promise, and if the 
contradictions between ecological and economic rationalities remain, then one of the 
central underpinnings of ecological modernisation will look shaky, and the Green 
Marxist perspective will be accordingly strengthened.
1.2 Aim and research strategy
This section will specify the aim of the thesis. We shall also introduce the research 
questions, and, finally, a brief description of the methodology (a more 
comprehensive account is given in chapter 4).
1.2.1 Aim
Cleaner technology is being promoted in both political and academic discourses as a 
means of simultaneously achieving environmental improvements and economic 
6 We do not mean ‘rationality’ in the normative sense, that is, as an opposite to irrationality. Instead it 
here means a way of thinking about a certain topic in a particular cultural context, and we see the 
possibilities for multiple rationalities, in particular ecological and economic ones.
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gains. Cleaner technology is thus thought to provide so-called ‘win-win’ 
opportunities, and circumvent conflicts between environmental and other 
‘business-as-usual’ (BAU) commercial motives (cost, profitability, product quality, 
resource efficiency, etc.).
It has, however, been observed that cleaner technology has yet to deliver on a large 
scale on this promise, and that the uptake of cleaner technologies has been limited 
(Clayton et al. 1999:2). Explanations for this have also been put forth. It has been 
claimed that cleaner technologies are generally newer than end-of-pipe technologies, 
and therefore less optimised, less well-known etc., which may in turn discourage 
adoption (Malaman 1995:2). Clayton et al. (1999:230, 251) have also shown, for 
example, that regulatory demands of too large and rapid environmental 
improvements risk pushing companies to invest in end-of-pipe technology rather 
than cleaner technology, and that if environmental staff dominate the investment 
process, there may be a lock-in to end-of-pipe technology. 
Existing accounts of cleaner technology have thus focussed on comparisons with 
end-of-pipe technologies, but fail to compare cleaner technology with 
‘non-environmental technology’, that is process technologies that are not considered 
to be ‘environmental’ – let us call them BAU innovations – in a systematic way, and 
to explore this distinction.7 The existing accounts are therefore asymmetrical in the 
sense that they explain environmental technology, but not BAU innovations. In the 
area of environmental management literature, this is mirrored empirically by a bias 
towards studies of so-called ‘best practice’.8
The existing accounts also fail to distinguish clearly between environmental 
intentions and environmental outcomes. This means that there is a risk of taking the 
environmental properties of the technologies for granted (reification), rather than 
examining how their ‘environmental-ness’ is constructed throughout the innovation 
7 Clayton et al. (1999:237) note that when resource efficiency concerns are already well entrenched it 
is difficult to distinguish between cleaner technologies and what is otherwise considered good 
engineering practice, but do not explore this further.
8 With the intention to show what is possible and in the hope that such ‘good examples’ will be 
compelling enough to change actual practices. See for example Zwetsloot (1995:64) and Handfield 
et al. (2001:189).
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process.9 We need to ask how a technology comes to be seen as delivering 
environmental improvements, and not just accept the label ‘environmental’ as 
presented to us. This means that we need to unpack the innovation process, and study 
how environmental intentions are articulated in decision-making.
The distinction between intentions and outcomes is also blurred when the focus is on 
good (that is intentional and successful) examples of environmental innovation – but 
would become more urgent if BAU innovations were to be studied as well. 
Reification and asymmetry thus go hand in hand.
These problems – asymmetry and reification – raise doubts about our understanding 
of cleaner technology, and the claims made about it. We must ask ourselves again 
what cleaner technology is. Can cleaner technologies be distinguished from BAU 
innovations? Does it make sense to say that cleaner technologies deliver win-win 
solutions? And if these basic facts are questioned, other claims made about cleaner 
technologies, that is, that they are newer than end-of-pipe technologies, and that the 
up-take has been low, may have to be revisited as well.
The aim of this thesis is therefore: to explore the concept of ‘cleaner technology’ 
through comparison with ‘BAU innovations’, and through studying the role of 
environmental intentions articulated in decision-making in innovation processes, in 
order to set out an understanding of the topic that avoids reification and asymmetry, 
and is useful analytically and for policy.
There is also a more personal background to the topic of this thesis. Before starting 
out on this research project, I already had an interest in environmental innovations, as 
a way of combining my interests in environmental and technological issues. As part 
of my previous work in Sweden, I had done a study of environmental innovation 
literature and noticed that there was something strange about how the concept 
‘environmental innovation’ was defined in terms of either environmental intentions 
or environmental outcomes (Markusson and Olofsdotter 2001:14-15). It seemed to 
me that environmental intentions and outcomes need not coincide, and that the 
concept was therefore ambiguous.
9 We shall discuss these claims in more detail and back them up in chapter 2.
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When looking for a PhD position I encountered the Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) approach at Edinburgh University, and it seemed to offer a good way of 
understanding technology and innovation, which also chimed with my general 
political, conflictual view of society. When later reading the literature on 
environmental innovations, it became obvious that a large part of it was done by 
researchers with quite different commitments from those prevalent in STS, and the 
project came to be in part about how to understand this difference.
During the course of planning the research a choice also had to be made whether to 
focus on the organisational level or the meso-level of technological 
systems/industrial sectors. Either avenue could quite possibly have proved fruitful in 
probing the issue of intentions and outcomes, and the choice of focussing on the 
organisational level was made based on a (more or less accurate) idea of wanting to 
study the ‘reality’ of the micro setting. Here I could study people – and not just 
organisational actors – with their knowledge, roles and interests. A political approach 
to studying organisations appeared to both match my interests, and to offer promising 
avenues of research on this topic.
At this more personal level this thesis is therefore also about bringing STS and 
organisational politics literature to bear on an area of research dominated by 
environmental management literature.
1.2.2 Research questions
It follows from the discussion above about the aim of this thesis that we do not know 
enough about how environmental intentions shape technology and environmental 
outcomes in innovation processes. Since we intend to focus on comparing cleaner 
technology with BAU innovations, we are especially interested in ‘core’ rather than 
end-of-pipe technology. Our first research question is therefore:
1. What is the impact of environmental intentions on the technological outcomes,  
especially on core technologies?
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We also saw that we need to unpack the innovation process and study how 
environmental intentions are articulated and how they impact on the decisions made 
as part of the innovation process in firm organisations. Little existing research in the 
area of organisation and environmental innovation has been done from the 
perspective of organisational politics, which is a likely explanation for some of the 
gaps in our knowledge. The main gaps identified (as discussed in more detail in 
chapter 2) are:
• Relatively little is known about the roles and contributions of engineers and 
environmental staff in this context, and about the relationship between these two 
actor categories.
• There is also a lack of knowledge about how environmental intentions fit with 
other strategies and motives behind technological change in firms, and in more 
concrete terms how environmental intentions fit with the interests and agendas 
of the actors in the firm.
• Finally, not enough is known about structural limits to the integration of 
environmental concerns into firm organisations, and how such structures can be 
changed.
We thus need to know more about how decisions are made in innovation processes. 
We need to know why any firm actor would promote environmental concerns and 
under what circumstances environmental concerns are successfully promoted in this 
context. Our second research question is therefore:
2. How do any environmental concerns that firm actors may have affect the 
decisions made in innovation processes?
And, relatedly, we need to understand the organisational context in which the 
promotion of environmental concerns in innovation work may happen. This raises 
questions about how the organisational structures affect decision-making. Especially 
if these structures limit the opportunities for successful environmental promotion 
then we need to know why that is so and when and how these limits can be shifted. 
The final research question is therefore:
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3. What are the structurally determined organisational limits and opportunities to 
the integration of environmental concerns into firm innovation processes? 
1.2.3 Methodology
Having set out the research questions, we need to develop a methodology that will 
enable us to answer these questions. The methodology will be introduced in this 
sub-section (and more thoroughly in chapter 4). First we discuss why a cases study 
approach was chosen. Thereafter data collection is presented, and, lastly, the 
analysis.
This research is – at a general level – about making peoples’ everyday experiences 
accessible to academic reflection, about providing concepts and categorisations that 
reflect people’s lives, but that also form a systematic framework capable of 
generalisation. The wish to gain access to people’s own understandings of their 
situation and to analyse this within a complex setting calls for a case study approach 
capable of dealing with the required richness of data (Yin 1994:13).
This thesis sets out to understand the decisions made as part of innovation processes, 
and their background in the interests of the actors, given the context of the firm 
organisation and the wider societal context. The unit of analysis was thus chosen to 
be the technological choices made relating to an investment project.
Analytical leverage was sought from a comparative perspective. Deliberately 
contrasting case selection may shed light on the influence of the differing 
characteristics of the cases (‘theoretical replication’, Yin 1994:48). Cases were 
selected in different industries as well as in different countries. The chemicals 
industry was chosen for its obvious relevance to environmental issues, but also for its 
relatively long history of exposure to environmental regulation, and supposed 
well-developed capabilities of responding to regulation. As a contrasting case the 
dairy sector was chosen, with its typically less harmful waste streams and weaker 
exposure to regulation. By delimiting the study to process industries comparability 
between sectors is enhanced. Cases were also drawn from Scotland and Sweden. It 
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was hoped that differences in regulatory regimes as well as in general public 
commitment to environmental improvement would enable useful comparisons. 
We have consciously avoided studying only ‘best practice’ cases, to avoid an 
asymmetrical analysis. Both cases where environmental motives were central and 
more peripheral (as claimed by the initial contacts in the firm) were selected. This 
was also thought to help against reification of environmental intentions, in that we 
thus avoid presupposing that environmental innovation is a distinct and separate 
category of innovation, and instead study the role of environmental intentions in 
cases with varying degrees of environmental ambition and outcomes. The cases 
selected were mainly focussed on core technology, but also included to a smaller 
degree end-of-pipe technology.
Data was collected primarily through semi-structured interviews, suitable for the 
complex and contextualised nature of the topic (May 1993:93). Most interviews were 
performed visiting the companies in question, although a minority of interviews were 
done via telephone. All interviews were transcribed and sent to the interviewees for 
comment.
The main categories of interviewees are managers, engineers and environmental staff 
in the companies that had a role in the investment projects. To find as many of these 
three categories of interviewees as possible in each case, small companies were 
avoided. Small investment projects with few employees participating were also 
avoided for the same reason.
Apart from these interviewees, all cases apart from one also include consultants and/
or suppliers doing work that would otherwise have been done by firm employees. 
Consultant and supplier staff were also interviewed when appropriate. Lastly, 
interviews were made with staff in regulatory agencies to gain a potentially different 
viewpoint from the one of the firm regarding the environmental aspects of the 
investment projects.
The major interview themes were: the projects, the choices made, the actors 
involved, the internal organisational context and the external context of the 
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companies. Efforts were made to elicit information both on the period of the project 
and the history of the organisations and the individuals before that.
The cases were written up as case stories (Yin 1994:104), focussing on the decisions 
made and the roles of the actors in the innovation process. An important part of the 
analysis is comparing the cases. Clear differences were for example found between 
the chemicals and the dairy cases. But the cases also have strong similarities, and 
some of the analysis is made across the cases.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
In the next chapter we shall review the existing literature on environmental 
innovations. The chapter starts off with a discussion of the role of regulation and 
other drivers of environmental innovation. It is possible to distinguish between 
environmental innovation literature that deals with firm organisation and literature on 
firms as wholes. The latter stream of literature is first reviewed and some problems 
with this literature are outlined. Thereafter, the literature on environmental 
innovation and firm organisation is reviewed.
Chapter 3 sets out the theoretical framework of the thesis. In its first section a 
political approach to firm organisation is introduced, and contrasted with a 
managerial perspective. Special attention is given to the interests and expertise of 
firm actors. In the second section the political perspective is applied to the area of 
environmental process innovation. After first discussing different perspectives on the 
innovation process, this section is organised around the themes of environmental 
promotion (action) and the company social constitution (structure). Throughout the 
notion of integration of environmental motives into innovation processes is 
elaborated. Thereafter, in chapter 4, the methodology of the thesis is set out, as more 
briefly described above.
Chapter 5 gives a background to the case studies in terms of the two country settings: 
Scotland and Sweden, with special attention given to environmental attitudes, 
regulatory regimes and occupational formation regimes. Also, the chapter introduces 
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the two sectoral settings: the chemical industry and the dairy industry. The sectoral 
settings are described in terms of markets, technology and environmental aspects. 
The main empirical foundation of the thesis is presented in chapters 6 and 7, with the 
four case studies of the environmental aspects of investment projects in four firms. 
Two case studies are of chemicals firms and two of dairy firms. One case study in 
each sector is in Sweden and one in Scotland.
In chapter 8 the data is analysed. The first section deals with the relationship between 
environmental staff and engineers, and the formers’ roles in the company and its 
innovation processes. Thereafter follows a section on environmental champions, 
based on analysis of careers and championing events. The third section discusses the 
relationship between environmental intentions and technological outcomes, with a 
focus on core technology, but also – to a lesser extent – end-of-pipe technology.
Finally, in chapter 9 the findings are summarised before setting out the main 
theoretical contributions of the thesis. Furthermore, some implications for practice 
are presented. This chapter also discusses some methodological implication and 
limitations to this thesis, and presents some ideas for further research.
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2 The organisation of environmental innovations
As suggested in chapter 1 there are problems in the existing literature on 
environmental innovations, and especially when it comes to the notion of ‘cleaner 
technology’. We there concluded that we need to compare cleaner technology with 
other core technology innovations, and unpack the innovation process to study how 
environmental intentions are articulated in the decisions made as part of it. We shall 
here discuss these issues in more depth. 
The chapter starts with a discussion of literature on environmental innovations that 
conceptualises the firm as a whole. We shall address the theme of environmental 
regulation versus voluntary firm action, and based on this problematise the concept 
of ‘cleaner technology’. Thereafter follows a discussion of problems in the literature 
on environmental innovation, as seen from an STS (Science and Technology Studies) 
perspective. Building on the discussion of these problems and a review of the 
literature on environmental innovation and firm organisation, we shall – finally – 
draw conclusions regarding what knowledge gaps there are.
2.1 What are environmental innovations?
An important goal of this thesis is to understand the role of environmental motives in 
innovation processes. We shall in this section first discuss the impact of 
environmental regulation as a driver motivating environmental improvement through 
innovation, and contrast this with the idea of voluntary (that is not compliance 
driven) innovation. This will serve as an introduction to a discussion of the concepts 
of ‘environmental innovation’ and ‘cleaner technology’ and what motivates firms to 
undertake such innovation.
2.1.1 Environmental regulation, the firm and voluntary action
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, end-of-pipe technology as a response of 
firms to environmental regulation has been discredited, and increasingly hope has 
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instead been set to cleaner technology solutions. The economic effects of 
environmental regulation on firms have also been debated, not least in terms of the 
effects on firm profitability and, by extension, on economic growth and employment 
levels. Porter and van der Linde (1995) challenged the existing consensus among 
economists that environmental regulation increases costs for firms and thus reduces 
their competitiveness, and instead proposed that regulations induce firms to 
undertake environmental innovations that may increase their competitiveness. 
Underlying this debate are differing views of the role of technology in business. 
Porter10 draws on business studies (and evolutionary economics) with its 
understanding of innovation and technological differentiation as a strategy to create 
competitive advantage, as compared to the mainstream view in (neoclassical) 
economics where technology is available to all and firm competitiveness is built on 
efficiency and reduced costs. 
By extension this debate is also about the possibility for environmental 
improvements by regulation. It may be argued that if firms are commercially 
hampered by heavy-handed environmental regulation they may lose out in 
competition, and ultimately go bankrupt, in which case an improved environmental 
performance will not help. In contrast, Porter claims that regulation can both improve 
environmental performance and lead to more competitive firms, a so-called win-win 
solution.
We can ignore the discussions on conceptual and statistical problems in the 
unresolved debate in economics (see for example Palmer et al., 1995) regarding 
Porter’s arguments, but it is worth noting that his ideas are part of a broader 
statement that better environmental and economical performance can be mutually 
reinforcing and should be simultaneously achieved. That is, Porter’s ideas mirror 
ecological modernisation theory.
Some authors have taken the win-win idea one step further, stressing the voluntary 
action of firms undertaking environmental innovations. A weak version of this 
argument is that some firms will innovate in advance of expected new regulation to 
10 The debate is commonly referred to as the Porter debate. I will follow this convention, in spite of 
the contributions of, for example, van der Linde.
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capture first-mover advantages – so called proactive compliance (Aragón-Correa 
1998; Marshall et al. 2005).
A stronger version of the argument does away with regulation altogether: if there is a 
business case of environmental improvements offering economic benefits, then 
environmental innovations will be undertaken regardless of any regulation (Meredith 
and Wolters 1994:25).11 The original position of, for example, Porter – that while 
environmental innovations do entail costs, they can sometimes also make business 
sense – has here been virtually inverted. It is not only the case that environmental 
innovations can sometimes make economic sense, but, it is claimed, they generally 
do offer larger economic benefits than costs.
These arguments refer primarily to cleaner technology. There are even some 
definitions of cleaner technology that include business opportunities as part of what 
constitutes cleaner technology (McMeekin and Green, 1994).
There is plenty of evidence on which to base a discussion of these matters. 
Survey-based studies of stakeholders and of the motivations behind environmental 
innovations provide important sources here. These studies have shown that regulators 
are not the only important actor driving environmental improvements, and that 
market conditions may drive environmental innovations as well as regulation 
(Madsen and Ulhøi, 2001; Polonsky and Ottman, 1998). A longitudinal study by 
Heidenmark suggests that regulation used to be the main reason for environmental 
improvements, but that that is no longer the case (Heidenmark, 1999:32). 
The evidence tends to confirm that regulation still matters, but that there are also 
other important driving forces. The claim that regulation does not matter at all any 
more is not confirmed by the survey data. It is also worth noticing that there is a 
11 Note that there are two interpretations of what the win-win argument actually says. One of the 
‘wins’ is about economic benefits (profits, cost savings, etc.), but the other ‘win’ is either regulatory 
compliance or environmental improvements. The strong version of the voluntary action argument 
stresses environmental improvements irrespective of compliance with regulation, whereas the weak 
version of the argument refers to compliance rather than environmental improvements per se.
Meredith and Wolters start off investigating proactivity, but discover a dynamic that goes 
beyond proactivity, with market forces controlling the modernisation process, and governments 
playing only an initiating role. The authors make explicit reference to ecological modernisation 
theory.
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difference between environmental process and product innovations: the latter are 
typically driven more by market dynamics and less by regulation than the former 
(Green et al., 1994).
There is a methodological problem with these studies in that they distinguish 
between regulation and markets drivers as seen from the viewpoint of the individual 
firm. It may be that one would get a different picture looking at sectors at a system 
level. If, for example, a supplier meets environmental demands from a customer 
company, this may in turn be due to regulatory demands on the customer firm. This 
type of dynamics may not be visible from the perspective of the supplier answering a 
survey. The effect of regulation in creating demand may thus be underestimated. 
This shows that disentangling markets from regulation may be difficult (see Emtairah 
et al., 2002, for an interesting effort to study the creation of markets for goods with 
an environmental profile). There are of course cases where consumers or other 
buyers take the environment into account without being prompted by regulation, but 
for many products this is not the case. The point here is that we should remain 
sceptical of these studies as evidence of an increasing market dynamic supporting 
environmental innovation that is independent of regulation. This argument is 
supported by Green et al. (1994), who found a correlation between regulation and 
market factors, and by Foster and Green (2000), who saw that regulation was an 
important driver of customer demands.
Another problem with the win-win argument is that if environmental innovations 
offer these economic advantages to firms, then why do we not see more of them? 
There have, certainly, been improvements over the last 30 years in terms of reduced 
pollution from firms, and yet it still is a substantial problem (Richards et al. 
204:389), and surveys appear to show that many firms do not engage in 
environmental innovation (see SCB 2000 for the case of Sweden).
The win-win argument does not require firms to adopt wholeheartedly an ecological 
rationality; it is enough that they respond to regulation. Responding to regulation 
requires attention to environmental aspects of production, and is in this sense a 
source of ecological rationality. (The strong, voluntarist version of the win-win 
argument does, however, suppose that this happens spontaneously.) And conscious 
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efforts to improve environmental improvement may – as we shall see in the next 
section – help firms to spot win-win situations and opportunities for cleaner 
technology.
2.1.2 Conflating intentions and outcomes
The background of the concept of ‘environmental innovation’ in environmental 
policy, as described in chapter 1, reflects a desire to see firms doing something 
differently to what they would otherwise have done. That is, it highlights the 
intention12 to achieve environmental improvements. The concept of environmental 
innovations also relates, however, to the outcome of environmental innovations in 
terms of the handling of pollution and waste, the prevention of pollution and waste 
etc.
This distinction matters because motives other than environmental ones may drive 
investments in cleaner technology. In particular, resource efficiency is an important 
driver for cleaner technology (Malaman 1995:2). Inefficiencies are costly and 
resource efficiency is an important goal in itself for many firms. It may be the case 
that no one in the firm thought about the environmental gains following from 
resource efficiency improvements (Clayton et al. 1999:268). The environmental 
improvements may thus be unintentional and unrecognised side effects of increased 
resource efficiency.
There is thus an ambiguity in the concept of environmental innovation between 
intentions to improve environmental performance, and the outcomes of innovation. 
Many researchers of environmental innovation have neglected this; the definitions 
given vary, but not in explicit recognition of this ambiguity. It is often impossible to 
tell which of these two bases the definition is meant to rest on, and sometimes an 
assumption is made that intentions and outcomes coincide. For example Murphy and 
Gouldson (2000:36) define cleaner technology as “general processes or products  
12 ‘Environmental intention’ here refers to conscious efforts to improve environmental performance 
irrespective of why the firm wants to do this. A dominant cause is, as we have seen, regulatory 
compliance, but the term does not exclude other possibilities, like market demands, or even any 
ethical twitches.
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which fulfil a non-environmental objective as their primary purpose but which 
integrate environmental considerations into their design to avoid or reduce their  
impact on the environment”. This can be compared to the definition given by del Río 
González: “changes in production processes that reduce the quantity of wastes and 
pollutants generated in the production process or during the whole life cycle of the 
product” (2005:22), which appears to be outcome-orientated.
Sometimes the lack of attention to this distinction causes problems. Del Río 
González also defines environmental technology as “any technology that drastically  
reduces environmental problems and that has been adopted mainly for that  
reason” (ibid.:29), which refers to both intentions and outcomes. Having thus stated 
that environmental motives are the main motives behind environmental technology 
adoption (per definition) the author goes on to say that economic motives played a 
very limited role (ibid.:30). This would have been a simple case of circular reasoning 
had it not been for the fact that the author also states that economic motives are 
important for cleaner technology adoption (ibid.:30). This confusion is based on a 
lack of clarity as to what the relation is between intentions and outcomes, and how 
innovations were chosen for this study.
Failure to appreciate the distinction between intentions and outcomes can have 
serious implications for the way that studies on environmental innovations are 
carried out. For example, Hilliard (2001:22) has claimed, in a study of how 
organisational capabilities of pharmaceutical firms relate to their environmental 
innovations, that there is no correlation between a firm’s process development 
capability and its propensity to undertake cleaner technology (as opposed to 
end-of-pipe) projects. This result is counter-intuitive and goes against the findings of 
other authors (Clayton et al. 1999:251). 
However, the study by Hilliard is based on data reported to the Irish Environmental 
Protection Agency, and it is likely – but not made explicit – that what is reported 
here as cleaner technology projects excludes projects where environmental concerns 
were not central to the innovation. Effectively then the innovations studied are 
delimited by intention (as well as outcome). This is in line with the aim of the study 
which was to analyse the impact of regulation, and the definition of cleaner 
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technology given is “approaches to manufacturing that minimise the generation of  
harmful waste and maximise the efficiency of energy use and material use” (ibid.:4), 
which appears to include intentions as well as outcomes.
Hilliard argues that her finding shows that in general process development and 
environmental management are not connected (ibid.:23). And whilst this may well be 
true, it is still unlikely that process development capabilities are irrelevant for the 
uptake of cleaner technology. Questions arise about exactly what projects were 
reported to the Environmental Agency, and what the results of the study would have 
been has its scope been set differently.
These examples illustrate why it is important to be explicit about whether we are 
talking of environmental intentions or environmental outcomes when studying 
environmental innovations, that is, how we define the concept. We should avoid 
conflating environmental intentions and environmental outcomes, and instead 
analyse them as separate phenomena.
The examples also show that definition by intention or outcomes matters for what 
innovations we should choose for study. If we are primarily interested in the role of 
environmental intentions we may want to select environmental innovations as 
defined by intention, but then we shall miss those innovations that are driven 
predominantly by other, for example resource efficiency, motives. If, in contrast, we 
are interested in all sources of environmental improvement, then we need to study all 
innovations that improve environmental performance, irrespective of intentions.
2.1.3 Cleaner technology as reification
The distinction between intentions and outcomes plays out somewhat differently 
between end-of-pipe and cleaner technology. We shall here discuss these two types 
of environmental innovation, and criticise a tendency to reify cleaner technology, 
that is, to assume that environmental properties are inherent in cleaner technologies.
Cleaner technology can, as we saw in chapter 1, be defined as changes to production 
processes so as to avoid the production of pollution and waste. It may also be defined 
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to include for example input substitution. The common factor among different 
definitions is the avoidance of pollution production, as compared to collection and 
treatment with end-of-pipe technologies.13
It is thus often assumed that there are two main categories of technology available 
for environmental process innovations: end-of-pipe and cleaner technology. Cleaner 
technology is often thought of as an alternative to end-of-pipe technology, but the 
concepts are in a sense quite different. Whereas end-of-pipe technologies are to a 
large degree a discernible set of technologies: filters, treatment plants, etc., cleaner 
technology is a relative concept. Any technology used in a production process could 
in principle be labelled cleaner depending on what alternative it is compared to. For 
example, a new production control system may improve environmental performance 
as compared to a previous system by reducing the waste produced (per unit product), 
and so deserve the label cleaner technology (as defined by outcome). Its ‘clean-ness’ 
thus lies in a comparison with the environmental performance of another technology, 
and this property needs to be judged for each particular innovation case.
It is however not quite clear what technology to compare with. Malaman proposes 
that cleaner means cleaner than “the dominant technologies in the period under 
consideration” (1995:1), which implies a general, or perhaps a sector level, 
comparison. But he also defines cleaner technologies as “all the modifications in  
processes and products which reduce impact on the environment, as compared to the 
products and processes which they have substituted” (ibid.:2), which appears to be a 
more situated definition, suggesting that the comparison is to be made at the firm 
level.
In practice some technologies are more likely than others to offer opportunities for 
environmental improvements for a particular type of production process at a 
particular point in time. For example, Cesaroni and Arduini (2001:10) list what they 
perceive to be current cleaner technological trends in the chemicals industry (see 
table 2.1). It is however unclear how the authors have identified these technologies, 
13 It is also worth noting that there is a grey zone between cleaner technology and end-of-pipe in the 
case of recycling, where a waste product is linked back into the production process to become a useful 
input.
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and it seems unlikely, for example, that all biological processes always produce less 
pollution than all non-biological alternatives. 
Table 2.1  Cleaner technology trends in the chemicals industry
Application Technology
Plants Continuous reactors, low temperature separation 
processes, continuous fluid bed processes, safety 
systems: e.g. control procedures
Chemicals High-selectivity reactions, reactions producing 
recycling by-products, biological processes
Source: Cesaroni and Arduini (2001:10)
It appears problematic to identify and list cleaner technologies. The same authors 
discovered that they could readily identify patents of end-of-pipe technologies, but 
not of cleaner technologies (ibid.:48). They also noticed that they could identify 
suppliers of end-of-pipe technologies, but not of cleaner technologies (ibid.:63). This 
illustrates the difficulty of identifying cleaner technologies out of the context of the 
particular innovating firm.
This difficulty is connected to our discussion of intentions and outcomes. There is a 
sense in which end-of-pipe technologies embody environmental intentions in a way 
that cleaner technologies do not. End-of-pipe technologies typically do not offer the 
adopting firms any economic advantages, and whilst Clayton et al. have shown that 
regulatory compliance is not the only motive for their adoption (1999:251), it seems 
very unlikely that they would be considered without any reference to environmental 
performance. By contrast, as we have seen, cleaner technologies may well be 
adopted without considering their contribution to environmental performance.14 
End-of-pipe technologies are therefore likelier to be patented and sold as offering 
environmental benefits.
14 Clayton et al. found an example of the impetus for the introduction of a particular cleaner 
technology being environmental motives in one company and economic motives in another 
(1999:268). 
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End-of-pipe technology can therefore reasonably be described as a universal class of 
technology with an environmental function, whereas the clean-ness of cleaner 
technology is more clearly a situated property in a particular adoption context. 
This is neither to say that any particular end-of-pipe technology is always the best 
environmental option in a given situation, nor that end-of-pipe technologies will 
always work. Their clean-ness also needs to be constructed in a particular setting, but 
they seem always to come packaged with an idea of clean-ness.15 In contrast, to talk 
of cleaner technology as a class of technology is to impute this environmental 
property where there may be none.
The clean-ness of cleaner technology is thus not built into particular technologies in 
the same way as the clean-ness of end-of-pipe technologies. Spinardi et al. (1998:3) 
have pointed to this difficulty of packaging cleaner technologies into easily adaptable 
and transferable black boxes. Relatedly, Cesaroni and Arduini note that cleaner 
technology is difficult to standardise into specialised products provided by a 
specialised sector (2001:66). 
End-of-pipe technology is in this way a successful reification of environmental 
intentions, whereas cleaner technology is more difficult to ‘blackbox’ (Scarbrough 
1995:1006). Cleaner technology is therefore a somewhat misleading concept. It 
would perhaps be better to talk of ‘cleaner innovation’ than ‘cleaner technology’ to 
stress that it is a situated activity rather than a universal class of technology,16 and see 
core technology rather than cleaner technology as the opposite to end-of-pipe 
technology.
This still leaves us, however, with the issue of definition by intention or outcome. 
We need also to distinguish between ‘intentional cleaner innovation’ and 
‘unintentional cleaner innovation’ (both of which may draw on the same 
technology). This distinction is unnecessary for end-of-pipe innovation.
15 Relatedly, core technology investments will normally be subjected to a pay-back evaluation, 
whereas end-of-pipe technology as a response to regulation may avoid being given such explicit 
economic valuation and instead be seen as a stay-in-business investments (Clayton et al. 1999:255).
16 This also makes the concept more similar to alternatives like ‘cleaner production’ or ‘pollution 
prevention’.
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We can now return to the issue raised in chapter 1 of whether cleaner technology is 
newer than end-of-pipe technology. Often cleaner technology means cleaner than the 
technology it replaces (Malaman 1995:2). Malaman here refers to the firm level, but 
it would appear to be valid also on a higher level, say a sector.17 This means that as 
more efficient technologies are developed for a particular type of production 
(whether motivated by environmental concerns or not) they can be labelled cleaner 
technology. In this sense cleaner technologies are likely to be comparatively new. 
But it also means that what is called clean technology today may not be called that 
tomorrow.
Murphy and Gouldson claim (with reference to the OECD, DTI, etc.) that cleaner 
technology adoption has been hampered by end-of-pipe technologies being older and 
having benefited more from scale and learning effects. “In many instances, clean 
technologies have yet to benefit from a similar process because they have been less 
widely adopted” (2000:36). But this appears to be a dubious explanation. As the 
relatively new cleaner technologies are developed further drawing on experiences 
from their adoption, they may well be overtaken by newer technologies and so lose 
their status of being cleaner, rather than becoming more competitive vis-à-vis 
end-of-pipe technologies. The view of the development of cleaner technologies of 
Murphy and Gouldson is based on the mistake of seeing cleaner technology as a 
universal class of technology in the same sense that end-of-pipe technology is. 
Murphy and Gouldson are in a sense right that cleaner technologies are generally 
new, but for the wrong reasons. Cleaner technologies tend to be new technologies, 
since they lose that status when even cleaner technologies are developed, not because 
they are a newly developed and unproven special class of technology. Moreover, 
end-of-pipe technology is not static. New such technologies are also developed, 
adding to or replacing the already existing ones. It may be that on average, cleaner 
technologies are newer than end-of-pipe ones, but this obscures large variation.
17 Indeed, it may be that ‘cleaner technology’ makes more sense on a sector level than on the firm 
level. It seems likely that particular technologies will offer firms more opportunities for win-win 
solutions than other technologies as compared to the technologies typically used in the sector at a 
particular point in time. ‘Clean-ness’ here becomes a ‘statistical’ property. Individual firms may adopt 
such technologies for different reasons that may or may not include environmental improvement. It is, 
as we have seen, difficult to blackbox cleaner technologies.
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From this line of argument it also follows that there have always been cleaner 
technologies, in the sense of technologies that were more resource efficient than what 
came before. Cleaner technology is in this sense not a new thing, and probably rather 
older than end-of-pipe technology. What is likely to be new is intentional search for 
cleaner technological solutions, that is, intentional cleaner innovation,18 and the very 
idea that this is possible.
2.1.4 The role of environmental intentions
We have seen that the distinction between environmental intentions and 
environmental outcomes matters when studying environmental innovation, and in 
particular cleaner innovation. We have also seen that other motives than 
environmental ones, not least resource efficiency, may motivate firms to undertake 
cleaner innovation. Environmental motives may even be absent as in the case of 
unintentional cleaner innovation (see diagram 1 in figure 2.1).
The question then arises what the role of environmental motives is when there are 
also other motives for technological changes that improve environmental 
performance. What is the relationship between the different motives?
18 And intentional cleaner innovation is probably somewhat newer than ‘end-of-pipe innovation’.
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Figure 2.1  Cases of cleaner technology innovation19
Note: ‘RE’=resource efficiency, ‘EI’=environmental improvement, ‘CT=Cleaner technology.
Clayton et al. (1999) have shown that intentional efforts to improve environmental 
performance may uncover resource efficiency opportunities hitherto unnoticed. 
Scrutinising existing operations from an environmental perspective may generate 
new knowledge about them, thus revealing new opportunities to improve resource 
efficiency. The authors describe this as an ‘information inductance’ effect where new 
evaluation criteria generate new knowledge which in turn may lead to the 
identification of new opportunities (ibid.:248). This is schematically depicted in 
diagram 2 in figure 2.1 as environmental motives generating resource efficiency 
motives, both of which subsequently support a proposed innovation.
19 Reality is likely to be less linear than what these figures imply. We will return to that issue in the 
The diagram is also a simplification in that it excludes other motives than resource efficiency 
and environmental improvement. The overall argument is however not dependent on whether we 
include more motives, as long as it is recognised that there may be other motives behind 

































Such induction may work especially in sectors where there are relatively weak 
drivers to resource efficiency. What, then, about cases where there are stronger 
resource efficiency drivers? Can environmental motives add something to the brew 
then? 
Clayton et al. further state that it is hard to distinguish cleaner technology from what 
is otherwise considered good process technology when resource efficiency is already 
strongly institutionalised as a motive for innovations (1999:241). This shows, again, 
that cleaner technology is a matter of whether the label of clean-ness gets attached to 
a technology or not in the process of innovation, rather than clean-ness being 
inherent in the technology.
However, Clayton et al. (1999:219) also state that environmental motives may 
reinforce the search for cleaner technology solutions (see diagram 3 in figure 2.1), 
unless hampered by occupational and organisational barriers between process 
engineering and environmental functions (ibid.:244), also in the case of strong 
resource efficiency drivers. But if there is little difference between 
resource-efficiency driven innovation and intentional cleaner technology, there 
seems to be little scope for environmental motives to add anything.
This discussion leaves us with the question:
- What is the scope for intentional cleaner technology, especially in the presence of 
strong drivers for resource efficiency? 
To address this question, we need to know more about how environmental intentions 
interact with, and add something to, other intentions. We need to look in more detail 
at the articulation of different motives in the innovation process, and how they are 
made to bear upon the technological choices made.
In a sense this discussion is about the boundary between environmental innovation 
and other innovations, and as we have seen above it might for example be difficult to 
tell what is cleaner technology and what is not. An important aspect of this research 
project is to explore this boundary, and to seek to clarify the concepts of 
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‘environmental innovation’ and ‘cleaner technology’. Another question follows from 
this discussion.
- Is ‘cleaner technology’ a useful analytical concept? Or is ‘intentional cleaner 
innovation’ perhaps a more useful concept?
We shall return to, and refine, the questions raised here at the end of this chapter.
2.2 Problems regarding environmental innovation and the firm
We have in this chapter discussed the role of different motives – including regulatory 
pressure and resource efficiency – for environmental improvement in innovation 
processes. We have also addressed the concept of ‘cleaner technology’ and further 
problematised the relationship between intentions and environmental/technological 
outcomes.
For the discussion of cleaner technology we drew extensively on the interdisciplinary 
study by Clayton et al. (1999). The wider literature on environmental innovations 
includes contributions from many fields including economics and politics, but is 
dominated by management and business studies (what could broadly be labelled 
‘environmental management’).
As mentioned above, an aim of this study is to engage with the environmental 
management literature and bring Science and Technology Studies (STS) to bear upon 
it. This disciplinary distinction matters in at least two ways. Firstly, and most 
obviously, STS can contribute a richer understanding of what technology is, and of 
the relationship between technology and organisation. The environmental 
management literature sometimes operates with too simplistic a conceptualisation of 
these issues. (The same applies to some of the other literature in the area from the 
fields of economics and politics.) We saw examples of this in the previous section.
Secondly, STS as a field in the social sciences is based on an interpretivist 
epistemology as compared to environmental management, which is dominated by a 
more positivist outlook. The discussion to follow will reflect the difference between 
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positivist and interpretivist epistemologies, and to a degree be a rehearsal of 
arguments about these that have been made many times before in the social sciences. 
STS also enables a politically critical commitment that is rather different from the 
managerial perspective20 of much environmental management literature.
We have identified two common problems in the literature on environmental 
innovation that reflect these disciplinary differences. The first problem is that of 
environmental management determinism, that is, an assumption that firm 
environmental performance will necessarily get better in the future. The second 
problem is a view of the firm as a rational actor who is able to implement 
management intentions straightforwardly into action. In the following sections we 
shall discuss these problems in more detail.
2.2.1 Environmental management determinism
There are many studies of so-called ‘best practice’21 in the area of environmental 
innovations: case studies of companies having excelled in improving their 
environmental performance, often in ways that are also commercially successful. The 
cases are thus intentionally selected (for example by studying firms that have won 
prizes for their environmental initiatives, or who take part in high-profile government 
programmes) with a bias towards firms with comparatively good environmental 
performance, and towards commercially successful environmental innovations. 
Based on this data the authors often assume that these practices are indicative of 
general business practices in the near future (see for example Zwetsloot, 1995:64 and 
Handfield et al. 2001:189). We propose to call this assumption ‘environmental 
management determinism’.
This intentional bias is, more or less explicitly, motivated by a wish to promote good 
environmental practice, and to show that – in line with Porter – environmental 
improvements can increase firm competitiveness. And whilst this may be a laudable 
20 That is the assumptions that management alone manage firms, and that management is a narrowly 
rational activity. We shall discuss this more later.
21 Alternatively, entire companies are presented as actors doing best practice. These companies are 
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intention, there is a problem in terms of generalising the business case of 
environmental innovations based on these asymmetrical studies. 
The underlying assumption is that other, less ‘progressive’ practices will recede, 
although these other practices are not explicitly studied. The studies tend to focus on 
explicitly environmental firm practices, to study the firm through a ‘green lens’. 
Rarely do they look at the environmental initiatives in the context of other practices 
in the case firms, perhaps with worse environmental consequences. (In terms of the 
Porter debate, the win-win cases are not compared to or contextualised with win-lose 
cases.)
This intentional bias contributes to the notion that environmental innovations are an 
easily distinguishable, separate category of practices, and underplays any 
interdependence between environmental innovations and other, less environmentally 
beneficial practices and any grey zone between the two. Especially in the case of 
cleaner technology this is problematic. As we have discussed above it is not always 
easy to distinguish between cleaner technology innovations and other innovations. 
Studies of best practice innovations ignore this boundary problem, and thus reinforce 
the impression of cleaner technology as straightforwardly embodying environmental 
intentions. Environmental management determinism thus tends to lead to reification 
of cleaner technology.
Sometimes the environmental management determinist assumption is formalised into 
stage models of firms’ environmental work. A common terminology is to talk of 
firms as laggards, compliers and pro-active firms (Noci and Verganti 1999:5; Sroufe 
et al. 2000:271; Richards et al., 2004).22 The basic distinction here is the way the 
firm behaves in terms of compliance with regulation: ignoring it, complying with it, 
or taking voluntary action ahead of or independently of regulation.
There is merit to these models in that they do distinguish between different 
behaviours among firms, and in a context of ever more stringent regulation it is likely 
that some (especially large) firms have moved away from the laggard stage to at least 
compliance. However, there may also be assumptions made about the business case 
22 The exact terminology varies, as does the number of stages, but the basic idea is the same.
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of environmental initiatives, and that it is in every firm’s best interests, always, to 
move up the scale of the models towards a pro-active position – not because new, 
stricter regulations may be expected, but because this is soon going to be the normal 
way to do business and to be competitive. This linear progression is contradicted by 
Vickers (2000), who has shown that firms may well ‘regress’ from pro-active 
activities to less pro-active ones.
Another problem is that firm practices may well encompass behaviours at several 
‘stages’ simultaneously (Schaefer and Harvey 1998:116). Stage studies tend to give 
an aggregated picture of firm activities that smoothes out or erases differing and even 
contradicting practices. Evidence of ‘good practice’ may not be a reliable indicator of 
what else goes on in a company. Similarly firms may well be moving both up and 
down the model simultaneously, so statements about trends need to be treated with 
caution. Again, this highlights the need to study environmental innovations in the 
context of other activities in the firm, so as to avoid generalising from instances of 
win-win situations.
2.2.2 The rational, manageable firm
A problem with treating firms as wholes is that it easily leads to a view of firms as 
manageable and rational. Often data is collected from managers thought to represent 
the entire firm (see for example Pujari 2006).23 But any actor is likely to exaggerate 
their rationality, and it is also in the self-interest of managers (and a part of their 
self-image) to believe that they are managing the organisation. And whilst this is of 
course not altogether wrong, it may lead to an overly rational and manageable view 
of organisational life. That is, when management has decided something that is then 
straightforwardly implemented. Outcomes are seen as direct, automatic results of the 
decisions made, and there is no organisational dynamic that might influence and 
re-shape the implementation of management decisions, or even produce other 
decisions. 
23 We will return to the theme of the rational firm throughout the next section. There we will also give 
more examples to back up the claim that this is a common feature of the literature on environmental 
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This underestimates the complexities of organisational processes and the 
uncertainties this creates for anyone trying to manage them. Different actors in the 
firm will have their own agendas and try to influence the outcomes. For example, 
Clayton et al. (1999:250) have described a case where a decision to invest in 
end-of-pipe technology blocked cleaner technology solutions and thus hindered 
potentially larger economic (and perhaps environmental) gains. It was in this case an 
Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS) unit with competence in end-of-pipe 
technology that managed to control the investment, and this locked in the end-of-pipe 
solution.
This example highlights the fact that organisations may produce unintended (by 
management and sometimes perhaps by anyone) outcomes. Companies as a whole 
and the actors in them are characterised by their bounded rationality (Simon 1982). 
Furthermore, we see that environmental innovations need to be seen not only in their 
technological context, but also in an organisational context. That environmental 
motives interact with other motives, as mentioned previously, can now be seen to be 
also about the politics of actors in the firm with their different agendas. An important 
point to make here is that strategic level actors in the firm do not have a monopoly on 
intentions and decision-making. The interests and preferences of all the actors in the 
firm, that is not just high-level managers but also engineers, environmental staff and 
others, may influence the decision-making.
The problem discussed in this section goes back to a basic issue of how to 
conceptualise technology (or innovation defined as technological change in a 
commercial context). Technology involves more than simply artefacts. It is also the 
competence, skills and expertise that go into the development and use of artefacts, 
and it is the organisation of artefacts and skilled people together (MacKenzie and 
Wajcman 1999). Seen from this perspective it comes as no surprise that the 
organisational context matters for environmental innovation, and that management 
decisions may not be straightforwardly implemented.
We have now treated three problems of the literature on environmental innovations, 
namely the conflation of intentions and outcomes, environmental determinism and 
the rational firm. These three problems are based on two related questionable 
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assumptions: that firms are monolithic, rational actors, and that environmental 
innovation is an easily distinguishable category of innovations where environmental 
intentions are built into technological outcomes.
In the treatment of these problems, we have learnt some important lessons. Firstly, 
environmental innovations need to be studied in the context of other, notably 
technological, practices and activities in the firm. Secondly, we need to distinguish 
between what are one-off contingencies and what are longer-lasting changes in the 
organisations. And, lastly, we should study the agendas of different actors in the firm 
as a background to understanding how environmental motives are shaped, and how 
they interact with other motives.
To better understand the impact of environmental motives we thus need to look 
closer at the organisational dynamic within firms. In the next section we shall look at 
literature that deals with organisational issues relating to environmental innovations.
2.3 Environmental innovation and firm organisation
The last approximately 15 years has seen the beginnings of a literature on 
environmental innovations and firm organisation. The literature covers different 
manufacturing industries, mainly in Europe and the US.24
The literature covers different aspects of innovation processes. Some contributions 
are focussed on R&D whereas others study implementation of technology. There is 
also a distinction to be made between contributions focussing on production process 
innovations and those dealing with product development.25
This literature is diverse in terms of disciplines and, especially, the theoretical 
approaches used. The main contributing disciplines are management and business 
24 In part perhaps a reflection of the delimitation of this review to literature in English, but probably 
mostly because this has been a concern mainly in affluent countries.
25 This thesis is about process innovations, but some literature on product development has been 
included here, due to the scarcity of literature on process development, and in the hope that the results 
will carry over. It is however important to keep in mind the differences between the two areas, and the 
text specifies which is discussed.
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studies, organisation studies and innovation studies – the latter broadly defined as 
including both evolutionary economics and the sociology of technology.26 We shall 
return shortly to the issue of theoretical perspectives, although it is worth noticing 
that a concern with (organisational) learning is common in this literature. In terms of 
methodology the literature is almost exclusively based on case studies.
We shall now present the main findings from the existing literature on environmental 
innovation and firm organisation. Relating back to the previous section, we shall 
structure the discussion around four themes: the actors involved in the processes of 
environmental innovations, the intentions behind the processes, and the practices 
involved in the processes. Finally, we shall summarise the structural aspects of firm 
organisation.
2.3.1 Actors
The main actors studied in the literature on environmental innovation and firm 
organisation are environmental staff.27 Some manufacturing firms today have 
managers responsible for environmental issues. Some also have dedicated units with 
staff working on environmental tasks and/or environmental staff integrated in other 
functions. The literature reveals that the Environmental function is often 
co-organised with the Health and Safety functions, and the units are then referred to 
as EHS (or SHE, or HSE…) units.
Groenewegen and Vergragt (1991) studied the role of EHS units in social networks 
in firms. They identified three separate networks: production, strategy and 
26 This classification is by necessity somewhat arbitrary for several reasons. Firstly, the level of 
aggregation could be different. For example, management and business studies can be subdivided into 
several more specific disciplines, here including environmental management and technology 
management. Secondly, these disciplines overlap to some extent. For example, organisation studies is 
a broad label overlapping several of the other disciplines.
The main journal of the field is Business Strategy and the Environment, with contributions 
also in journals like Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, International Journal of  
Operations and Production Management, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management and 
Journal of Cleaner Production.
27 There is no established convention for what to call these employees. Options include: environmental 
experts, SHE staff etc. They will here be called ‘environmental staff’.
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innovation. The role of EHS units was most well established in the production 
networks, but they also found some evidence of these units acquiring roles in the 
policy and innovation networks, although the EHS units had as yet had little impact 
on R&D (ibid.:53).
There is no clear picture in the literature of how important environmental staff are in 
innovation processes. King (1995; 2000) stressed that the role of environmental staff 
was intended to be a buffer between the firm and external environmental demands 
(mainly from regulators), but also saw that they were sometimes nevertheless able to 
contribute substantively to process innovations as information providers through 
their knowledge of the waste streams produced (King 2000:236). In the area of 
product innovation Lenox et al. (1997; 2000) found that cross functional teams that 
included environmental staff could work well as long as environmental staff 
participation was not imposed on the design engineers. The environmental staff here 
provided “information about environmental design techniques, costs and benefits” 
(2000:92) and thus acted as gatekeepers (1997). 
In contrast, Handfield et al. (2001:198-200) found that environmental staff had only 
a limited role, and that there was a large gap between design engineers and 
environmental staff in terms of how important they considered environmental 
motives should be in the design process. The engineers also tended to see 
environmental considerations as constraints rather than as opportunities to express 
their creativity. Clayton et al. (1999:251) also found that engineers and 
environmental staff do not always cooperate. And that in such cases the latter will 
tend to promote end-of-pipe solutions, whereas the engineers are more likely to 
promote cleaner technology based on their process technology expertise.
There is surprisingly little written about the role of engineers in environmental 
innovation work. As indicated above, Handfield et al. (2001) found that engineers 
involved in environmental product innovation were relatively resistant to 
environmental considerations. On the other hand, Clayton et al. (1999:237) found 
that for process engineers involved in process innovations resource efficiency was a 
well-established design criterion. This difference may reflect the difference between 
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explicit environmental criteria, and criteria like resource efficiency which are 
traditionally motivated by economic concerns.
It is also worth noting the existence of so-called environmental engineers. This is, 
however, not a protected title like for example chemical engineer, and this group of 
employees may therefore include quite different people. Their role in environmental 
innovation work is not clear.
There is rather more research on the role of workers in environmental innovation. A 
common theme in this literature is participation: the issue of whether workers are 
included in environmental innovation processes or not, and how constructive a role 
they get when included. There is a basic tension here between on the one hand 
professionalisation and specialisation – the use of dedicated environmental staff – 
and on the other hand recognition of the useful knowledge workers possess of 
operations (Forman and Søgaard Jørgensen, 2001:87; Boiral, 2005:356). The 
established traditions of control and cooperation between workers and management 
in general seems to heavily influence whether workers can contribute in the area of 
environmental work (Kamp, 2000:89). It would seem that workers do not have a 
special role with regard to environmental issues, but that their participation in this 
area typically reflects their participation in decision-making in general.
There is also a literature on environmental champions, some of which touches on 
technological innovation issues. It has been shown that environmental champions 
with high environmental awareness, a strong position and good credibility may have 
an important role to play in environmental innovations (Vickers and Cordey-Hayes, 
1999:87-88). Environmental champions are therefore likely to be found in 
management positions. Vickers and Cordey-Hayes warned, however, that 
environmental initiatives resting on single individuals are vulnerable, and advocated 
broader collective processes of promoting environmental improvements in 
innovation work.
An environmental champion, unlike the categories of actors above, is not found in a 
particular organisational unit, and is perhaps better thought of as a role than a distinct 
actor category. It is also worth noting that champions are champions in a particular 
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context. The emergence of environmental champions should be seen as an outcome 
of social dynamics inside the firm, as much as the result of individual efforts or 
characteristics (Clayton et al. 1999:251).
2.3.2 Motives
We have discussed previously in this chapter that other motives than explicitly 
environmental ones may lead to environmental improvements, but that explicitly 
environmental motives also matter. The focus here will be on the latter. 
External drivers are important to the formulation of motives behind the production of 
environmental innovations. Green et al. (1994:1051) showed, based on a survey of 
UK manufacturing firms, that regulatory compliance was the most important driver. 
Compliance was followed by expectations of increased market shares (for product 
innovations) and cost savings through resource efficiency measures (for process 
innovations). Of these, cost savings is in a sense an internal driver, though no doubt 
often motivated by competitive pressures on the market. 
Green et al. (1994:1057), however, also criticised the idea that changes in a firm’s 
context automatically result in a modified firm strategy.28 They drew on the 
sociology of technology to emphasise that there is also a process of interpretation, 
where external factors are perceived and translated by firm management into action 
plans. This highlights the process of strategy formulation, as part of the management 
of environmental innovations.
Management and strategy making should not be seen as a purely cognitive activity 
though. Halme (2002), drawing on a learning perspective, studied the development 
of environmental management paradigms in two Finnish firms. She showed that, 
rather than intentions being formulated first and then implemented, intentions and 
action co-evolved (Halme 2002:1103). The formulation of management intentions 
evolves in part as a response to experiences from operations. The formulation of 
28 There’s a distinction here to be made between ‘intention’ and ‘strategy’. The way these terms are 
used here, ‘strategy’ refers to official plans of action, whereas ‘intention’ includes also more informal 
desires to see things done a certain way. ‘Motives’ and ‘intentions’ are here used interchangeably 
though.
42
environmental management intentions thus depends on the existing operations of the 
firm, and thus on the history of the firm.
Such strategy formulation takes place in the context of firm management and may 
link to other strategies and different actors in the firm. Groenewegen and Vergragt 
(1991:53) noted that environmental staff (as part of units for environmental, health 
and safety work) had started to get a role in firms’ policy networks. Vickers and 
Cordey-Hayes (1999:82, 84) identified cases where the environmental innovation 
agenda was promoted by, for example, the quality or the marketing functions. 
Consequently, existing structures in terms of the groups and units in the firm with 
their (political) agendas29 are important to the formulation of environmental motives 
behind innovations.
That environmental innovation strategies may be political issues and not just a 
consensual process was also demonstrated by Steward and Conway (1998). Drawing 
on discourse analysis and network mapping, they observed that environmental issues 
were expressed rather differently to different actors. They contrasted a ‘repertoire of  
conviction’ in communication with environmentalist communities with a ‘repertoire 
of accountability’ in communication with management (Steward and Conway 
1998:498-499). Both repertoires were used when communicating with employees. 
This suggests that firm actors are skilled at using different ways of framing 
environmental strategies depending on whom they are talking to, and for what 
political purposes. Again, this highlights the different roles played by different actors 
within (and outside) the firm structure in the formulation of environmental motives.
Both Halme (2002) and Vickers and Cordey-Hayes (1999) drew on an organisational 
learning perspective, which has proved to be a useful approach to the study of 
motives behind environmental innovations. It has allowed these researchers to 
distinguish between motives and actions, as well as see that different actors in the 
firm may have an impact on strategy formulation, and thus to avoid a 
conceptualisation of the firm management process as performed by one, monolithic 
29 We also need to distinguish between ‘intention’ and ‘agenda’. ‘Agenda(s)’ highlights the multitude 
of more or less conflicting intentions different actors in the firm may have. It also, however, focuses 
on the political aspects of intentions, and – compared to ‘intention’ – would tend to ignore the less 
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management group. The management process is a multi-actor process. Groenewegen 
and Vergragt’s study (1991) confirms this, and they were also able to map the actors’ 
roles in social networks (inside and outside the firm). These results highlight a 
methodological problem when studying firms’ environmental innovation strategies. 
Different actors may have different strategy preferences. Asking only one person 
from each firm about the management of environmental innovations is thus 
problematic.
A problem with the learning perspective, however, seems to be that it easily leads to 
assumptions about the lasting effects of observed actions. If actions and changes in 
the firm are conceptualised as learning it seems reasonable to expect the firm actors 
to have internalised these practices and to build future actions on such experiences. 
But, as Vickers (2000:266) has shown, firms may also ‘unlearn’ environmental 
innovation strategies. He saw a firm changing from a proactive strategy back to a 
more reactive one. Vickers (2000) studied worker participation in environmental 
innovation processes, and whilst also drawing on an organisational learning 
perspective, was more sensitive to issues of power and conflict. Unlearning is not 
just a matter of forgetting the lessons learnt, but may also be a result of shifting 
agendas within the firm. This result also shows that structural change does not 
necessarily follow from a single event of environmental innovation. Structures are 
more obdurate than that, and reversals are to be expected.
2.3.3 Practices
First we need to recall that environmental intentions are not necessary for 
environmental outcomes. This means that practices other than explicitly 
environmental ones may be conducive to environmental improvement. For example, 
we saw above that resource efficiency as an established goal and practice may result 
in cleaner technology. 
However, Clayton et al. (1999:248) also found that firms did not necessarily discover 
the opportunities available to them, even in cases where this would have led to 
economic gains. These authors explained this by reference to the bounded rationality 
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of firms. In such cases introducing an explicit environmental motive may make firm 
actors see things in new ways and discover opportunities that would otherwise go 
unnoticed.
A way to make environmental change permanent is, thus, to integrate environmental 
considerations into routines and established practices. Some authors have studied the 
greening of process development practices. A study by Groenewegen and Vergragt 
(1991:51) showed that some firms routinely made environmental assessments of 
their development projects. This was confirmed by Green et al. (1994:1054), and for 
the case of product development by Handfield (2001:198). According to Miles and 
Green (1994:19), greening of R&D takes the form of modifications to existing 
technological trajectories in a firm, by amending the assessment criteria used, rather 
than any wholesale change to new trajectories.
Groenewegen and Vergragt (1991:53) also showed that, in addition to the engineers, 
EHS units had some role to play in environmental innovation processes, although it 
was not clear exactly what role, or how important it was. Studying product 
development, Lenox and Ehrenfeld (1997, see also Lenox et al., 2000) showed that 
successful environmental product innovations built on corporate environmental 
experts being linked into product development teams. The environmental experts 
here provided (as mentioned above) ‘information about environmental design 
techniques, costs and benefits’ (2000:92) and thus acted as gatekeepers (1997:195). 
Clayton et al. (1999:251) have also called for the combination of environmental and 
process engineering expertise, especially for cleaner technology innovations. On the 
other hand, they also highlighted a case where an engineering group found it in their 
interest to promote cleaner technology, more or less in conflict with the EHS staff, 
who were oriented more towards end-of-pipe solutions (ibid.:252). Collaboration and 
conflict may thus shape environmental innovation in complex ways.
The literature suggests that there are two main management practices related to the 
greening of R&D. The first is building cross-functional teams as discussed above. 
Such teams may also go some way to shape the informal networks in the firm, which 
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will remain after the team’s work is over. Again, Groenewegen and Vergragt’s focus 
on networks in the firm is useful here.
The second main management practice is the adoption of tools – standardised 
working methods. These include for example LCA (Life Cycle Analysis) and DfE 
(Design for Environment) tools for product development, and waste audits for 
process development. These tools range in sophistication from basic checklists to 
complicated software tools.
Lenox et al. (2000:92) studied the use of such tools for product development, and 
they found that they rarely delivered on their promises. Handfield (2001:202) 
supports this conclusion. Reasons for this included that the tools were seen as either 
too simplistic to be of any practical use, or too difficult and time-consuming to use 
(Lenox et al. 2000:92). These views could conceivably also reflect a low motivation 
to take environmental considerations into account, and these studies may 
underestimate the usefulness of such tools. In contrast, Holm and Klemmensen 
(1994) described a case of the successful use of a waste audit procedure in a Danish 
firm.
An issue raised by several authors is the question of the continued use of these 
practices. That is, studies often focus on the introduction of new greener practices, 
and in some cases assume that they will continue to be used in the future. Blomquist 
and Sandström (2004), for example, raise this issue in relation to product 
development practices in two Swedish consumer goods manufacturers. They found 
many examples of the introduction of new practices, but little evidence of embedding 
(conceptualised as second-order learning). 
This issue relates to the discussion above about studies theorising action as learning, 
and the dangers of making assumptions about lasting effects. This shows that we 
need to have a processual approach to the study of environmental innovations, that is 
to take the firm’s history into account, and assess whether the observed behaviour is 
due to temporary contingencies or the result of more stable, structural features of the 
organisation and its context.
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2.3.4 Structures
The concept of structure highlights durable aspects of firm organisation; things that 
do not – most of the time – change easily or rapidly. It thus brings to our attention the 
history of the organisation and the stable qualities of it. Organisational structures 
mediate the influence of the organisational history and shape current events.
The literature reviewed above reveals some structural features of the firm. For 
example, Miles and Green (1994:19) showed that the technological trajectories of 
firms30 are typically modified by environmental criteria rather than abandoned for 
new greener technologies.
Relatedly, the division of labour and knowledge in the firm is also likely to change 
slowly. Established groups in the firm have their specific expertise and routines, and 
their own agendas for what should be done (Clayton et al. 1999:251). We saw above 
that different groups in the firm may be involved in the formulation and framing of 
environmental motives, and they are likely to have different priorities in this process.
It was also noted that that routinising environmental concerns into technological 
practices (Green et al. 1994:1054) may be a way of integrating environmental 
considerations, but also that there were indications that introducing new such 
practices may be easier than establishing them on a permanent basis. There appears 
to be structural constraints to the setting up of environmental practices.
To call these things (the division of labour and knowledge, technological trajectories, 
etc.) ‘structural’ is not to say that they can never change, but the problems observed 
in the literature of achieving lasting change – the unlearning of proactive 
environmental strategies, the weak embedding of practices, etc. – confirm that we 
need to be careful not to overplay the lasting effects of individual projects and 
30 Dosi (1982:148) defines ‘technological trajectory’ as the direction of advance within a 
‘technological paradigm’, which, in turn, is an established way of thinking when researching and 
developing a technology. Paradigms and trajectories are not in Dosi’s account localised to a specific 
organisation, but – like Miles and Green – we may speak also of ‘local’ paradigms and trajectories in 
particular firms.
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events. We need to be able to distinguish between temporal contingencies and 
longer-lasting structural change.
The authors cited here (Miles and Green 1994; Green et al. 1994; Clayton et al. 
1999) all draw on the theory of evolutionary economics to capture the stable, 
structural features of firm organisations. Apart from the notion of ‘trajectory’, the 
‘bounded rationality’ of firms and actors in firms is also a useful antidote to theories 
implying automatic immediate responses to stimuli, and constant change. Clayton 
et al. (1999:248) further drew on this concept (see section 2.1.4) to explain why 
firms do not necessarily discover opportunities for, for example, resource efficiency 
improvements. We shall introduce some of the basics of evolutionary economics in 
more detail in chapter 3 (section 3.1.1.1). For now, we may note that it is a useful 
theory in terms of explaining structural features of firms.
2.3.5 Summing up
We have in this third part of the chapter seen that environmental staff have some role 
in innovation work, but it is not clear exactly what that role is. In the literature they 
are seen as either barriers between the firm and external actors with environmental 
demands, or as gatekeepers securing communication between external and internal 
actors. Even less is known about the role of engineers in environmental innovation 
work. On the one hand engineering practice is seen to include resource efficiency 
concerns, but on the other hand it is unclear how engineers relate to more explicitly 
environmental criteria. 
Workers appear not to have a specific role in relation to environmental innovations, 
and their participation (or not) depends on the conditions of participation in general. 
It has been shown though, that workers may have useful knowledge that can be 
drawn upon. Environmental champions are those actors that promote environmental 
concerns, in the context of innovation or otherwise. Successful champions are often 
found in a management position, where they can wield more power. What is not 
clear is how anyone becomes an environmental champion.
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External pressure – regulation, customer demand, etc. – are important drivers of 
environmental strategy. The formulation of environmental intentions happens in a 
process of interpretation of external demands, and is affected by the agendas of the 
different actors in the firm. We should not think of this process as just a cognitive 
one though. The formulation of environmental intentions also co-evolves with action.
Firm practices do not have to include explicit environmental considerations to 
produce environmental improvements. But, due to the bounded rationality of firms, 
environmental considerations may trigger the firm to discover new opportunities for 
improvement. Two main environmental practices are described in the literature: 
cross-functional teams including environmental staff, and the use of special tools like 
LCA or waste audits. 
Environmental staff participation in innovation work may be effective, and more so 
if this participation is built on existing networks rather than imposed from above. It is 
not clear, however, that collaboration is always more effective than conflict in 
producing environmental outcomes. The literature shows that the tools used to 
include environmental considerations in innovation work may work, but that it may 
be difficult to routinise their use. Overall, it seems important to distinguish between 
one-off introduction of these practices and well-established routines.
Finally, important aspects of the organisational structure that may have an effect on 
environmental innovations are: technological trajectories, the division of expertise 
and established routines. Evolutionary economics has proven to be a useful theory in 
explaining such structural features and their importance for environmental 
innovation.
There are, however, important empirical gaps in the existing literature on 
environmental innovations and firm organisation. Firstly, the roles of the different 
actors are unclear. Little is known about the role of engineers. We know that 
environmental staff have a role, but not quite what it is and how important it is. 
Secondly, it is not clear quite how environmental motives fit in with other agendas in 
the firm, such as resource efficiency, health and safety or quality, as well as the more 
political aspects of the agendas of different groups in the firm with their varying 
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interests. Thirdly, we need a better understanding of how environmental concerns 
come to be embedded (or not) in firm structures.
On a more theoretical level, there is a scarcity of studies taking a political approach 
to the topic of firm organisation and environmental innovation. Approaches based on 
a rational and consensual view of management and organisation dominate. Hence the 
lack of attention paid to the interests and agendas of the actors in the firm. It is also 
not clear what the role of conflict in the organisation is in terms of producing 
environmental improvements.
We also need to be able to distinguish between contingencies and structural factors 
behind environmental behaviour, so as to understand better the embedding (or not) of 
environmental concerns into firm structures. We shall in the next chapter introduce a 
process perspective to address this need. Relatedly, we need to pay attention to the 
structural context of the behaviour of the actors. For example, the discussion of 
environmental champions showed that it is important to contextualise environmental 
promotion.
2.4 Conclusion
We have in this chapter discussed the impact of environmental regulation on firms in 
terms of technological innovation, as well as the possibility of voluntary firm action. 
With reference to the Porter debate we identified that cleaner technologies are 
examples of proposed win-win solutions to economic and environmental problems. 
Whilst resource efficiency is an important driver for cleaner technology, intentional 
efforts to improve environmental performance (ecological rationality) may also help 
firms discover win-win opportunities. There are still questions unanswered regarding 
what such intentional efforts can add when there are already strong resource 
efficiency drivers present, how such integrated strategies play out in the organisation, 
and even whether ‘cleaner technology’ is still a useful concept in this situation.
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A problem in the literature on environmental innovations is that it tends to conflate 
intentions and outcomes (and even conflates processes and outcomes). Discussing 
this problem, we saw the need to contextualise environmental innovations in terms of 
other technological practices and activities in the firm.
Another problem in the literature is that it is often biased by environmental 
management determinist assumptions, based on stage models and studies of ‘best 
practice’. This leads to overly optimistic predictions of constant improvement. In 
terms of methodology it is important not only to study and explain best practice, but 
also normal or bad practice. Moreover, it is important to be able to distinguish 
between one-off contingencies and longer-lasting change. There is a need to 
contextualise environmental innovations in terms of also their temporal contexts.
There is also a tendency to assume that firms are rational and manageable, which 
underplays the role of organisational dynamics and the interests and agendas of 
different actors in the firm. We should study the agendas of different actors in the 
firm as a background to understanding how environmental motives interact with 
other motives.
Regarding the literature on firm organisation and environmental innovation, we have 
seen that much of it treats the organisation as rational and consensual. Studies with a 
more explicit political approach have highlighted the multi-actor character of 
environmental innovation work, but there is still a lack of knowledge about the roles 
and interests of actors in the firm. In particular, there is little knowledge about the 
roles of engineers and environmental staff in the context of environmental 
innovation. What, for example, is the impact of collaboration versus conflict between 
these two groups on the production of environmental improvements?
To avoid the environmental determinism trap, we need to pay more attention to what 
are contingencies and what is longer-lasting structural change. We also need to 
examine the structural context of the behaviour of actors in the firm. Especially, 
more knowledge is needed about the structural impacts on decision-making: the 
process of agenda-setting and interactions between different motives in 
environmental innovation work.
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An important aspect of the aim of this thesis is to study the organisational integration 
of environmental motives into innovation processes. To do this, one must disentangle 
motives from outcomes, and look at the organisational decision processes in between 
and how actors in the firm shape these decision processes. There may be actors 
involved in an innovation process who promote environmental improvement. To 
understand how the roles of these actors relate to the resulting technological 
solutions, we need to study them in the structured organisational context of the firm. 
We may now expand and revise the set of questions stated above (at the end of 
section 2.1.4.). In the context of innovation work:
• How do different actors – with their expertise, interests, etc. – in the firm 
contribute to the shaping of environmental motives, and what influence do they 
have over the decisions made?
• What limitations and opportunities do organisational structures create for 
intentional environmental improvement, in agenda-setting and decision-making?
• What is the impact on the technological outcomes of intentional environmental 
considerations, especially on core technologies and when there are other drivers 
leading to environmental improvement?
• Is ‘cleaner technology’ still a useful analytical concept, and a relevant target for 
environmental policy?
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3 A political process approach to the organisation of 
environmental innovation
We saw in the last chapter that we need to study the integration of environmental 
intentions into decision-making in innovation processes, and that to do this we need 
to study the roles of different actors in the firm in innovation work and to situate 
their behaviour in the structured context of the firm organisation. Specifically, to 
understand how decisions are made and influenced by the interests and agendas of 
the different actors, we need a political approach to these organisational phenomena.
In the first section we shall introduce the basics of a political approach to 
organisational studies, and in the second section we shall elaborate and apply this 
perspective to the issue of integration of environmental intentions into innovation 
processes. Throughout this section we shall further specify the research questions of 
this thesis. The third and last section will bring the themes of the chapter together 
and present the analytical framework.
3.1 Decision-making and actors
This section will introduce a political perspective on organisations. The focus will be 
on decision-making,31 and, subsequently, on how to conceptualise the actors in the 
firm. The literature used will be mainly studies with a political perspective on 
organisations (and with a focus on technological or organisational innovations).
3.1.1 Organisational politics
As we saw in the previous chapter, it is common in the literature on environmental 
innovation and firm organisation to assume that decision-making is a rational activity 
as opposed to subjective or political, and that decision-making is the prerogative of 
management rather than a distributed activity among the employees in the firm. This 
31 Including agenda-setting.
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managerial approach is common in spite of a long-standing critique of these 
assumptions from literature that is more aware of the political nature of organisations 
(Burns and Stalker 1961, Pettigrew 1985).
It is useful to take as a starting point of this debate the theory (as well as ideals and 
practices) of scientific management. This theory was based on the – bureaucratic – 
idea of rational planning of production, with operations mapped and correct 
procedure prescribed in detail with the aim of centralising control and optimising 
efficiency (Morgan 1986:30). Efficient procedures are here to be implemented 
top-down with management making all decisions on how to operate and being in 
control of implementation (ibid.:30). In this model of organisation there is no room 
for employee participation in decision-making, nor in any other creative activity. 
There is also no recognition of any other interests of managers apart from 
contributing to efficient operations.
Burns and Stalker (1961) criticized this practice as not being suitable for 
organisations that need to change rapidly in response to external developments. They 
contrasted in their analysis the organisation of scientific management – the 
mechanistic organisation in their terms – with that of the organic organisation. 
Whereas in the mechanistic organisation everyone has clearly bounded tasks and 
communication is primarily vertical, in the organic organisation tasks are more 
fluidly defined and communication among individuals and groups can be direct 
rather than go via the organisational hierarchy. Burns and Stalker replaced (at least to 
some extent) top-down control via management fiat by a shared commitment to the 
purposes of the organisation, and claimed that an important task of management is to 
create such commitment.
Burns and Stalker (and subsequent writers in this tradition) are commonly referred to 
as contingency theorists (Morgan 1986:48), meaning that they prescribed different 
organisational designs for different contexts rather than one ideal for all situations.32 
They claimed that in a stable environment the mechanistic organisation worked well, 
but in a rapidly changing environment an organic structure was better suited. This 
32 And, analytically, compared different models of management.
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was also reflected in their interest in studying the organisation of R&D as compared 
to production, where, arguably, R&D work is difficult to routinise and plan in the 
same detail as production work. In this sense their theory also mirrored the rise of 
R&D as an important industrial activity in the post-war period.
So far we have seen that Burns and Stalker contributed the idea that a relatively fluid 
organisation can be more efficient than a mechanistic one. They also brought to 
attention the role of organisational politics and conflict within the organisation. To 
them, the organisation can be conceptualised as a work organisation – consisting of a 
system of management and the activities carried out (1961:97) – as well as a political 
system and a status structure. They recognised the existence of political interest 
groups with different agendas. Political behaviour is here seen to have its roots in the 
management system (demands for resources and control of other people) as well as 
in the status system (promotion, rewards, etc.) (1961:144-5).
However, Burns and Stalker see politics as a disruptive element in an organisation, 
leading to inefficiency (1961:146), rather than as a productive mechanism (Hård 
1993:408). Their perspective is still managerial, in the sense of being primarily 
concerned with efficiency as opposed to other possible aims, for example 
democratisation. Reduction of direct management control is, for them, only advisable 
when a context of rapid change demands a more flexible organisation. And political 
behaviour is something that must be understood, but preferably avoided or 
controlled. 
Interestingly this view of politics chimes with management ideology. Burns and 
Stalker themselves note that self-interest is typically not openly admitted in the firm 
organisation (1961:144-5). Political motives are not seen as legitimate rationales for 
behaviour, and are downplayed in favour of more consensual organisational motives. 
In this sense Burns and Stalker’s theory is uncritical and serves to preserve 
management privileges.
For a more critical treatment of the political aspect of organisations we can turn to 
Pettigrew (1985). He sets out a treatment of political behaviour that is similar to 
Burns and Stalker, in that it is caused by the division of work and by “career, reward 
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and status systems” (Pettigrew 1985:42). However, he refines the analysis of 
decision-making, based on a more developed treatment of power in organisations. 
Pettigrew pays more attention to the context of decision-making in several ways. 
Firstly, he distinguishes between a strategic level of change (and decision-making) 
and an operative level of change, where the former sets the constraints of the latter. 
The strategic level of decision-making amounts to setting the agenda, that is, 
defining which issues are up for discussion and which ones are not. Influence is here 
a question of who has access to such agenda-setting. Secondly, he draws on Lukes’s 
(1974) third dimension of power: ideology, to discuss different actors’ unequal 
influence on each other’s understandings of reality. This is a cultural form of power, 
determining how issues are to be understood and what intentions and interests are 
legitimate. Pettigrew (1985:44) speaks of the ‘management of meaning’ to capture 
this form of power.33
The particular group Pettigrew is interested in is internal Organisational 
Development consultants. He studied their political strategies, including their efforts 
to change the interpretive schemes used to formulate strategy (Barley 1987:177). 
Pettigrew emphasises that he does not wish to take sides in the conflicts he studies, 
and aims to “let the data speak for themselves through as many channels and 
contexts, and over as long a period of time as possible” (1985:50). This pluralist 
commitment is somewhat compromised when he chooses to explain the survival of 
the organisational development groups facing difficulties. Ultimately, he is interested 
in their survival and success.
It is worth noting that Burns and Stalker (1961:119) do talk of culture in 
organisations, but in their treatment culture is an apolitical phenomenon that serves 
to give cohesion to the organisation (especially in organic organisations where 
coordination through managerial fiat is weaker). For Pettigrew, in contrast, culture is, 
as we have seen, a political phenomenon, through which power can be exercised.
33 Pettigrew thus runs the risk of over-estimating the intentionality of this form of power, as set out by 
Lukes. Ideology and culture may not be easily shaped by intentional efforts on behalf of management.
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Moreover, Pettigrew’s treatment of decision-making and power is linked to his 
treatment of organisational dynamics. He sees change events (and decisions) as part 
of ‘ongoing processes of continuity and change’ (1985:26), thus emphasising that 
change does not come out of the blue, but is preceded by an organisational process, 
and is shaped by organisational structures and actions. Pettigrew describes change as 
a courtship process between a group championing a new rationality and the strategic 
context, potentially leading up to a marriage (1985:440), and criticises studies taking 
a snapshot view of change, neglecting the history of change events.
Strategic context here refers to the context of the group championing a new 
rationality. Pettigrew stresses a multi-level perspective with an inner context and 
outer context, the latter including the societal structures in which the firm is located. 
Pettigrew’s approach is ambitious, including as it does the several levels of context, 
the temporal process dimension, and a complex model of organisations (including 
formal organisation, activities, cultural aspects, political aspects, etc.). And there is in 
the end perhaps a problem with such a rich framework in terms of what exactly 
explains what, and what precisely is to be explained. No very clear model of 
organisational change emerges, and the approach is perhaps better seen as an 
approach to research, rather than a crisp (or rigid) theory of organisations. It does, 
however, offer a comprehensive framework for understanding the political aspects of 
organisations, and represents an ambition worth aspiring to.
A political process approach to organisational decision-making would seem to be 
useful to the study of integration of environmental motives into innovation activities 
in firms. By contextualising the decisions made and adopting a process perspective 
we should be able to avoid the determinist traps of separating out environmental 
activities and focussing on best practice.
A large body of literature has drawn on Pettigrew’s work (see for example Schaefer 
and Harvey 1998 and Kamp 2000 in the area of environmental aspects of 
organisations). This includes researchers explicitly labelling their approach political 
process research (this literature is usefully reviewed in McLoughlin and Badham 
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2005). We will not here aim to review all this literature, but will draw on it when 
appropriate in the remainder of this chapter.
3.1.1.1  The limits of rationality and politics
We will here address the limits of rationality and politics in organisations, and 
therefore their limitations as explanations for organisational dynamics. For this 
purpose we will draw on mainly evolutionary economics, and this will also entail 
some broader reflections on the compatibility of this theory with the political process 
perspective.
We have seen how Burns and Stalker criticised the mechanistic model of 
management from the standpoint of efficiency, claiming that a more fluid and 
decentralised organisation is better suited for dynamic contexts. Analytically, they 
abandoned rationalistic theories of organisation since they failed to acknowledge 
informal aspects of organisations. Neither would Pettigrew sign up to an analysis 
based on a rational model of management, but in his case the problem with that 
model is that it underestimates the importance of politics (as well as history). 
Pettigrew, then, highlights the centrality of subjective rationality as opposed to the 
alleged objective rationality of scientific management. 
A further challenge to the rationality of management comes from evolutionary 
economics.34 A basic theme here is how a company (or a group within a company) 
searches for and processes information about itself, and more importantly, about its 
environment.35 Evolutionary economists stress that a company has limited capability 
to search for and process information (Nelson and Winter 1974:888) because actors 
within a company have ‘a bounded rationality’ (Simon 1982).36
34 As mentioned in chapter 2, management may not recognise potential ‘win-win situations. See also 
chapter 2 for a summary of evolutionary economy accounts of environmental innovations and firm 
organisation.
35 Here referring to context, rather than the natural environment.
36 And that differences in such capabilities help explain differences in performance between 
companies.
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Evolutionary economics rejects the notion of maximisation (or optimisation) from 
neoclassical economics, which presumes access to complete information, and instead 
suggests that firms ‘satisfice’ (Simon, cited in MacKenzie 1996:51). This is taken to 
mean that firms normally settle for what is good enough, rather than try to achieve 
the perfection inherent in notions of maximisation.
Furthermore, satisficing behaviour is based on following routines for information 
search and processing (as well as for operations), and these routines limit what 
information about the environment gets brought to attention and how it is evaluated. 
Unless this limited evaluation tells the company that it needs to change, it will 
continue to follow its established routines (MacKenzie 1996:51). Stability is thus 
explained either by the evaluated information failing to meet established criteria, or 
because information was not picked up by the search and thus remained unknown.
This mechanism for managed change is essentially imperfect. A consequence of this 
is that it may also be different in different companies.37 This means that different 
companies have different routines, and embedded in them, different criteria for what 
information to search for and how to evaluate it.
Evolutionary economics is in some ways compatible with a political perspective. As 
MacKenzie points out (1996:51), since different groups in a company may follow 
different routines and apply different criteria, organisational politics is possible. We 
agree with evolutionary economics that the limited capabilities of companies for 
search and evaluation – and the ensuing lack of information and knowledge – is a 
cause of organisational stability. The political process approach then adds nuance to 
how companies evaluate information, in bringing firm actors’ interests to the 
foreground of the analysis. Interests matter for how and why criteria are negotiated 
and applied, and for what routines and criteria are adopted in the first place. 
There are, however, ways in which evolutionary economics is less compatible with 
the political process perspective. Evolutionary economics emphasises the tendency 
of firms to reproduce existing routines as long as they do not perceive sufficiently 
37 Compare the perfect, effortless adaptation assumed by neoclassical economics, which does not 
allow individual variation as that would mean deviation from the optimal.
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strong signals from their environment to change them. In comparison with 
neoclassical economics this makes for a more realistic model of organisational 
dynamics, where instead of assuming continuous adjustments to changing external 
circumstances, periods of relative stability are interspersed with episodes of more 
rapid change. Furthermore, in evolutionary economics the organisation interprets the 
environment and judges the need for change, instead of seeing adjustments as 
following mechanically from a changing environment.
This view, however, makes organisations essentially reactive and risks underplaying 
internal politics as a dynamic force in firms. There may well be internal causes of 
changing routines and criteria. Whilst the political perspective tends to foreground 
the interior of the organisation it has been able to recognise both internal and external 
sources of change.38 Pettigrew talked of the match (‘marriage’, 1985:440) between 
the interests of inside groups and the changing context, as a way of conceptualising 
change as a coming together of internal and external processes.
And whilst for Pettigrew there is still a clear demarcation between inside and outside, 
recently writers in the political process tradition have paid more attention to the 
blurring of firm boundaries. See for example Hislop et al. (2000) and Swan and 
Scarbrough (2005) writing on the politics of networked innovation.
We may draw out a further implication of evolutionary economics for our political 
approach. The political perspective of organisations is also based on a notion of 
rationality, albeit a more explicitly subjective one. By analogy with evolutionary 
economics we may also assume that political, explicitly subjective rationality is 
limited. Organisational actors will not evaluate everything, all the time.39 There will 
be issues that are accepted without question, that is, are apolitical. (Which does not 
mean that they could not be politicised, just that they have not been). There are thus 
limits also to political rationality, and to organisational politics.
38 See for example Koch (1997) and Clausen (1997) on the roles of suppliers and consultants.
39 In a similar vein a friend I had used to talk of every person’s limited supply of ‘indignation calories’ 
to describe the need to focus one’s engagement and the impossibility of caring about everything that 
one could conceivably care about.
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This is in contrast to, for example, Knights and Murray, writers in the political 
process tradition, who see politics as not only inescapable but “the very stuff, the  
marrow of organisational process” (1994:xiv). Their version of the political process 
theory puts actors’ efforts to manage their identities at the centre of organisational 
dynamics. A climate of competition and insecurity here means that identities are seen 
as constantly threatened and rather fragile. 
Whilst this works well for them with their focus on organisational change and on 
managers and IT-specialists, this perspective seems somewhat less useful for 
understanding stable aspects of organisations, and those organisational actors – 
workers say – who find themselves in situations offering less scope to influence their 
own roles. The imperative of identity management in this theorisation threatens to 
override other goals and intentions. Actors that experience fewer threats and/or 
career opportunities may be less absorbed in the shaping of their organisational 
identities. We contend that, whilst politics is undoubtedly a central feature of 
organisational life, there is a risk of over-politicising the analysis in a way that blinds 
oneself to uncontroversial40 but important aspects of organisational activities.
The idea of limited politics is not new. Mintzberg (1973) has written about the limits 
of a political model for studying strategy- (and policy-) making. He contrasts three 
schools of thought in this area, and their three models of strategy making. In his 
terms the three modes are: entrepreneurial, adaptive and planning. Briefly put, the 
entrepreneurial mode is characterised by a strong, risk-taking leader, the adaptive 
mode by bargaining amongst the parties of a ruling coalition, and the planning mode 
by management using analytic planning techniques for the long-term perspective. 
The adaptive model here corresponds to what we would call a political perspective.
Mintzberg sees these modes as different ways of making strategy, which can be used 
alone or in combination by organisations, and that the adaptive (political) model is 
most likely to be found in established organisations in complex, dynamic contexts 
(1973:49).41 However, this conclusion is based on a partial view of politics, namely 
politics as bargaining. One should not assume that something that is not surrounded 
40 We will in this thesis not investigate ‘ideology’ (Haugaard 2002:38) in the sense of Lukes’s third 
dimension of power.
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by overt politicking is necessarily apolitical.42 We may therefore distinguish between 
overt and covert politics, and furthermore see covert politics as distinct from the 
genuinely apolitical.
Thus far we have discussed decision-making as a collective process. The remainder 
of this section will deal with how to conceptualise the actors in the firm in a way that 
is compatible with the political approach.
3.1.2 Actors
The political approach to organisations as outlined here draws our attention to the 
different actors in the organisation, and their different roles and behaviour. It also 
emphasises that all employees are political actors in the sense that they may have a 
role to play in decision-making, potentially even regarding strategic decisions. 
Furthermore, a processual perspective asks us to not to lose sight of the context of 
the actors, but to see them as both producers and products of that context (Pettigrew 
1997:338).
In particular, a political approach highlights the interests of the actors. We will here 
look closer at the concept of interests, preliminarily defined as what actors want to 
see happen in the organisation to themselves and others.43 Especially we will 
consider what factors shape the interests of the actors. For the purpose of studying 
innovation processes, we will also introduce expertise as an important characteristic 
of organisational actors.
41 It is, however, unclear on what grounds these three perspectives are compared, and to what degree 
they are distinct phenomena, rather than the products of different theorisations. We would claim, for 
example, that there is no reason a priori to believe that planning or entrepreneurial leadership is 
apolitical. (For examples of the politicisation of planning see Brunsson 1989). Mintzberg has 
undoubtedly a point, though, that degrees of overt politicking vary between contexts.
42 Firstly, if power relations are too asymmetrical, the weaker part may chose not to voice any 
concerns. Secondly, and more importantly when explaining the outcomes of decision-making, 
compromises between actors with different interests may be preserved without overt politics. For 
example, Kamp (2000:77) has described organisational structures as stiffened politics, where actors 
prefer sticking with a compromise to open conflict. 
Interestingly this is compatible with evolutionary economics. For example, Nelson and 
Winter (1982, cited in Becker et al. 2005:781) have described routines as truces. 
43 We shall in this thesis focus on subjective rather than objective ‘real interests’ (Lukes 1974:25). 
This will suffice for the purposes of this thesis.
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3.1.2.1 Interests  
Burns and Stalker mention formal organisational position as a source of interests 
(1961:11), and note that a task (as defined by position) can be everyone’s concern or 
just the concern of the person/group whose task it is (1961:69). In an organic 
organisation tasks are less clearly delimited, and there is a stronger commitment to 
the overall purpose of the organisation, whereas in a mechanistic organisation 
people’s interests are less focussed on the whole organisation and more strictly 
limited to their own tasks.
In the preface of their 1961 book Burns and Stalker also mention employees’ careers 
and their commitments to any political interest groups they are part of as sources of 
interests. Potential sources of conflicts between groups include competition for 
resources, money and control over others (ibid.:144-5). The authors thus recognise 
interests stemming from the formal (mechanistic) organisation, the culture of the 
organisation and, finally, the political system of the organisation. Given their view of 
politics as disruptive Burns and Stalker effectively make a distinction between the 
‘political’ self-interests of individuals and groups and their ‘productive’ interests 
stemming from position/task and company commitment (‘duty and loyalty’).
Pettigrew in contrast see politics as a potentially productive force, and does not make 
this distinction between political and other interests. In this perspective it makes little 
sense to denote certain political interest groups, and Pettigrew instead emphasises the 
different rationalities of all groups. In ‘rationality’ he included problem-solving 
styles and time-orientations, but also goals and values (1985:42). Rationality is here, 
then, a political concept.
An underlying theme here is the identity of the individuals in the organisation, and 
how this identity is shaped and managed. As we have seen, Burns and Stalker see 
commitment to – that is, identification with – the company as a factor shaping the 
individuals’ interests. We have also seen how membership of (smaller) groups 
matters. And, on an even smaller scale, the individual identifies with his or her task 
and position (both current and in the future, the latter aspect giving rise to career 
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interests). Morgan (1997:161) adds private life commitments to the equation,44 and 
claims that people will strive towards a fit between their private lives and their 
professional roles.
This point also highlights that interests are not only shaped by things internal to the 
organisation. Individuals’ identities and interests span the organisational boundary. A 
further boundary-spanning mechanism is the group rationalities discussed by 
Pettigrew. Some group identities, for example membership of professions, will also 
transgress organisational boundaries.
Furthermore, we should be careful not to assume that actors’ interests can easily be 
read off their positions, group memberships, etc. What is in an actor’s interest also 
depends on how he or she interprets his or her situation. And whilst maintaining that 
an individual’s situation and interests are in part shaped by organisational structures, 
the individual also has an active role in understanding and assessing the situation 
(and some influence on what situation to end up in).45
3.1.2.2 Expertise  
In the context of innovation, the skills and knowledge of employees are of central 
importance. In a political approach such as the one developed here, it is useful to 
think of this in terms of the expertise employees have. This emphasises that 
possession of expertise in an organisational context is a matter of legitimacy. In other 
words, expertise is about who is seen to possess the legitimate knowledge or skills to 
solve a certain problem, rather than knowledge or skills as an innate property of 
individuals or groups. Indeed, Fincham et al. suggest that expertise should be defined 
as ‘the capability for authoritatively applying special knowledge or skill’ (1994:19). 
The concept of expertise, then, highlights the interests of employees in maintaining 
or raising the legitimacy of their knowledge, by being seen to ably solve problems.
44 Although Burns and Stalker make a related point (1961:99).
45 As stated above, we shall here limit the analysis to subjective interests, but even when including 
objective aspects of interests, the task of relating interests to positions etc. is not an easy one; 
individuals are located in the intersection of multiple social structures.
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The status of a group of experts, and hence the legitimacy of their expertise, is 
determined by several factors. Not least among these is, of course, the status and 
position awarded by firm management, but Fincham et al. (1994:20) also suggest 
that the experts’ positions in labour markets and professional accreditation can 
provide them with leverage in any power plays that occur in the firm. Indeed Fleck 
(1998a:145) emphasised the importance of (internal and external) labour markets in 
determining the legitimacy of expertise, by including it in his ‘trialectic of expertise’, 
a model of expertise with three dimensions: knowledge, power and tradability. 
Expertise and interests are of course not independent phenomena. Firstly, it is worth 
noticing that trading expertise on labour markets relates to the career interests 
discussed above. Secondly, we again encounter professions as a link between 
employees’ interests and structures external to the organisation. Burns and Stalker 
(1961:190) note that membership of professions is a source of status within the 
organisation.
More could be said about expertise – and about interests – but this will suffice to lay 
a foundation. We shall return to these topics in the next section.
3.2 The integration of environmental motives
In this section we will elaborate on some aspects of the political approach to 
organisations, and apply this perspective to our research aim of studying integration 
of environmental intentions into innovation processes. Before doing that, we need to 
introduce the innovation process, focussing on the firm level, and its environmental 
aspects. Again, we start with a rationalistic model and then progress towards a more 
politically sensitised approach.
The following two sub-sections are structured around the action-structure duality, 
and will deal with these two aspects of the integration of environmental intentions 
into innovation processes. We will first discuss the promotion (championing) of 
environmental concerns and thereafter the organisational structures that enable and 
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constrain environmental action. Through this section we will, based on the theory set 
out, present the research questions of this thesis.
3.2.1 Innovations
The basic notion of technological innovation is the new application of technology to 
practical ends. The innovation process, then, is the activities leading up to and 
including the adoption of technology by users (Kline 1985:37).46
Often the focus in innovation studies is on the development of (or even research on) 
technology, rather than use, but researchers have shown that technologies are not 
fixed and stable as they move from development to use, but may be re-configured, 
re-interpreted etc. by users (Fleck 1998b; Lie and Sørensen 1996:10). The innovation 
process is a messy one, with typically many actors involved and numerous 
feedbacks, overlaps and contingencies (Williams 1997:173-4), and one should be 
careful not to assume that development and adoption are necessarily separate 
activities.
This thesis is primarily concerned with activities inside firms, and will investigate 
this part of the larger innovation process. Specifically, we will study innovations in 
production technologies in process industry firms. Such firms may or may not have 
internal development capacities, and the main focus is on technology adoption by 
firms, that is, firms as users of technology.
The focus on technology adoption – although as described above adoption and 
development are not necessarily distinct activities – leads us to consider the 
organisational aspects of technology adoption. Adoption of technology means that 
the new technology needs to be made to fit with existing technologies, as well as 
46 A few qualifications. Firstly, one may speak also of innovations in the public sector, which is not 
commercial, but traditionally the concept has referred mainly to industry. Secondly, new may refer 
either to what is novel to an individual firm, or what is new to the entire market. Thirdly, one may also 
speak of other innovations than technological ones, for example organisational innovations (Boer and 
During 2001: 83-4).
And from an environmental point of view it would make sense to include what happens to a 
product after its use, that is how it is reinterpreted and modified during recycling, waste treatment etc. 
– perhaps especially in cases of reuse, where the innovation process in a sense becomes circular.
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existing organisational arrangements. Or, rather, that technology adoption is about 
constructing such a fit. And if we see a technology as a configuration of artefacts, 
routines, expertise, meanings, etc. (Fleck 2000:252), constructing this fit is about 
creating a new match between new and old artefacts, routines, expertise and so on.
Having thus set out the basic context of process innovation and firm organisation, we 
will here elaborate on the innovation process and discuss how environmental motives 
might be integrated into it. As in section 1, we will begin by setting out a 
mechanistic, rational model of the innovation process, and progress towards a more 
political approach.
Any larger innovation effort in a firm is likely to be managed as a project, with 
associated goals and plans, deadlines and other project management techniques to 
structure decision-making and work. In terms of decision-making (and work), this 
model suggests that the scope of decisions and the level of technological aggregation 
change through the process. They would change from the whole investment at the 
idea stage, down to a much more detailed level during the design and later stages 
(and back up to whole-project level at for example special decision points at the end 
of each stage). This corresponds to a division of labour between managers dealing 
with the overall picture, and employees solving more detailed problems drawing on 
their more specialised expertise.
In the project model there is also a progression from early stages, through a middle 
phase to late stages (a pre-determined project lifecycle, Hodgson 2004:86). In the 
case of investments in process technology this means something like: ideas and 
planning, design and implementation, optimisation and use. Moreover, the stages and 
levels intersect so that in early stages decisions are made at a high level of 
aggregation, and in later stages increasingly detailed decisions are made. As a 
consequence, employees can be expected to be involved less than managers in the 
early stages. Decisions at the whole-project level thus set the agenda by putting 
limitations on subsequent detailed decisions. Indeed, early decisions may decide 
what are considered major issues, and what are considered mere details.
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Reality is prone to be much messier than this simple model suggests, in terms of 
feedbacks and concurrent activities (Williams 1997:173-4). It is also a highly 
rationalised and managerial view of the innovation process, neglecting the political 
aspects of what is going on. Nevertheless, the model is still useful to give an 
overview of the innovation process, and as a starting point for discussion of what a 
more political model would look like.
We may now also ask what integration of environmental motives into the innovation 
process might mean. The rational model described above draws our attention to the 
management techniques (project management, environmental management, 
technology management, etc.) used, and the different stages and levels of decision-
making in the innovation process. 
We saw in the previous chapter that certain project practices were important ways to 
integrate environmental concerns into innovation processes. Firstly, environmental 
criteria may be routinely used for project assessment (Foster and Green 2000:296, 
Handfield et al. 2001:198). Secondly, there is the application of environmental tools 
like life cycle analysis, waste audits etc. (Lenox et al. 2000:91). Thirdly, there is the 
use of cross-functional teams including environmental staff (Lenox and Ehrenfeld 
1997:190, Lenox et al. 2000:91). 
These practices and techniques fit neatly into the rational, managerial view of the 
innovation processes, when described as neutral instruments ensuring the 
implementation of management intentions. A closer look at the methods used for 
environmental innovation shows that they are far from mechanistic and neutral. They 
involve subjective judgements and choices open for negotiation. Holm and 
Klemmensen (1994) described an eco-audit project with the aim of improving 
environmental performance in a Danish firm. The extensive auditing work 
undertaken involved, for example, prioritising what waste streams to analyse in 
depth. A scoring system was used, based on various national classification standards, 
but in the end “pragmatic reasoning and subjective evaluation” was also necessary 
(ibid.:19). This example shows that even using well-grounded, formalised methods, 
there is room for – and a necessity for – judgement and choice, which in turn opens 
up a space for organisational politics. When studying the use of such techniques, we 
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thus become aware that they are neither necessarily neutral instruments, nor 
necessarily lead to the implementation of management intentions in any simple, 
mechanistic way.
Indeed, we may say that rather than organisational rationality being reflected in such 
management techniques, organisational rationality is constructed through the use of 
these techniques. For example, project management relies on “careful planning and 
firm control of critical variables” (Hodgson 2004:85), and through such efforts 
managers seek to reduce uncertainties and achieve discipline and predictability (ibid:
85). (But, as we saw exemplified above, the success of such efforts is always only 
partial).
Management techniques reduce uncertainty about how to act, but they are also based 
on a particular body of knowledge and thus prescribe a specific way of interpreting 
the world. In the case of the eco-audit mentioned above, national standards of 
classifying environmental effects and risks were mobilised (Holm and Klemmensen 
1994:19). Such standards vary between countries and are the results of particular 
choices and priorities. This highlights that the management techniques embody 
specific values – although they are surely to some degree open to re-interpretation – 
and may be more compatible with the expertise of some firm actors than that of 
others.
A political approach would question why certain practices and techniques are 
established and what interests they may serve. The criteria and tools applied are 
likely to reflect some actors’ interests over others’, both in terms of management 
control and in terms of competition between different groups of experts. 
In a political approach the integration of environmental concerns is not just a matter 
of how, but also of who does the integrating and why they manage or not to do so. 
Looking back, again, to the literature review, we saw that the agendas of different 
departments or groups may influence the decisions made. In particular, the 
formulation of such strategy co-evolves with experiences from operations, rather 
than being a decoupled management activity (Halme 2002:1103).
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We need to ask ourselves what determines who influences decisions and who 
promotes environmental concerns. As we saw above, managers may be more likely 
than employees to successfully do so. An important dimension of this is who has 
access, that is who gets to be a part of the project and who does not (see for example 
Remmen and Lorentzen 2000 regarding workers). The literature reviewed shows a 
core set of mainly managers and engineers, but that it is an empirical question if and 
to what extent environmental staff (and workers) are allowed to take part. 
Cross-functional teams including environmental staff may or may not be set up 
(Lenox et al. 2000:91). 
This also relates to the notion of setting up an environmental function to buffer core 
activities from unwanted influences from environmental regulators (King 2000:224). 
Keeping environmental staff out may thus serve a function in letting the company 
manage different goals and external requirements in separate parts of the 
organisation, which may be helpful especially when those goals and requirements are 
seen to be contradictory (Brunsson 1989:11).
Mere access to a project does not, however, necessarily mean having a large 
influence. An important question is who is appointed to the more influential positions 
in the project, for example as project leader, and who has access to early stages of the 
process when important agenda-setting decisions are made.
As discussed in chapter 2, to understand environmental innovations in firms we need 
to look at the organisational aspects of the innovation process, and at how 
environmental and other motives are articulated and brought to bear upon the 
technological choices made, and how the technological and environmental outcomes 
are constructed in the process. We have here seen how this process is a complex one, 
in terms of practices and techniques, motives, actors etc. There is no straightforward 
connection between (some) firm actors’ environmental motives and the 
environmental outcomes of innovation work. The impact of such motives will 
depend on who has access to decision-making, on what routines and practices are 
applied to the work, etc. Contingencies and uncertainties are likely to be as important 
as orderly, rational implementation of management strategies.
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The first research question is therefore, as introduced in chapter 1:
1. What is the impact of environmental intentions on the technological outcomes,  
especially on core technologies?
We have here discussed the organisational aspects of technology adoption. A rational 
model of firm innovation based on stages, levels and project management techniques 
has been contrasted with a more critical political perspective. The political 
perspective opens up further questions regarding access and influence, as well as 
how project practices may reflect different actors’ interests. 
These issues of influence and power will be discussed in more detail below. Firstly 
we will focus on the – successful and unsuccessful – promotion of environmental 
concerns by individuals and groups, and thereafter we will shift the focus to the 
organisational structures that define opportunities and restraints of environmental 
promotion in the context of innovation processes in firms.
3.2.2 Environmental championing
The shaping of intentions and motives in innovation processes is done by the actors 
in the firm. Actors who have an interest in taking environmental aspects into 
consideration may promote those issues in the decision processes, and thus act as 
carriers of such environmental intentions.47 This section will focus on environmental 
promotion, and conceptualise it in terms of action and structure. Thus, the different 
influence of actors will be seen as reflected in the success, or lack of success, of their 
environmental promotion.
A common category of actor in the literature on environmental management is the 
environmental champion (see, for example, Anderson and Bateman 2000). This is a 
parallel to the literature on innovation, where the innovation champion is a common 
47 It is perhaps worth noticing here that an interest in promoting environmental issues does not pre-
suppose heart-felt environmentalism on behalf of the actor. Such an interest may be rooted, as we 
shall see later, in other things, for example raised status or control of resources.
Moreover, this definition of promotion (championing) is not limited to large issues, 
initiatives, etc., but includes also smaller ones.
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character (for a review see Jenssen and Jørgensen 2004), and to the change agent of 
organisational studies (Burns and Stalker 1961:199; Buchanan and Storey 1997). We 
will draw on these sets of literature as well, since although they highlight different 
actors with different skills, there is a common theme of conceptualising promotion 
(of the environment, of a technology, etc.).
There are different approaches to conceptualise what a champion is. At one end of 
the spectrum are models where the champion possesses certain qualities – like 
enthusiasm and willingness to take risks – which are what makes him/her a 
champion. This way of understanding champions risks underplaying the 
organisational context of the champion, and overplaying the achievements of the 
champion. 
Another, but related, weakness with this model is that the champion tends to become 
a hero, and everyone who does not accept the ideas of the champion becomes a 
villain.48 Resistance is in this model seen as destructive politicking, indeed politics is 
seen merely as something negative, rather than something a champion would be 
involved in to promote his/her aims. Whilst uncritically taking sides with the 
champion may serve well in an account with a highly prescriptive aim, analytically it 
runs the risk of neglecting the political dimension of environmental promotion, and 
to imbue champions with too narrow a range of motives.
A better way of understanding champions is to focus on the behaviour of 
championing (promoting) the environment. Anderson and Bateman (2000) studied 
the ways champions framed and presented environmental initiatives and compared 
successful championing attempts with unsuccessful ones. This approach recognises 
that the organisational context matters for championing, and that champions need to 
be reflexive about what they do. However, this is still a push rather than a pull model 
in its concern with the receptivity of managers to champions’ ideas.
At the opposite end of the action-structure spectrum is a structural model of 
championing. Here the organisational context stimulates the emergence of 
champions by creating opportunities for employees to assume this role. The findings 
48 Tidd et al. (2001:327) even speak of ‘assassins’.
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by Fincham et al. (1994) illustrate this model. They studied the careers of IT 
specialists in financial sector firms, and observed how there were structurally defined 
opportunities for this group of employees to further their careers by championing IT 
in these firms (and thus also strengthening the legitimacy of their own expertise) 
(Fincham et al. 1994:276).49 
This structural model thus highlights the organisational context of championing, but 
it also encompasses an action component in that potential champions must choose to 
take the opportunities offered to them by the organisation. The model thus avoids 
extreme structural determination.
Furthermore, the model of Fincham et al. (1994) is political, and career- and self-
interest is here part of what motivates the champions. Heroic models of champions 
tend to be uncritical of the champion’s goals (environmental improvement, 
technological innovation, organisational change, etc.), and describe them as 
benefiting the whole organisation. An explicit and perhaps extreme example of this is 
given by Jenssen and Jørgensen (2004:80): “It seems that the champion always acts  
unselfishly and in the best interest of the organisation but the organisation and its  
leadership do not understand this and resist change”. A political approach may 
reveal a more complicated set of motivations and interests.
Attention to political factors is thus a useful way to counteract the heroism-tendency 
of much of the champion literature. Another way to achieve this is to look at what 
other roles are played by firm actors in organisational change. For example, 
Tushman and Nadler (1996:151-2) present four roles that are ‘critical’ to 
innovations: idea generator, internal entrepreneur (champion), boundary spanner 
(gatekeeper) and sponsor (mentor). Whilst such typologies are somewhat arbitrary 
49 The study by Fincham et al. also highlights that championing can be a collective effort – a notion 
that is often lacking in champion research (Jensen and Jørgensen 2004:65), although Anderson and 
Bateman (2000) also talk of alliance-building. 
We may here refer back to Pettigrew (1985:481) who distinguished between different 
categories of alliances or groups promoting issues: hierarchical units, task forces, voluntary 
associations and networks. This categorisation also highlights the difference between groups with a 
mandate from management (the first two) and those that may need to operate without such legitimacy 
(the last two), which again draws our attention to the opportunities offered or not by the organisational 
structure.
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this set of roles serves to emphasise that champions are but one of the roles necessary 
for change,50 and so it puts the contribution of the champion into perspective.51
A further relativisation of the champion comes from Buchanan and Storey (1997) 
writing about organisational change agents. They point out that individuals may 
change roles during a process of change (and by analogy an innovation process), and 
point to role-taking and role-switching as important aspects of championing. This 
highlights the process of becoming (as well as ceasing to be) a champion, which is in 
conflict with essentialist and therefore static theorisations. And whilst Buchanan and 
Storey’s perspective is strongly actor-centred, we would argue that there is also a 
structural, contextual component to the process of becoming a champion.
In relation to environmental innovations environmental staff would seem to be 
natural candidates for the champion role, given their (presumed) knowledge about 
environmental aspects, at least when they are given access through inclusion in 
project teams. As we have seen, King showed that environmental staff are sometimes 
able to be gatekeepers between the environmental and engineering functions in the 
firm (1995:276; 2000:236). On the other hand, managers may be better situated to 
successfully promote environmental issues (Vickers and Cordey-Hayes 1999:87), but 
it is less obvious that they would recognise a need for doing so. It remains to be seen 
if the organisation offers any opportunities for promoting the environment in the 
context of innovation processes, and if so, who will take on this role.
We have here discussed and criticized the common individualist (essentialist) models 
of environmental champions. The hero-like qualities of the champion have been 
relativised by focussing on championing as a behaviour rather than as a trait, and by 
looking at broader sets of roles played in change events. Accounts of championing 
with a more political slant highlight self-interest among the motivations in choosing 
to take on the champion role. Structural models draw our attention to the importance 
50 Buchanan and Storey call this approach to management research ‘listology’, and argue that the point 
of such lists is the plurality of roles they point to, rather than any particular set of roles they portray 
(1997:140).
51 It is also a rather functionalist model, but nevertheless we may employ it to relativise champions.
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of the organisational context in producing opportunities for championing. This leads 
us to the second research question, as introduced in chapter 1:
2. How do any environmental concerns that firm actors may have affect the 
decisions made in innovation processes?
In the next section we will further discuss the organisational structures that form the 
context of environmental championing.
3.2.3 The social constitution
In this section we will focus on the structural aspects of organisations that shape 
decision-making and any efforts to promote environmental issues. We will draw 
mainly on the political process literature for this, and in particular the concept of the 
‘company social constitution’ as introduced by German and Danish scholars in this 
tradition. We will discuss how the social constitution allows for, hinders or shapes 
the integration of environmental motives into innovation processes.
Structures are relatively durable features of an organisation, but they are not static. 
To avoid such a conceptualisation we will also pay attention to mechanisms of 
structural change and how environmental concerns may come to be embedded in the 
structures of the organisation. The issue of integration of environmental concerns 
here becomes an issue of embedding as integration that lasts, and of shifting the 
organisational limits to such integration.
The concept of the ‘social constitution’ of a company was introduced by the German 
scholars Hildebrandt and Seltz in 1989 to describe existing compromises among 
actors in the organisation, primarily between employees and management (cited52 in 
Kamp 2000:77). The social constitution is said to develop over time and come to 
constitute a system of implicit norms and values, or ‘stiffened politic’ (Kamp 
2000:77). Clausen describes it as the “concerted norms, rules and principles in the 
company which influence employees’ behaviour, motivation and 
attitude” (1997:174). Among the policy topics central to the social constitution we 
52 Their publication is in German and therefore I have not read the original work.
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find work content and responsibility, control of work performance, careers, etc. 
(Koch 1997:138).
The company social constitution pre-supposes the existence of conflicts of interest. 
Although it has mainly been used to study employer-employee conflicts, Clausen 
points out that it can also encompass a variety of lines of conflict and not just two 
opponents (1997:174). And, whilst inspired by a Marxist tradition, it focuses on 
actors’ own understandings of problems rather than any objective interests (Clausen 
1997:174). 
The assumption of conflicts of interest does not mean that the concept of the 
company social constitution mainly explains overt conflict. On the contrary, it serves 
to explain also the normal, stable situation of compromise and, in this sense, 
consensus. Kamp expresses this (with reference to Pettigrew) as political processes 
that serve to stabilise and reproduce the existing order (2000:76).
This does not mean that the company social constitution is static. It can break down, 
and does so sometimes. Furthermore, the relative permanence of the social 
constitution, that is, its reproduction as a social structure, is not automatic but 
requires effort. Once a compromise is in place, the actors have an interest in 
maintaining it or pay the price of overt conflict. When acting within the existing 
compromise, the actors in the firm take the established interests of the other actors 
into account. They often ‘reflect’ the interests of the other actors, rather than 
negotiate them explicitly (Kamp 2000:77).
Such reflection may happen, to a degree, unconsciously as the actors internalise the 
terms of the compromise. We here see a link to the cultural aspects of politics, as 
described by Pettigrew, and Kamp stresses that the social constitution concept refers 
to actors’ own understandings of structures, rather than structures in an objective 
sense (2000:78). This fits well with Clausen insisting, as we saw above, on the 
concept focussing on the actors’ own understandings of their problems and interests. 
The term ‘compromise’ does not imply an even distribution of power, just that 
opposing actors’ interests can not entirely be ignored, given the potential 
disruptiveness of open conflict. However, this assumes that no actors can be ignored. 
This may be a reasonable assumption when studying employer-employee conflicts, at 
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least in unionised workplaces, but perhaps less so for other actor categories and other 
lines of conflict. We need to be aware that the prevalent rules and norms may 
disregard the interests of some actors.
Although the concept of the social constitution of companies primarily refers to how 
people relate to each other in the organisation, several writers have stated that the 
social constitution is also a lens through which organisational actors interpret the 
external context of the organisation. Kamp refers to the social constitution as a lens 
(2000:77), and Remmen and Lorentzen as a filter (2000:366). The existing 
compromises set out the agreed positions on different issues, and come to shape how 
the actors interpret what goes on both in and outside the company.
3.2.3.1 Innovation, expertise and the social constitution  
The social constitution concept does not explicitly refer to either innovation or 
environmental work, although it has been applied to such topics,53 – for example, to 
the adoption of IT solutions for managing production (Clausen 1997). It has also 
been applied in the area of environmental work by Kamp (2000) studying the 
introduction of environmental (and health and safety) management concepts, and 
Remmen and Lorentzen (2000) who studied worker participation in cleaner 
technology projects.
For example, Remmen and Lorentzen showed that there was an emerging consensus 
between trade unions and employers regarding the importance of environmental 
work (2000:370), but that in some companies with weak traditions of worker 
participation in decision-making environmental work was managed in a way that 
invalidated the experience and expertise of the workers (2000:368). Kamp similarly 
53 It may therefore be useful to compare the concept with similar concepts that are more explicitly 
about technology. A related concept is that of a technological regime. A regime is a “multi-layered set  
of rules and grammar operating in and derived from the complex of ‘scientific knowledges,  
engineering practices, production process technologies, product characteristics, skills and 
procedures, and institutions and infrastructures that make up technology’ ” (Russell and Williams 
2002:118, citing Geels and Schot 1998). 
This concept shares a focus on rules and norms with the notion of the social constitution, but 
there are several differences. Firstly, the locus of these rules and norms is a technology in the case of 
the regime, and an organisation in the case of a social constitution. Secondly, the regime concept is 
concerned with the different social dimensions of technology, but the social constitution concept is 
more explicitly political in that it deals with interests and conflicts.
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showed how in the introduction of an integrated health, safety and environmental 
system, the new environmental management practices were influenced by traditions 
of participation in health and safety (2000:88).
Existing applications of the ‘company social constitution’ concept have thus 
focussed on conflicting interests between workers and employers. In this study the 
focus is more on highly educated, white-collar employees than on workers, and the 
concept therefore needs some modification. This will be done through a discussion of 
‘expertise’. We will here first set out some issues regarding expertise in 
environmental innovation work, and thereafter discuss how these issues may be 
understood through the concept of the social constitution.
Expertise in firms is often compartmentalised into formal organisational units, or into 
occupational categories (Fincham et al., 1994:20-21). For example, environmental 
expertise may be found within environmental, health and safety units or with 
environmental engineers positioned in other parts of the organisation. The divisions 
of expertise, that is the boundaries between organisational units or between 
occupational categories, is part of what is contestable between different interest 
groups in firms.
Expertise is a resource for a group of experts in their efforts to gain influence in a 
firm, as well as an outcome of such efforts. Thus, with reference to environmental 
innovations, it is suggested that important issues may be conflicts regarding the 
boundaries between areas of environmental and technological expertise, and that the 
legitimacy of environmental expertise may be questioned.
In the context of environmental innovations, Clayton et al. (1999:251) for example 
(as mentioned above) found cases where environmental staff sought to limit the 
solutions to environmental problems to end-of-pipe technologies since that was the 
kind of expertise they possessed. It was in their interest to promote such solutions, as 
this legitimised their expertise.
Whilst beneficial for the development of specialist knowledge, the division of 
expertise also gives rise to coordination problems, as well as communication 
problems between groups of experts. One proposed solution to this is the 
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development of hybrid expertise, that is, staff with some knowledge in both fields of 
expertise (Fincham et al. 1994:22) that facilitates cooperation and communication. In 
relation to environmental innovation, the role of environmental engineers as potential 
holders of hybrid expertise is especially interesting.
In terms of the social constitution, boundary disputes are examples of horizontal 
conflicts between competing groups of experts54. Examples of potential conflict 
topics in the context of innovation processes are the role of environmental design 
criteria and the relevance of environmental expertise for technological work.
But any such conflicts also take place in a hierarchical organisational context. 
Management is likely to want to have a say on matters of who does what and how it 
is to be done, that is, whose expertise is relevant for what tasks and what routines are 
to be followed. Management techniques like setting up cross-functional teams and 
supporting or mandating the use of environmental design tools can thus be seen to 
have political implications.
Indirectly, management will also influence the relative status of groups of experts 
through for example salaries and promotions. Management has a relatively large 
degree of control over the internal labour markets where expertise is valued, and over 
whose expertise is important and central to the organisation. This does not mean that 
management authority determines everything. Expertise may be difficult to evaluate 
(Fincham et al. 1994:241) and to manage, and there is room for manoeuvre for the 
employees as well. For the individual employee, striving for promotion is an obvious 
way of attempting to raise the status of his or her expertise (Heimer 1984).
As discussed previously there are limits to politics55 as an explanation of behaviour 
in organisations. Environmental aspects may have remained unpoliticised, and the 
absence of environmental motives in innovation work should not automatically be 
taken to mean that they have been excluded. We would, however, argue that different 
actors in the organisation are likely to have, to some degree, different interests 
54 As compared to previous work using this concept focussing mainly on conflicts of interest between 
blue-collar workers and management.
55 In terms of decision-making and agenda-setting.
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regarding the importance of improving environmental performance and regarding 
how to do it (Kamp 2000).
Expertise is thus formed, promoted and managed in a structured context of 
interlinked vertical and horizontal conflicts of interest. We are here extending the 
concept of the ‘company social constitution’ to encapsulate established norms 
regarding the boundaries of types of expertise, and the status and interaction between 
different experts. The social constitution will shape who has access to 
decision-making and work as part of the innovation process, and thus who will be in 
a position to promote environmental concerns.
The social constitution further highlights stiffened, covert conflict, and not just overt 
conflict. We would expect its norms and rules not to be constantly fought over, but 
often accepted, or even taken for granted, and reflected in the work practices and 
informal networks established. The social constitution thus shapes the ways in which 
environmental concerns may be integrated in work practices, and how 
environmentally committed actors may be included in influential informal networks.
Finally, the social constitution draws our attention to historical developments in the 
organisation, and how the current constitution has been formed and established over 
time. This will allow us to distinguish between one-off environmental improvements, 
and more long-lasting structural changes embedding environmental concerns into the 
organisational structures.
We have here introduced the notions of ‘the company social constitution’ and 
‘expertise’ to theorise structural organisational limits to the integration and 
promotion of environmental concerns into innovation work. Our third, and last, 
research questions is, as introduced in chapter 1:
3. What are the structurally determined organisational limits and opportunities to 
the integration of environmental concerns into firm innovation processes?
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3.3 Conclusion – the analytical framework
To sum up, we have seen that integration is here a matter of understanding the role of 
environmental concerns in the innovation process, and especially in decision-making. 
Environmental concerns will be brought into the process through environmental 
championing, that is, individuals or groups promoting environmental concerns. Such 
championing will be shaped by the social constitution of the firm. It may even be that 
the constitution changes over time, thus resulting in a more rooted, lasting integration 
of environmental concerns. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the main aspects of the resulting analytical framework. At the 
centre of the framework we have decision-making as part of the innovation process. 
Actors articulate and promote (champion) different objectives including, perhaps, 
environmental performance. Decisions about detailed solutions are made within the 
confines of an agenda largely set early on in the process.
These actors bring their interests to bear on their actions in the decision-making 
process, including career interests, concerns for the legitimacy of their expertise, etc. 
The actions and roles of the actors are enabled and restricted by the social 
constitution of the organisation, central parts of which are established routines and 
practices, the existing divisions of labour and expertise and the management system.
The actors and the constitution thus form an internal context for decision-making. 
Influences from the external to the company context include not least regulation and 
product market pressures, but also the individuals’ private lives and their positions on 
external labour markets.
Finally, the framework encompasses the processual, temporal aspect of 
organisational life, where stability and change are the products of the actors’ 
behaviour. Career moves and changed routines and practices are important examples 
of categories of change.
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Figure 3.1  Analytical framework
This framework will help us answer the research questions set out in chapter 1, and 
avoid the problems of the environmental innovation literature identified in chapter 2. 
The framework avoids reification of environmental motives, by analysing them as 
distinct from the technological outcomes, and in the context of other motives. The 
processual focus will expose change both for better and for worse, and enable us to 
distinguish between one-off changes and rooted change, and thus help us avoid 
environmental management determinism. The attention to the interests of multiple 
actors will help towards a non-managerial56 analysis. Furthermore, the framework 
will allow for an analysis that is sensitive to both structure and action aspects of 
decision-making. In the next chapter we will seek to develop a methodology through 
which this framework can be implemented.
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In the literature review (chapter 2) we discussed some problems identified in the 
environmental management literature. Based on this discussion we identified the 
need for a contextualist, processual and political theoretical approach, and such an 
approach was elaborated in the previous chapter.
This chapter aims to present the methodology used in this research project, and to 
justify the research design choices made. The first section sets out the starting points 
of the research project and some of the main analytical choices made. Thereafter, we 
shall discuss the empirical part of the project, and, finally, issues relating to the 
analytical methods used in a separate, third section.
A few comments need to be made before we start. Firstly, research is an iterative 
process and the different parts: literature review, analysis, data collection, etc. to an 
extent progress in parallel, and are interrelated. It has been attempted to make such 
dynamics and connections explicit whilst writing a linear narrative about the 
methodology. Secondly, the choice has been made to not tack on issues regarding 




We shall here take the research questions (previously stated in chapters 1 and 3) as 
starting points for the development of a methodology for this thesis. The first 
research question is:
1. What is the impact of environmental intentions on the technological outcomes,  
especially on core technologies?
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As discussed in chapter 2, we need to avoid conflating environmental intentions and 
environmental outcomes, and instead analyse them separately, especially in the case 
of cleaner technology. We therefore need to unpack the innovation process, and 
study how environmental intentions are articulated there and brought to bear upon 
the technological decisions made as part of this process. This is one of the reasons 
why we shall choose a case study approach, which will help us capture in some detail 
the processual character of innovations. See section 4.1.2.
Moreover, we have stated in chapter 1 that this research project is about exploring 
the boundary between environmental innovations and other innovations (especially 
between cleaner technology and other core process technology). This means that we 
need to avoid studying innovations through a ‘green lens’, that is to assume a 
separate set of environmental activities. Instead we need to contextualise the 
environmental aspects of the innovation process, to study environmental intentions in 
the context of other intentions, etc. This has consequences for what innovations to 
chose for study. Instead of studying only ‘best practice’ environmental innovations, 
we need to study a range of cases with varying environmental ambitions and 
outcomes. See section 4.2.2.
2. How do any environmental concerns that firm actors may have affect the 
decisions made in innovation processes?
This research question highlights the multiplicity of actors that may be involved in 
the innovation process, and the possibility of them promoting environmental 
concerns in this context. The question requires that we study the motivations and 
interests of the participants, which is best done by engaging with multiple informants 
for each case as opposed to choosing a single informant to speak on behalf of all the 
others (which, as we saw in chapter 2, may contribute to overly rational and 
managerial results). See section 4.2.3.
Question number 2 further enquires about the issue of how innovations are promoted, 
and how actors can bring influence to bear on this process. This supports the choice 
of a qualitative approach, which is better able to catch both the formal and informal 
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aspects of organisational dynamics (Marshall and Rossman, 1989:46). See section 
4.1.2.
3. What are the structurally determined organisational limits and opportunities to 
the integration of environmental concerns into firm innovation processes? 
This research question further highlights the structural aspects of the organisational 
context, seen as a dynamic aspect of the organisation that changes over time. This is 
an analytical category capturing on the one hand the organisational obstacles that 
limit any actor’s influence, and on the other the opportunities the organisation 
provides to the actor enabling action. Structures thus need to be evaluated and 
understood from the viewpoint of a particular (individual or collective) actor. What is 
structural and unyielding for one actor may be amenable to change by the actions of 
another.
The main methodological implication of this research question is about what data we 
need. Firstly, we need data about the organisational context57 of the actors’ 
behaviour, that is, how they understood the context of their action. Secondly, we 
need data about the history of that context. The interview themes following form this 
research question, as well as from the previous two, will be discussed in more detail 
in section 4.2.4.
4.1.2 Case studies and unit of analysis
This research is – at the most general level – about making peoples’ everyday 
experiences accessible to academic reflection, about providing concepts and 
categorisations that reflect people’s lives, but that also form a systematic framework 
capable of generalisation. The wish to gain access to people’s own understandings of 
their situation and to analyse this within a complex setting calls for a qualitative 
approach capable of dealing with the required richness and complexity of data, as 
well as the situatedness of the object of study (Marshall and Rossman 1989:46).
57 ‘Organisational context’ here refers primarily to the internal organisational context, but also to the 
external context – for example regulation – as it impacts on the organisation and shapes the internal 
context.
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There is a strong tradition of case study research in STS, and for good reasons. 
Firstly, to understand the co-evolution of society and technology (or science), we 
need to study technology (and science) in a social context. It is important to note here 
that social context is not only society at a macro level, but also the social aspects of 
the micro setting58, in this case organisational roles, routines etc. Case studies are a 
good strategy for studying objects in their “real-life context” (Yin 1994:13). A richer 
picture can be painted than using, for example, surveys. Secondly, and relatedly, case 
studies are good for dealing with complex topics where there are many dimensions 
(more variables than data points, Yin 1994:13).
This study deals with many levels and objects of analysis: nations, industrial sectors, 
firm organisations, people, decisions etc. The empirical core of the study, however, 
are the choices (decisions) made as part of investment projects. Such choices are 
what links (or not) intentions and outcomes, and they are influenced by the actors 
and structures of the particular organisation, which in turn are influenced by sectoral 
and national circumstances. The unit of analysis is therefore the technological 
choices made relating to an investment project. 
Four investment projects in four firms will be studied and written up as four case 
studies. There is a sense, however, in which we have more than four cases. It will 
also be possible to compare individual decisions in the same project.
4.1.3 Comparative analysis
It was judged that it would be possible to make several case studies within the 
limitations of the research project. This would have the benefit of enabling 
comparative analysis. Multiple cases can improve the precision, validity and stability 
of findings (Miles and Huberman 1994:29). 
Each case study was pursued until the major technological choices of the project 
were identified and explored, and until respondents representing the different 
categories of actors identified in the literature had been included. 
58 And to try to reconcile the macro and micro level settings (Russell and Williams 2002:61).
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More detail could have been elicited with a participant observation method. It was 
judged, however, that interviews would yield enough detail to understand the 
technological choices. Using a participant observation method would also have 
consumed more time per case study, thus reducing the scope for comparison of cases.
This comparative approach raises the issue of what comparison is and how it can be 
used to yield useful results. It is essentially a game of similarities and differences 
between cases. Cases are selected that are at the same time similar in some respects 
and different in others. Similarity enhances comparability, and differences in one 
dimension can shed light on how that dimension affects the overall case dynamics.
Whilst it is impossible to describe all aspects of a case, it is necessary to as far as 
possible account for all relevant aspects. What aspects are relevant will follow from 
literature and theory, or from the emerging understanding of the cases. Thus, this is a 
matter both of selecting cases, and of analysing the cases once the data has been 
collected. Regarding case selection the task is to find cases that are both sufficiently 
alike to be comparable, and different in interesting ways, with interesting being 
determined by theory and literature. This is called theoretical replication (Yin 
1994:46).
The overall set of possible cases that could have been chosen is called the sampling 
frame (which should not be taken to refer to any statistical sampling method) (Miles 
and Huberman 1994:29). In this study the sampling frame is: large investments in 
process technology in medium to large sized firms in process industries in Sweden 
and Scotland. We shall return later to the decision to avoid small projects and small 
firms. Here, let us just say that the focus on process technology as used in process 
industry firms gives us cases which are relatively comparable in terms of technology, 
as compared to the technology used in other manufacturing or service firms.
The choice made was to select cases from two different process industry sectors and 
two different countries. This way it was possible to control for each of these 
dimensions whilst analysing the other. For example, we could compare cases 
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between the two industrial sectors within the same country, thus exposing sectoral 
factors that were at work irrespective of nation.59
With this combination of sectors and countries we have a combination of similarities 
enhancing comparability and interesting differences. Starting with the country 
dimension, cases were selected from Scotland and Sweden. A complication here is 
that Scotland is part of the UK, which matters in terms of the organisation of 
environmental policy implementation. We shall return to this issue in the context 
chapter. 
The two countries have somewhat different regulatory regimes because of a history 
of higher environmental policy ambition levels in Sweden (Connelly and Smith 
1999:295; Midttun and Kamfjord 1999:875), although decreasingly so because of EU 
harmonisation. This difference is in part due to neocorporatist inclusion of 
environmental movement organisations in Swedish environmental policy-making 
(Connelly and Smith 1999:296), and has co-evolved with somewhat stronger pro-
environmental attitudes among the Swedish general public (as will be discussed in 
chapter 5). Regulatory differences are likely to impact on the compliance behaviour 
of firms. Environmental attitudes among the public may also matter directly for 
innovation work, insofar as they are expressed at work.
A further difference between the two countries is to be found in their structures of 
occupational formation. The UK has a much more elaborate organisational set-up for 
the formal recognition of skills acquired through experience, as well as for protecting 
and promoting the status of occupational groups, whereas in Sweden such groups 
rely more exclusively on the attainment of higher education degrees for the 
protection of their status. This difference between the two countries may relate to the 
UK having a weaker employment protection and a higher labour mobility between 
59 A potentially complicating factor here was the international character, mostly through ownership, of 
some of the companies. Both the Scottish cases were in companies with operations also in England. In 
the case of Chemicals Scotland, the headquarters and the owners were in England rather than in 
Scotland. This is one of the ways in which the Scottish cases are British rather than Scottish (we shall 
return to the issue of the possibility of analytically separating out Scotland from the rest of Britain in 
the next chapter). The Swedish dairy case was ‘all Swedish’, whereas the Chemicals Sweden case was 
in a company that had been set up in Sweden, and subsequently bought by a Dutch concern. For the 
purpose of our comparison, we can note that there was no case of ownership relations between 
Scotland and Sweden.
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firms, making formal recognition of skills and experience more important for both 
employees and employers (this will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5). The 
difference in the structures of occupational formation in the two countries may 
matter for how expertise is formed in firms, as well as for any policies addressing the 
formation of expertise.
As regards the sectoral dimension, cases were chosen from the chemical and the 
dairy industries. As mentioned above, both are process industries, which will 
facilitate comparison in terms of the technology used (although there are nevertheless 
considerable technological differences, not least within the heterogeneous chemical 
industry). Interesting differences are found in their environmental performance with 
the chemical industry having a much larger environmental impact, and a longer 
history of exposure to environmental regulation and stronger environmental 
pressures.
Other process industry sectors than the dairy sector could have been chosen as a 
contrast to the chemical cases. In actual fact a case study at a paper mill was 
initiated, but the company soon went bankrupt and the initial contact persons with 
whom access was negotiated no longer worked there. Attempts were also made to 
gain access to an oil refinery, but they were not willing to grant it.60
By this choice of cases, we were thus hoping to shed light on the importance of some 
of the contextual dimensions of the cases, both in terms of the outer context, notably 
regulation, and the inner context of environmental capabilities. Further, it was the 
intention to study the role of the historical (decades rather than centuries) 
development of environmental work and technology in the organisations. Using a 
comparative approach will in this way enable us to study the contextual and 
processual aspects of the cases, linking data with the theoretical perspective set out 
above, contributing to analytical generalisability (Yin 1994:30).
60 Also, access was negotiated with a waste management company, which could have been interesting 
in that the business idea here involves an environmental service. Contacts were also made with 
electronics manufacturing and mechanical manufacturing companies. Apart from access problems 




Having presented the major choices regarding the framework of the research design, 
this section will present the detailed design of the empirical part of the project. The 
first two sub-sections are about how firms and investment projects were identified, 
selected and gained access to. The next three sub-sections justify the choice of 
interviews as the main method of data collection, and discuss identification of, 
selection of and access to interviewees. These sub-sections also deal with issues 
relating to interview questions, the roles of interviewees and the interviewer, and 
practical aspects of recording and transcribing the interviews. The last sub-section is 
about the use of documents in this study.
4.2.1 The companies
Apart from choosing particular process industry sectors in Scotland and Sweden, one 
more criterion was applied when identifying possible case study companies. Since 
the study would focus on certain categories of staff, not least engineers and 
environmental staff, it was decided to avoid small companies who might not have 
such employees or very few.
Potential case study companies were identified in several ways. One case was 
identified through the supervisors of this project, who had studied this company 
before (see below, in the section Documents). The other cases were identified using 
the internet, or via colleagues at VINNOVA – The Swedish Agency for Innovation 
Systems, where I worked prior to and part-time during this research project. 
Initial access was gained by calling the company switchboards and after explaining 
my purpose, asking to talk to someone who might be relevant. The initial contact 
persons turned out to be environmental or technical managers (some of which had 
responsibilities in both areas) in all cases.
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Some companies (initial contact persons) said no to my request for access.61 More 
than ten companies were contacted in all, many of which granted access. Several 
companies that granted access were later discarded: the paper mill as described 
above, but also some UK dairy companies since one such was deemed sufficient.
Negotiating access in some cases involved agreeing to conditions set by the 
companies. This mainly regarded a promise to send them case reports for scrutiny to 
make sure that no details were included that would expose business secrets. In one 
case this also included keeping some of the technological details of the production 
process and the investment project secret. This was deemed acceptable for the 
purposes of the study, and has not hampered the analysis. All companies are also 
anonymised in this thesis.
61 In most cases, once access was initially negotiated, that was the end of this problem. However, in 
one case access was later withdrawn. This relates to the Chemical Scotland case, and the reason stated 
for withdrawing access was not clear, but related to my attempt to contact Scottish Environmental 
Protection Agency (SEPA) to interview the company’s contact person there about the project studied. 
Negotiation was on-going with the SEPA officer, and I had on his request sent an email to him 
outlining the areas I wanted to talk about. It transpired that he had then contacted the company to 
enquire what was going on. When the company heard his version of events and about the email I had 
sent there had been friction between the company and the regulator, and this issue had been taken to 
higher levels of authority in each organisation before it could be settled. The company then contacted 
me and let me know that I was no longer welcome. Nor, I understood, was it now possible to talk to 
the regulator.
It is still not clear to me why this happened, or why the email in question caused this rather 
drastic reaction. The email was phrased in a relatively open and informal manner, and did suggest that 
the regulator officer might have a different perspective on the project than company staff. Perhaps it 
was naïve to think that it was possible to be so straightforward in writing. This was the first of the case 
studies performed, and care was taken in the later cases to be more diplomatic.
The damage to this research project was limited. It would have been useful to do a few more 
interviews on the case, and to talk to the regulator, but it was nevertheless possible to use the case 
study with the information gained from previous interviews.
This event is also interesting in that it appears to tell us something about the relationship 
between the company and the regulator. On the one hand the relationship was close and good enough 
for the SEPA officer to contact the company and discuss my attempt to get in touch, on the other hand 
the relationship appears to have been relatively fragile, if my email could have had this impact. It also 
appears to testify to the importance placed by the company on the relationship with the regulator. The 
company went to some length in trying to repair the damage done to the relationship.
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4.2.2 The innovations
The unit of analysis, as stated above, is the choices made relating to investment 
projects. A few more things need to be made clear about how such projects were 
chosen. 
Firstly, we discussed above the importance of studying environmental intentions and 
environmental outcomes as separate phenomena, and to study them in the context of 
other intentions, and other technological practices than those explicitly labelled 
environmental. This is to avoid what could be called using a ‘green lens’, that is, 
studying only environmental aspects of firm activities without making clear how they 
fit in with other aspects. Such an approach is likely to lead to deterministic outcomes, 
predicting ever-improving environmental performances.
This is akin to Bloor’s ‘symmetry principle’ (1976:5), which states that the same 
types of causes should be used to explain the development of true and false scientific 
beliefs. Here we would insist that we need theories that can explain not just ‘best 
practice’ cases of environmental innovation but also less green outcomes.
This has consequences for how projects are chosen in this study. It is worth noting 
that the unit of analysis is not framed in environmental terms. The reason for this is 
that we should not uncritically accept the firms’ accounts of ‘best practice 
environmental innovations’ which give rise to improved environmental performance 
and which were driven by environmental (including compliance) motives. A core 
question of this research project is exactly how and when intentions and outcomes 
relate to each other, and so it becomes problematic to use this as a means of 
identifying projects for study.
When discussing with firms what projects to chose for this study, efforts were 
therefore made to explain that projects that were seen by the firm as representing 
good practice or large environmental improvements were not the only projects of 
interest. The projects finally chosen are a mix of projects in terms of environmental 
ambition levels and environmental outcomes.
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Secondly, projects involving only end-of-pipe technology were avoided. Such 
projects were attractive candidates in that they most likely had a strong component of 
environmental intentions, but were nevertheless rejected in favour of projects 
involving both core technology and end-of-pipe technology. A main reason for this 
was a perceived risk that such projects would be managed too separately from the 
rest of the organisation. One of the benefits of end-of-pipe technology to companies 
is just this, that it can be installed without major disruptions to operations. By 
including core technology it was guaranteed that the projects would be central to the 
organisation. Core technology is also likely to be more important economically to the 
company, and was judged to be more interesting in terms of studying the limits of 
integrating environmental intentions. Each project chosen is mixed in terms of core 
and end-of-pipe technology.
Furthermore, small projects were avoided to make sure that there were enough staff 
involved to have ready access to interviewees (compare the criterion of large firms 
above) and to study projects central to the organisation. The projects studied are all 
large investment projects.
The choice was made to study investment projects rather than technology 
development projects. The main reason is the former’s direct relevance to the actual 
environmental impact of technology ‘in action’ in firms. Technology development 
and even research are also interesting but that is for another study.
The investment projects were identified in discussion with the interviewees, most 
often the first person contacted. Typically a number of projects were discussed and it 
was up to me to choose, based on my understanding of what was relevant. In one 
case, Chemical Sweden, the contact person listened to my account of what I was 
interested in, and later came back to me proposing two projects, one regarding an 
investment in a plant and one about the development of a new product. The plant 
investment was deemed interesting.62 This identification procedure may help in 
explaining the relatively high environmental ambition seen in this case, as compared 
62 Two interviews were done regarding the product development project before dropping that case in 
favour of the process technology one. Those interviews were nevertheless useful for background 
information about the organisation.
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to the other three. The company probably wanted to promote a relatively ‘green’ 
project. The total set of cases, as mentioned before, is a mix of projects with different 
ambition levels.
Within the projects chosen, it was necessary to select what choices to study. Such 
large projects of course involve many choices on varying levels of detail or 
aggregation, and not all can be studied here. A few different criteria were used to 
identify choices for study. Of obvious interest is the decision to initiate the project in 
the first place. Further focus was achieved by asking about choices of relevance to 
different environmental aspects (releases to air, to water, energy usage etc.) of the 
projects, both as identified by the interviewees and after probing when some aspects 
were left out. For example, energy usage was not always spontaneously mentioned 
by the interviewees as an environmental aspect. Efforts were also made to cover the 
main technological components of the projects.
4.2.3 The interviewees
The interviewees were identified as the case studies were carried out (‘snowballing’, 
Berg 1995:206), starting with people identified by the first contact person in the firm. 
Access to interviewees was facilitated by entering the company at a management 
level (Arksey and Knight 1999:64, 123). Often the first contact person let other 
interviewees know I would get in touch with them, and the authority of a manager 
gave my contacting them added legitimacy. Access to staff was generally not a 
problem, once past the initial gatekeeper.
A first criterion when selecting new interviewees was their involvement in the 
project studied. In particular, the project leader for all cases was interviewed. In a 
few cases interviews were done with people who had no or little role in the projects. 
In the Dairy Scotland case no environmental staff were involved in the project, but 
an environmental staff member was interviewed anyway for contextual information 
regarding the environmental work in the company, and with the question in mind of 
why he was not part of the project. In the Chemicals Sweden case some of the 
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interviewees were involved in another project, but provided useful background 
information about the organisation.
It was not possible, nor necessary, to interview all project participants. A selection 
was made to cover the main categories of staff potentially involved, as identified in 
the literature review: engineers, environmental staff, managers and workers. Thus the 
main areas of expertise, and different hierarchical levels were covered.
The managers interviewed were located as high up the company hierarchy as the 
Technical Managers and Division Managers. Most managers were lower in the 
company hierarchies. Even though some decisions were made high up in the 
management structure, priority was given to those substantially involved in the 
projects. The reason for this was to talk to individuals with a thorough insight into 
the projects. It was also hoped that interviewees lower down in the hierarchies would 
put somewhat less ‘spin’ on their accounts of the cases, and give straighter answers.
The categories of interviewees to include changed somewhat over the course of the 
project. The aim to include operators and union representatives was eventually 
dropped. Firstly, this was done because relatively little relevant information was 
gained. Few of the unions interviewed, for example, had any interest in or much 
knowledge of the environmental aspect of the projects. Secondly, this was done 
because excluding the issue of worker participation allowed a sharper focus on the 
core categories of participants: engineers and environmental staff.
In contrast, a new category emerged during the project. Part of the project work was 
done in three out of the four cases by external consultants (or equipment supplier 
staff doing design-type work for their customers). This was mainly engineering 
consultants, but to a smaller extent also environmental consultants. Consultants were 
interviewed in these three cases.
In addition to those involved in the projects, interviews were also made with the 
companies’ main contact persons at the environmental regulator in each case (apart 
from the Chemicals Scotland case, see footnote 61). The regulator staff were 
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identified via firm interviewees, or via the regulator’s switchboard. The companies 
agreed to me contacting regulator staff.
This was done to gain a potentially different viewpoint from the one of the firm 
regarding the environmental aspects of the investment projects, and the company’s 
environmental performance in general. The regulator staff were also a useful source 
regarding details of environmental permits and permit application processes. 
The regulator staff were useful interviewees in that they had some insight into the 
company and – to varying degrees – the projects, whilst at the same time being on 
the outside of the firm and thus having somewhat different commitments. Although, 
as the Chemicals Scotland case illustrates, they also place value on maintaining their 
working relationship with the company, and this might have limited the amount of 
criticism of them revealed. A similar thing can be said about consultants and supplier 
staff, who when involved in the projects had good insights, but also are employed 
outside the firm. Here, repeated contracts and hopes for future work may have 
coloured their replies.
The interviewees were thus selected in part to represent the actor categories 
identified in the literature, and in part to explore those actor categories actually 
involved in the cases studied (Arksey and Knight 1999:52). All in all 43 interviewees 
were done. Between 8 and 14 per case, depending on access (in particular in the 
interrupted case of Chemical Scotland) and on how many people were involved in 
the project. The interviewees are listed in Appendix A.
4.2.4 The interviews
Data was collected primarily through semi-structured interviews. This was deemed 
suitable for the qualitative information sought, and for the potential to clarify and 
elaborate issues during the interviews given the complex, contextualised nature of 
the topic (May 1993:93). It would have been possible to choose a participant 
observation method instead, but it was judged that interviews would give enough 
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detail and insight, and the more time-consuming option of participant observation 
was therefore not chosen.
Another alternative would have been survey research. Given the aim to thoroughly 
contextualise the topic, surveys were not suitable as a main method of collecting 
data. However, using surveys in conjunction with interviews was considered, 
especially for questions regarding the interviewees’ private life environmental values 
and behaviour (see below). A survey would have given more easily comparable data, 
but as Crane has pointed out, criticising the predominant positivist approach of 
business ethics research, ethical concepts also need to be understood in context, and 
there are risks about developing questions prior to data collection (1999:245). It was 
therefore decided to stick with the interview method, and to combine an open-ended 
question about private life environmental values, with more closed, and comparable, 
questions about membership in environmental movement organisations, and 
household behaviour.
The research questions were designed to elicit the information necessary to answer 
the research questions. A set of themes were developed and made part of an 
interview guide. The themes of the interviews are listed in table 4.1.
A few comments may be made regarding the interview themes. We have already 
discussed above how different environmental and technological aspects were 
identified in dialogue with the interviewees. We have also discussed previously 
which categories of staff the case studies sought to cover, and that each interview 
offered opportunities to identify further potential interviewees. Also, some of the 
themes cover the recent history of the firms and the interviewees. These themes were 
included to strengthen the processual aspect of the analysis. The interview themes are 
also overlapping. For example, the interviewee’s background can be seen as part of 
the inner (history of work in the organisation) and outer (education, private life 
issues) context.
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Table 4.1  Interview themes
Major themes Sub-themes
Project Aims, outcomes, technological and environmental aspects, 
project organisation
Choices Options, motives, actors involved in decision-making
Inner context Company organisation, engineering and environmental work 
and expertise, history of engineering and environmental work
Outer context Markets, regulation
Actors Organisational position, roles in project, careers and 
education, private life environmental commitments, 
interaction between staff and consultants
These themes were quite stable over the duration of the project, with the emergent 
theme of interaction between staff and consultants as a major exception. Also, in 
each case more specific, detailed themes emerged. For example, the timing of the 
increased regulatory pressure in the Dairy Scotland case, or the vent gas conflict in 
the Chemicals Scotland case.
The interview guide was structured in three parts. The major middle part was about 
the case project, and here most of the themes tabled above were covered. The first 
and third part were about the interviewee:
1. the interviewee’s position in the organisation,
2. the case project, including the interviewee’s role in it, and
3. the interviewee’s background and private life environmental commitments.
The first part contained relatively easy questions to break the ice (Arksey and Knight 
1999:98). In the middle part more use was made of probing, follow-up questions to 
elicit more detailed answers (May 1993:93; Robson 1993:234). The parts about the 
interviewee were the most structured parts, mainly asking for basic facts about the 
interviewee’s position, previous jobs etc. It was made explicit at the start of each 
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interview that the interviewee did not have to answer the questions if they did not 
want to.
There is a sense in which the interviewees were prompted to perform two different 
roles. Firstly, their role as defined by their position in the company and experience 
from the case project – they here represented themselves as employees and 
representatives of the company. Secondly, they were asked about their background, 
including their education and any career before being employed in the case company, 
and also about their private life environmental commitments – it was here my 
intention to induce them to perform a role more independent of the company context. 
This does not mean that I could control which role they played. For example, in a 
few cases, the interviewees were not comfortable talking about their private life 
values, and preferred expounding on the company policy. The professional and the 
private roles are also not independent; we bring private life concerns to work and 
vice versa. Care had to be taken interpreting the interviewees’ statements when 
trying to distinguish between their private and professional roles.
A further complexity, given the comparative approach chosen, is to distinguish 
between national culture and other individual commitments. Not least for the 
sensitive questions regarding private life environmental values and behaviour the 
interviewees’ responses are likely to be influenced by what is seen as correct 
behaviour in each country. The generally somewhat stronger environmental 
awareness in Sweden as compared to Scotland coloured the replies of the Swedish 
interviewees relative to the Scottish ones. 
We should avoid seeing these influences as biases, although it may be tempting to 
talk here of political correctness and ‘business correctness’. We should not try to see 
the ‘true’ individual behind the roles, with the residual individuality being what is 
left when biases are stripped away. It is more appropriate to see this as consequences 
of the different roles people play, and investigate how these roles work and affect the 
cases. It was also not the case that the interviewees were ‘victims’ of these different 
cultural spheres; they were also quite capable of expressing different and diverging 
opinions.
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To properly understand and account for these interviews, it is necessary also to look 
at the roles I played. At the start of the interviews, apart from presenting my research 
project, I presented myself and my background briefly. This included mentioning my 
degree in engineering, with the intention to gain a degree of trust from the 
interviewees, many of which had engineering and science backgrounds. In Sweden, I 
could also mention my previous employment at VINNOVA as a means of gaining 
some respect (hopefully?), and so counteracting my relative youth as compared to 
many, but not all, the interviewees. As part of this status game I dressed in a suit to 
appear more business-like, and to show respect for my interviewees (Arksey and 
Knight 1999:104).
In the case of the UK interviews, my foreign background was apparent to the 
interviewees, and I clarified this as being from Sweden. My language skills were not 
generally an issue, although some minor problems were encountered in some cases 
with interviewees with strong regional accents. In those cases, transcribing the 
interviews took longer time. This was also an issue of cultural background 
knowledge, and asking again about some things that I would have known about had I 
been British. An example could be the differences in how the engineering profession 
is organised (as explained in the chapter 5). I had to learn these things as I went 
along, but they did not present any real obstacle to the interviews.
A potentially bigger problem was being seen as ‘green’. This was inevitable given 
the topic of the interviews. I tried to downplay this by explaining that my research 
interests are not about finding faults with anyone or exposing the companies. This 
was at least not counter-productive, but the interviewees clearly saw me as being 
environmentally committed. The effect of this was not too big, as some of the 
interviewees were quite comfortable saying that environmental things were not that 
important.
4.2.5 Handling the interview data
Most interviews (35) were performed visiting the organisation in question, although 
a minority of interviews were done via telephone (8). This was done for practical 
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reasons, as in some cases the interviewees of a particular case were geographically 
spread out, and the time and cost requirements of visiting everyone were prohibitive.
Approximately two thirds (27) of the interviews were recorded. This was done for 
several reasons, firstly, so as to be better able to concentrate on the dialogue (May 
1993:104), but also to facilitate detailed recall after the interview and be able to 
provide truthful quotes. The interviewees were asked for permission to record.
A total of 16 interviews were not recorded, which includes the eight phone 
interviews. The remaining 8 interviews were not recorded for a series of other 
reasons, each happened in a few cases:
 the interviewee did not consent to this procedure;
 the interviewee was perceived to not be very keen on the interview, and it was 
judged better to keep them as informal as possible;
 the room was too noisy;
 the recorder did not work.
When the interviews were not recorded, extensive notes were taken (apart from one 
or two very annoying cases when the recorder did not work). Further detail was 
gained from offering the interviewees the opportunity to read the transcribed 
interviews, and in a few cases by calling the interviewee after the first interview to 
ask further questions.
The interviews were transcribed in full, or written up from notes and memory as soon 
as possible in the cases not recorded. This was done to get full use of the recordings, 
and to facilitate the analysis. All the interviews were transcribed in the language in 
which the interview had been done. Translation of the Swedish interview data was 
done where necessary, for example for quotes, during analysis and writing.
All the interview transcripts were sent to the interviewees. As full transcripts are 
lengthy documents, sometimes abbreviated versions were sent to the interviewees to 
increase the chances of them reading the transcripts and of getting feedback. The 
shorter versions then focussed on the most important parts of the interviews. Sending 
out the transcripts was also an opportunity to ask more questions. I often included 
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questions in the transcripts asking for more information. Some of the interviewees 
wanted to comment on the transcripts and others not. 
Sending out the transcripts was also done partly as a courtesy to the interviewees. 
They were given the chance of pointing out if they did not want me to use particular 
statements, or facts about the company. This was rarely the case, however, and has 
not affected the analysis. All interviewees are also anonymised in this thesis.
4.2.6 Documents
The main source of data was interviews, for reasons described above. Some use was, 
however, also made of documents. 
Firstly, to describe the sectoral and national contexts of the cases, publicly available 
sources were used, rather than interview data. Some of the interviewees talked about 
this, but the focus of the interviews were the projects and the inner context of the 
respective organisation, for which there are little publicly available sources. The 
main sources used were academic papers and books, as well as reports and 
information material from public and private sector bodies.
Secondly, some documentary sources were used also for the cases. Effort was made 
to get copies of the relevant environmental permits to corroborate the interviews. 
Copies were attained either from the companies or from the regulators for all cases 
(apart from Dairy Scotland who was not at the time required to have an 
environmental permit).
One other category of documents was systematically sought: descriptions of project 
and firm organisations, to get concise and accurate information about the formal 
organisations. This was not always possible though. Some firms did, perhaps 
surprisingly, not agree to make such documents available.
Apart from this, various other firm documents were made available on an ad-hoc 
basis. This material ranged from company presentation brochures obtained in 
receptions waiting for interviews, to certain project documents made available by 
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helpful interviewees. The later type of documents was typically presented to me as a 
help for the interviewee to explain the projects, and was in this sense part of the 
interview data.
It is worth noticing here that, as described above, the supervisors of this thesis had 
done a case study at Chemicals Scotland previous to my case study. This case study 
has been published (Clayton et al. 1999:96) and could be used when writing the 
current case study. Also, the interview transcripts for the old case study were made 
available for renewed analysis. This could have strengthened the processual 
perspective, but the questions asked were not similar enough to allow comparison 
over time, and did not contribute very much more to this project than could be learnt 
from the published case report.
4.3 Analytical methods
Analysing qualitative data can not be done in a mechanical fashion. Part of the 
analysis process is about immersing yourself in the data (Berg 1995:180) to gain an 
understanding of the cases that way. The actual transcription of the interviews was 
helpful in this respect. Systematic analysis is, however, indispensable. Systematic 
analysis will help stimulate new insights and reveal new relationships in the data, but 
also help verify or undermine the understandings and impressions of the analyst. 
Several tactics were employed for a systematic analysis. Firstly, the interview data 
was coded, based on the interview transcripts and documents attained from the 
interviewees. The full text pertaining to each theme was then cut and pasted into a 
new computer document for each code. Sometimes it was useful to break the 
material down further into more fine-grained coding categories, and the procedure 
was then repeated for each sub-code. This was done to gain an overview of the 
categories, themes and patterns (Marshall and Rossman 1989:114; Arksey and 
Knight 1999:169) of the data.
To an extent it was possible to use predetermined codes mirroring the questions of 
the interview guide that was designed prior to data collection. There were, however, 
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also emergent themes, requiring new codes, whereas other codes were dropped as the 
project progressed. This relates primarily to the dynamics of the interview themes, 
and categories of interviewees as described above.
The cases were written up as case stories (Yin 1994:104; Arksey and Knight 
1999:169), focussing on the choices and decisions made and the roles of the actors in 
the innovation processes. The case stories also include the inner context of the 
organisation and its recent history, as well as some information regarding the outer 
context: markets and, not least, regulation.
An alternative to writing case stories would have been a cross-case thematic 
exposition. Whereas this could have been a useful way of setting up the subsequent 
analysis, it was felt that the contingencies of each case might have been lost in this 
format, and the comparative analysis was written up separately. This solution 
requires somewhat more repetition of the case data, but that is a price deemed worth 
paying to maintain the integrity of the cases, and avoid decontextualisation (Arksey 
and Knight 1999:168).
An important part of the analysis is comparing the cases. Clear differences were for 
example found between the chemical and the dairy cases, in terms of the timing 
when environmental regulation had started exerting pressure on the companies, 
which had consequences for the career patterns of the staff.
Extensive use was made of matrices, tables, diagrams etc. in the analysis process to 
visualise and get an overview of particular aspects of the data, as well as to test 
emergent hypotheses and search for alternative explanations (Marshall and Rossman 
1989:114). Some of the more useful ones of these can be seen below in the analysis 
chapter.
4.4 Conclusion
The first research question relates to the impact of environmental intentions on 
technological outcomes. The methodological strategy to answer this question 
includes a contextual and processual perspective, within which to study the 
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relationship between intentions and outcomes. Further, the unit of analysis was not 
chosen in terms of the environmental dimension, so as to allow the study different 
intentions and outcomes, and to see how environmental intentions relates to other 
intentions etc. With regard to case selection, not only ‘best practice’ cases were 
chosen, to avoid pre-judging the environmental character of the projects, and the 
relationship between environmental intentions and environmental outcomes. Finally, 
the set of interview questions includes questions regarding both intentions and 
outcomes.
The second and third research questions are about environmental promotion and its 
structured organisational context. This leads us to study the different voices of the 
actors in the firm, and to look for potential areas of conflict between them. Different 
categories of actors in the firm were chosen for interviews, covering both different 
areas of expertise, for example engineers and environmental staff, and different 
hierarchical levels in the organisation, for example managerial and non-managerial 
staff. Also, the interviewees were asked about any private life environmental 
commitments that may or may not influence them at work. Furthermore, interview 
questions regarding decision-making, as well as the organisational setting – in which 
context decision-making happens – and its recent history, were included to enable 
analysis of organisational structures.
This contextual, processual and political approach leads to a choice of a qualitative 
approach, based on case studies and semi-structured interviews. A comparative 
approach further strengthens the contextual and processual analysis.
The approach chosen reflects personal commitments to the environmental cause, as 
well as a political outlook. Efforts were made to manage the impression of being 
‘green’ in the interview setting. Some such impact was unavoidable merely from 
approaching the interviewees about the chosen topic.
Efforts have been made to treat the informants fairly. Firms and interviewees are 
anonymised in the written outputs. All interviewees have been given the chance to 
read transcripts from their interviews.
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The use of an interview guide and a coding procedure for the analysis has 
contributed to the reliability of the research. The validity has been enhanced in 
various ways. That the case narratives relate well to the reality of the interviewees, is 
guaranteed by interviewing several people about the same case, and having given 
company representatives the opportunity to read the case studies. That the analysis 
provides valid explanations has been secured by the explicit comparative analysis, as 
well as iterating parts of the case data to back up cross-case conclusions. Finally, the 
theoretical framework developed is adapted to large investments in process 
technology in medium to large sized firms in process industries in Scotland and 
Sweden, and the results are valid primarily in this domain (Yin 1994:33).
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5 Setting the scene – countries and industrial sectors
This chapter will set the scene for the comparative analysis. We shall in the analysis 
compare two countries - Scotland and Sweden - as well as two industrial sectors: the 
chemical industry and the dairy industry. Here, we shall begin by discussing relevant 
aspects of the two countries, to be followed by the two sectors. 
5.1 Countries: Scotland – Sweden
We are in this study concerned with two countries: Scotland and Sweden. These are 
two small European countries with 5.1 and 9.0 million inhabitants respectively 
(GROS 2006:6; SCB 2005b:40), and with similar levels of economic wealth: 
£16 20063 and £20 400 per capita (Scottish Executive 2006a:5; SCB 2005b:40).
An important difference, however, is that whereas Sweden is a state, Scotland is a 
nation64 within the United Kingdom.65 This matters to comparisons of the two 
countries, and sometimes it will make more sense to compare Sweden with the UK 
as a whole, and sometimes this will be the only feasible thing to do because of a lack 
of data specifically on Scotland. But sometimes this will not be acceptable for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
For example, we shall need to study environmental regulation separately, since it 
differs between Scotland and the rest of the UK. It is a so-called devolved issue, 
(Scottish Executive 2006b) meaning that the policies implemented in Scotland are 
made by the Scottish Parliament rather than by the UK Parliament. 
Apart from this difference in the formal governance structures, Sweden and the 
UK/Scotland are also rather different in terms of political economies. Using the 
63 GVA in 2004. The Scottish Executive report Gross Value Added, rather than GDP. 
64 Scotland is a nation, rather than a country. We shall here mostly refer to it as a country for the sake 
of convenience in comparing it with Sweden, which is a country (and, arguably, a nation).
65 For Swedish readers: The United Kingdom (UK) consists of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
Great Britain, in turn, consists of England, Wales and Scotland.
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dichotomy set up by Hall and Soskice (2001:8) Sweden can be characterised as a 
‘coordinated market economy’ as compared to the ‘liberal market economy’ of the 
UK.66 This distinction refers primarily to the means through which the economy is 
coordinated. In an ideal-typical liberal market economy this is done through formal 
contract-like economic relations, and in its ‘opposite’ through informal network 
relationships (ibid.:8). 
The state also has quite different roles in these two types of market economies. In a 
coordinated market economy like Sweden the state is more directly involved together 
with industry organisations and organised labour in the coordination of (industry- or 
sector-wide) industrial structures. In contrast, in a liberal market economy like the 
UK the role of the state becomes more that of the securing of framework legislation 
to enable markets to function (Wood 2001:251). 
The UK underwent a dramatic development during the 1980s and 1990s, bringing it 
closer to the ideal-type liberal market economy (Coates 1999:652). For example, 
trade unions had more influence on policy before the Conservative governments of 
the period (Taylor 2001:11). Like in the UK there has also been a shift towards 
increased market liberalism in Sweden during the 1980s and 1990s, but with much 
less dramatic effect. For example, formal corporatism has ended and labour 
organisations have less influence on policy, but not radically so and the biggest 
change is perhaps the more informal way in which corporatism now works 
(Svensson and Öberg 2002:310).
To be more specific the Swedish regime can be characterised as neo-corporatist, 
reflecting the participation in policy-making by other organised interests than capital 
and labour. Connelly and Smith (1999:296) have described the comparatively large 
role of the environmental movement in policy-making in Sweden (as we shall 
discuss more below).
66 There are many alternative models to characterise different types of market economies. For 
example, Coates (1999) argues for a ‘triangular’ model encompassing a third state-led, conservative 
model (closely modelled on Japan) in addition to the market-led, liberal and the labour-led, social 
democratic ones, which are similar to the models of Hall and Soskice above. Hall and Soskice’s 
model appears to be well suited for the Sweden-UK comparison though.
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A fundamental aspect of the differences between liberal and coordinated market 
economies is the role of organised labour in labour markets, and here the two 
countries are distinctly different. Sweden has strong employment and unemployment 
protection (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001:165, 168) and strong labour unions (high trade 
union density, Hall and Soskice 2001:59). And although wage bargaining has been 
decentralised from national to sector/firm level (Thörnqvist 1999:81-82) 
co-determinism in the workplace is still strong (Levinson 2000:472). In contrast, in 
the UK employment and unemployment protection is weak (Estevez-Abe et al. 
2001:165, 168). Rates of trade union membership and workplace presence are low, 
especially after having been substantially reduced during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Taylor 2001:6). The trade union influence in many workplaces is weak even where 
there is union representation (Terry 2003:487). 
These differences in the workings of labour markets matter for occupational 
formation, as we shall discuss below. We shall in particular describe some 
differences in the labour markets for engineers and environmental staff in the two 
countries. After that we shall compare the environmental regulatory systems of 
Sweden and Scotland, and the environmental attitudes and behaviours of the two 
populations. 
5.1.1 Occupational formation
The different roles of labour are a reflection (and a cause) of the different ways that 
labour markets and skills formation work in the UK and Sweden. As compared to 
Sweden the UK economy with its low employment and unemployment protection 
favours high labour market mobility and the development of general skills 
(Estevez-Abe et al. 2001:170). In contrast, in Sweden there is lower mobility (longer 
average tenure) and more investment in sector- and firm-specific skills, through for 
example a larger fraction of the population obtaining training from vocational 
colleges (ibid.:170)
For the individual this also translates into a stronger orientation towards careers (in 
terms of moving between firms) in liberal economies, as compared to commitment to 
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firms (or lock-in) in coordinated economies (Hall and Soskice 2001:40). This may go 
some way to explain the differences in the occupational formation of engineers and 
environmental staff discussed below.
We shall describe here some differences between the two countries in terms of the 
work and occupational formation of engineers and industrial environmental staff. 
The focus will be on, not least, the differences between the two countries in the 
organisational set-ups for protecting and promoting the status of these occupational 
groups.
5.1.1.1 Engineers  
‘Engineering’ and ‘engineers’ are relatively well-known phenomena (Whalley 1986; 
Vincenti 1990; Sørensen and Levold 1992; Bucciarelli 1994; Downey 1998; de Vries 
2003) and will not be described in all their aspects here. We shall instead focus on a 
few national differences.
The balance between engineers and scientists is different in the two countries. A 
larger share of those with a tertiary education in the UK holds a degree in science as 
compared to Sweden. In Sweden a much larger share hold an engineering degree. 
See table 5.1. This suggests that there are more scientists employed in the UK 
industry than in the Swedish one, and that some work that would in Sweden be done 
by engineers is done by scientists in the UK.
When comparing the qualifications of engineers in Sweden and the UK, it should be 
noted that the UK system is much more complex than the Swedish one. In Sweden 
an engineer will have an educational degree in engineering (upper secondary67 or 
tertiary68 level or a research degree) typically attained from full time studies. In the 
UK there are, apart from such full time educational degrees, also other ways of 
attaining qualifications. The UK has an elaborate system of certificates and diplomas 
67 Gymnasieingenjör
68 Högskoleingenjör, eller civilingenjör
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(Higher National Certificates, Higher National Diplomas, etc.) typically attained by 
part-time study.






1) Science here excludes Computing, as well as Mathematics and statistics
2) Degrees included are those included in ISCED 5A, for example, MSc and Bachelor degrees, but not 
Higher National Certificates in the UK, or Lower Level Diplomas in Engineering 
(Högskoleingenjörer) in Sweden. Including those (ISCED 5B) does not change the overall picture.
In the UK there are professional institutes, for example IChemE (Institute of 
Chemical Engineers), which organise and protect the status of certain professions 
and occupational groups. To become a (full) member you need to have certain 
academic qualifications as well as practical experience (IChemE 2006). This system 
of certificates, memberships, etc. is not limited to engineering but extends to other 
vocations. Sweden has no legal protection of engineering titles, and no central 
certifying body. However, there are two labour unions for engineers who, among 
other things, may negotiate salaries and conditions of employment for their members 
(Hamilton 2000:79-80). 
In Sweden more people get a vocational engineering education at what Estevez-Abe 
et al. call ‘vocational colleges’ (2001:171).69 It appears, however, that the UK system 
is better suited for giving individuals formal recognition for practical experience. In 
terms of occupational formation, the Swedish strategy for protecting the title of 
‘engineer’ rests heavily on acquiring degrees, that is on the knowledge base, whereas 
in the UK there is a much more elaborate formal organisation of the labour market. 
The somewhat stronger orientation towards external careers of UK employees may 
69 They probably refer to ‘högskolor’.
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contribute to a greater need for formalised recognition of experience. One may also 
speculate that in Sweden it is easier to market and evaluate expertise informally 
through the denser inter-firm networks.
5.1.1.2 Environmental staff  
There has been relatively little research done on industrial environmental staff as 
compared to on engineers. We shall therefore introduce this occupation with a 
somewhat broader scope, and discuss who its members are, what they do and how 
their expertise is formed. Given the focus of this thesis, special focus will be paid to 
‘environmental engineers’.
By ‘environmental staff’ we refer to firm employees with environmental work as an 
explicit task. This group refers to those with environmental work as their principal 
area of work, as well as those for whom it is an additional, secondary task. Therefore, 
it also refers to people doing environmental work full-time as well as part time. 
Below we shall mainly be talking about employees with environmental work as a 
principal area of work. Finally, ‘environmental staff’ includes both managerial and 
operational staff.
Environmental staff typically have an educational background in science and 
engineering (NMC 2002:8; White 2006:9). According to White, they have also often 
studied environmental science or engineering (2006:11).
At managerial level environmental work is often done on a part-time basis (one third 
of respondents did environmental work full time, NMC 2002:11). Often these 
managers are also managers of quality and H&S issues (30% and 20% respectively, 
NMC:11).
To further understand who environmental staff are, we shall look at what 
‘environmental work’ they do. We can get an idea about this by looking at what 
Swedish environmental managers said they did in 2002. Their most common tasks 
were:
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Table 5.2  Most common tasks of environmental managers
Lead the work on the environmental management system
Develop a strategic environmental policy
Support firm management
Motivate employees
Give strategic advice to management
Be an advisor
Be in charge of environmental permits
Be in charge of environmental auditing
Produce environmental reports
Source: NMC 2006:14
The tasks of environmental managers thus include, apart from administrative tasks 
relating to permits, audits and reports, support and guidance on a strategic level in 
the firm.70
White (see table 5.3) has attempted to categorise the work of environmental staff, 
based on what he identifies as the direction in which environmental work has 
developed: essentially away from compliance and end-of-pipe, via integrated 
solutions, towards work on the level of production systems.
70 It should perhaps be noted that these data build on a survey to environmental managers themselves. 
A different picture might emerge if one were to ask their colleagues.
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Table 5.3  Type of environmental work
Type Activities
Traditional Legal and regulatory analysis, site audits, pollution control, 
product content changes
Non-traditional Pollution prevention, waste minimization, resource conservation, 
chemical use reduction, and design for EHS; product design
Noveau Supply chain management, technology development, stakeholder 
communications, corporate governance
Source: White 2006:12
We can observe that although tasks that would appear to demand science- and 
engineering-type skills are included here, as reflected in the educational background 
of environmental staff, their work also involves other types of tasks, like 
communication, management etc.
From these data it would seem that environmental staff in general do more 
engineering-type work than do environmental managers, although this may also 
depend on White’s study being of environmental staff in the high-tech semiconductor 
industry (2006:1). More generally, it is difficult comparing these accounts of 
environmental staff work, since the authors do not clearly define what they consider 
‘work’ to be, and appear to describe it in partially different dimensions. Indeed, what 
White describes appears to be outcomes of environmental work, rather than the 
actual tasks. 
Nevertheless, we see that environmental staff work involves tasks relating closely to 
administrative systems: permits, policies, etc. It also appears to involve 
communicative work: supporting and advising firm management, as well as other 
functions, including technology, manufacturing, etc.
Environmental staff do not, of course, do all the environmental work. Kvernes and 
Simon observe that environmental tasks and responsibilities are increasingly 
integrated into other tasks in the workplace, and the skills profile demanded by 
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employers is primarily an ability to relate environmental issues to the work of other 
professions and occupations like engineers, managers, lawyers, etc. (2000:5).
This draws our attention to the professionalisation of environmental work, in itself 
and in relation to engineering. Like in engineering, the UK regime of occupational 
formation for industrial environmental staff is more complex. A group of UK 
professional institutes in the environmental area are organised under the umbrella of 
the Society for the Environment (Soc Env). Through the society individual members 
can apply for the title of Chartered Environmentalist. This group of institutes include 
for example:
- IEMA, Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment, 
- IEEM, Institute of Ecology and Environmental Management,
- CIWM, The Chartered Institute of Wastes Management, and
- CIWEM, Chartered Institute of Waste and Environmental Management 
(Soc Env 2006).
These institutes have somewhat different profiles. CIWM, for example targets the 
waste management industry (CIWM 2006). IEMA targets all industry (as well as 
other organisations), and especially individuals working with environmental 
assessments or auditing (IEMA 2006).
Soc Env overlaps with the umbrella organisation in the area of engineering: the 
Engineering Council UK (ECUK), which protects the titles of Chartered Engineer, 
Incorporated Engineer and Engineering Technician. Several professional institutes 
are part of both umbrella organisations, including CIWEM and IChemE: Institution 
of Chemical Engineers (ECUK 2006).
There is a professional institute for environmental engineers in the UK, SEE: The 
Society for Environmental Engineers, founded in 1959 (SEE 2006). The society is 
part of the Engineering Council UK, but not, however, the Society for the 
Environment (ECUK 2006; Soc Env 2006).
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Figure 5.1  Selection of UK professional institutes
The Swedish institutional landscape is less elaborate. There are no unions 
specifically for industrial environmental staff. The main institutions relevant to 
environmental work in industry are:
- Swedish Association of Environmental Managers (Näringslivets Miljöchefer, 
NMC), and
- Swedish Environmental Engineering Society, (Ingenjörer för Miljön).
Neither of these, as can be expected in Sweden from our discussion of engineers 
above, protects professional titles. Overall, we see a much more elaborate and 
interwoven structure of professional bodies in the UK. See figure 5.1. The dearth of 
such bodies in Sweden means that the structure of educational degrees and 
programmes to a larger degree defines the occupation.
There are higher education degrees in environmental engineering, but – at least in 
Sweden – they lack a clear identity (HSV 2003:8). Having grown out of other 
engineering education (HSV 2003:7), they are still searching for a clear format that 
can be more effectively marketed on the labour market. This can be compared with 
other areas of environmental education, for example Environmental Health, which is 
a well established route to becoming an environmental health inspector.
In conclusion, it would seem that the occupations of industrial environmental staff 
and environmental engineers are less well defined in Sweden than in the UK, and at 







in terms of protecting industrial environmental expertise may be that environmental 
work is increasingly done by other than environmental staff.
5.1.2 Environmental regulation
We shall here compare the regulatory regimes in the two countries, starting with the 
background in terms of a brief historical account. Thereafter, we shall look at formal 
(organisational structures and content) and informal (styles and tactics) aspects of 
regulation.
Sweden is among a group of Northern European countries with a reputation for 
pioneering environmental policies (Connelly and Smith 1999:295; Midttun and 
Kamfjord 1999:875). The UK has historically had a stronger orientation towards 
demanding a well established scientific basis for its regulation, and towards taking 
the varying assimilative capacity of the recipient environments into account, as 
compared to Sweden where the precautionary principle has had an impact for a 
longer time and regulation has aimed towards always reducing pollution at the source 
irrespective of the specifics of the locale (Clayton et al. 1999:34; Honkasalo 
2003:27). The UK has effectively been a follower, and EU regulation has had a large 
(larger) impact on UK environmental regulation over the last two decades (Connelly 
and Smith 1999:298).71 EU harmonization has also meant a shift in the UK away 
from the recipient-oriented approach towards source reduction (Clayton et al. 
1999:40).
Both Sweden and the UK have moved from regulating pollution per medium: water, 
air, etc., to so-called integrated permitting, to reflect that many processes affect more 
than one medium and to avoid polluters shifting their pollution from one medium to 
another. Sweden has had integrated permitting since the 1960s (Honkasalo 
2003:26-27). (Further integration of environmental legislation was achieved through 
the Environmental Code of 1997, Lundqvist 2000:24).
71 Although the recent (late 90s) IPPC regulation to come out of Brussels was modelled on the UK 
IPC regulation (Connelly and Smith 1999:308).
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The UK introduced integrated permitting in 1990 (Honkasalo 2003:26-27) through 
the Environmental Protection Act (Connelly and Smith 1999:303). With the 
Environment Act of 1995 the UK also got an organisationally integrated system with 
the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EA, for England and Wales), 
and the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), both of which were 
established in 1996 (Blair 1997:93; Connelly and Smith 1999:305).
5.1.2.1 Organisational structures and content of permits  
The Swedish organisation of environmental regulation is fragmented (Connelly and 
Smith 1999:300) and devolved (Fudge and Rowe 2001:1530), whereas the Scottish 
one is (largely) integrated and centralised.
Swedish business operations are classified in three categories with regard to the 
seriousness of their potential harm to the environment,72 corresponding to three 
different bodies awarding environmental permits. The most serious cases are 
awarded environmental permits by environmental courts (as from 1999). Medium 
cases are dealt with by county administrations, and the least serious cases are given 
permits by the local municipality (Connelly and Smith 1999:301), see figure 5.2. 
Inspection is carried out by the municipalities. The structure is thus fragmented both 
vertically between the three levels, as well as horizontally, as there are 290 
municipalities in Sweden. In contrast, environmental permits are granted by SEPA in 
Scotland, which also carries out inspections. 
The only anomaly to the Scottish system is that Scottish Water, which provides water 
and manages effluent, is allowed to fine companies in cases where the received 
effluent threatens the operation of Scottish Water’s effluent treatment facilities. 
Scottish Water may also inspect business operations for this purpose. In Sweden the 
municipalities are responsible for (and often run) public treatment works. These 
sewage utilities may, unlike environmental regulators proper, have an interest in 
maintaining a certain level of effluent for the effective running of the treatment 
plants. Their primary type of sanction is fines.
72 A fourth category is those that do not require permits.
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Figure 5.2  The organisation of pollution regulation in Scotland vs. 
Sweden
The content of environmental permits are in many ways similar in the two countries. 
They will include compliance standards, that is, limits to the discharges of certain 
substances. Also, in both countries the permits granted are supposed to reflect a 
compromise between environmental and economic objectives. Swedish regulation 
weighs environmental concerns against economic viability and best available 
technology (Connelly and Smith 1999:301). In Scotland the formula for this is 
BATNEEC: Best Available Technology Not Entailing Excessive Costs (Smith et al. 
1997:164; Connelly and Smith 1999:303). 
Furthermore, when applying for a permit in either country, the company will have to 
produce an assessment of the environmental impact of any planned releases (Smith 
et al. 1997:168; NV 2001:10). This means that since changes to the production 
processes may require a new permit, the law requires an assessment be carried out.
A difference between the two countries is that in Scotland the law regulates 















will cover a production site with one or more processes. Therefore, in Scotland, a 
firm may need more than one permit per site. This may matter when there is a change 
to a process (or a new process is introduced). In Sweden, this potentially could lead 
to a review of the entire permit of the site, whereas in Scotland only the permit for 
the changed process is affected.
5.1.2.2 Styles and tactics of policy-making and enforcement  
Both Sweden and the UK have collaborative styles of policy-making (Connelly and 
Smith 1999:296, 300; Midttun and Kamfjord 1999:875; Lundqvist 2000:22). In both 
countries government cooperates with industry in formulating environmental policy. 
The difference between the countries is the role of other actors, in particular the 
environmental movement.
The Swedish style can be described as neocorporatist (Connelly and Smith 
1999:296). It is here common practice to have large non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) as part of government committees developing policy (OECD 2004:129). The 
UK style has been more closed to other actors than industry. Until recently there has 
not been much public consultation on environmental policy, and thus less access for 
NGOs, but this may be changing (OECD 2002:188).
As for implementation of environmental regulation, a distinction is often made in the 
literature between collaborative and policing-style enforcement. The literature is not 
quite clear as to how Sweden and the UK (or Scotland) compare on this distinction. 
Bohne (2001:4) found a more policing-style enforcement in England and Wales, as 
compared to the Swedish ‘mediating’ style. But, Gouldson (2004:593-594) claims 
that the enforcement approach in England and Wales became more formalised in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. This means that the difference between Sweden and the 
UK may have varied over a relatively short period, which makes comparison more 
complex. 
Moreover, Lovat (2004:53) found that in Scotland environmental inspectors place 
importance on a collaborative relationship with operators (Lovat 2004:53). This 
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suggests that there may be a difference between Scotland and the rest of the UK, but 
without any studies making direct comparisons, such a conclusion is uncertain.
Furthermore, Sherlock et al. (2004:660) have pointed out that enforcement style is 
also a matter of tactics. Inspectors will apply a combination of collaboration and 
policing in trying to influence firms (Sherlock et al. 2004:660). Gouldson (2004) 
made a similar point, showing how regulators will vary their approach depending on 
the operator, and change it depending on the operator’s response.
An important foundation for a collaborative approach is for the inspectors to have a 
degree of discretion (Lovat 2004:51). Discretion will allow the inspectors, for 
example, to weigh different types of pollution against each other. Regulators do have 
some discretion in both Sweden and Scotland (but not, as a contrast, in Germany) 
(Bohne 2001:5). All in all, it seems that we should not exaggerate the difference in 
enforcement styles between Sweden and Scotland.
5.1.3 Environmental attitudes and behaviour
We shall discuss here the environmental attitudes of people in Scotland and Sweden. 
This was thought relevant as a potential contributory explanation of any differences 
in expression of environmental concerns at work in the two countries.
There is data that allows us to compare the attitudes and behaviours of the Swedish 
and Scottish populations (although in some cases we shall be forced to compare 
Sweden with the whole of Britain). This said, we are limited in our choice of 
indicators. We shall here first look at direct measurements of environmental attitudes 
– revealed preferences, and thereafter study recycling and voting as further indicators 
of how environmental attitudes are expressed.
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5.1.3.1 Revealed preferences  
There is a possibility to compare directly the environmental attitudes of people in 
Sweden and Great Britain73 using The World Values Survey (WVS 2006), although 
this data does not distinguish between Scots and other UK peoples. 
In surveys carried out in 1999 we can compare the answers from three questions. On 
all three questions, the Swedish respondents gave more pro-environmental responses. 
See table 5.4.
Table 5.4  1999 environmental attitudes
Strongly 
agree
Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree
Don’t know
“Would give part of my income for the environment”
Sweden 14.1 50.3 24.6 6.4 4.5
Great Britain 7.1 37.0 35.1 11.2 6.1
“I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money was used to 
prevent environmental pollution”
Sweden 10.6 56.2 22.3 6.7 4.3
Great Britain 5.8 39.7 34.1 11.5 5.9
“The Government should reduce environmental pollution,
but it shouldn't cost me any money”
Sweden 17.8 36.6 37.7 4.8 3.0
Great Britain 29.0 41.8 19.5 1.7 6.4
Source: WVS data
This dataset also allows us to compare the trends in these two countries between 
1990 and 1999. In 1990 the differences between the countries in responses to these 
three questions were quite small. In both countries we see reduced pro-environmental 
attitudes during the period. The largest decline can be found in Great Britain. See 
table 5.5.
73 For Swedish readers: The smallest nation in the UK – Northern Ireland – is not included in the 
figures for Great Britain. As the population is small compared to the UK in total, it is unlikely to make 
any significant difference here.
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Table 5.5  Change in environmental attitudes
Difference between 1990 and 1999, %
Sweden Great Britain
“Would give part of my income for the environment”
Agree -14.6 -34.0
Disagree 13.1 25.4
“I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money was 
used to prevent environmental pollution”
Agree -8.2 -31.6
Disagree 6.4 23.1
“The Government should reduce environmental pollution, 




Note:  “Agree” here includes both the original responses “Strongly agree” and “Agree” etc.
5.1.3.2 As expressed in behaviour  
A further question is how these environmental attitudes are expressed in action.74 An 
indicator of pro-environmental behaviour in private life that is both available and 
(somewhat) comparable is that of recycling of household waste.
For Sweden as a whole the last available data is from 1996. The question asked was 
whether the respondent had decided for environmental reasons to reuse or recycle 
something during the last 12 months. 90% answered that they had done, and 8.6% 
that they had not (WVS 2006). A survey from Stockholm, Sweden, provides us with 
more recent data, although with less geographical coverage. 90% of respondents said 
74 That is, action other than responding to surveys etc. And as we shall discuss later behaviour is 
shaped in complex ways, and not mere extensions of attitudes.
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they often or always recycle newspapers, and almost as many recycle bottles and 
aluminium cans (with deposit) (SSM 2001:36).
As a comparison, the Scottish Executive (2005c) has published recycling data for 
Scotland. 61% of households (45% of individuals) reported having recycled 
something in the past month in 2004 (ibid.:33). Newspaper was the most commonly 
recycled type of waste here as well. 53% of households had recycled newspapers 
(ibid.:33).
It would seem from this data that Swedes are more involved in environmentally 
motivated recycling behaviour. A caveat is needed here, however, in that behaviour 
reflects other factors than attitudes. Notably the availability of recycling facilities 
will have a strong effect on these numbers.
We shall now look at two more public aspects of environmentally motivated 
behaviour: activism and voting. Firstly, let us look at membership in environmental 
NGOs. For a comparison we can look at membership in Greenpeace. In table 5.6 we 
see that both countries have sizeable membership cadres, and that the Swedish 
membership per capita is close to twice to that of the UK. Unfortunately there is no 
data available for Scotland specifically.
To fully interpret these numbers one would have to study the bigger landscape of 
environmental NGOs in each country. For example, the OECD (2002:187) states that 
the UK has a large number of strong environmental NGOs. There is, however, a lack 
of publicly available data on membership in many of these organisations. 
Also, the range of specific environmental NGOs differs between the two countries. 
The SNF (Swedish Society for Nature Conservation) is the largest environmental 
(conservationist) NGO in Sweden, while the RSPB (Royal Society for the Protection 
of Birds) is probably the largest environmental NGO in the UK, with a similar 
orientation towards conservation. These organisations are not the same, in the sense 
of the national Greenpeace organisations being part of the same international 
organisation, but are perhaps nevertheless similar enough to be comparable. See table 
5.6. Swedes are more active here as well, but the difference is smaller.
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Table 5.6  Membership in selected environmental NGOs
Members % of population
Greenpeace Sweden App. 65 000 0.72
Greenpeace UK 221 000 0.37
SNF, Sweden 168 000 1.9
RSPB, UK 1 042 000 1.7
Sources: Karlsson with others 2006:1; Greenpeace UK 2006; SNF 2006:54; RSPB 2004:26
Turning now to voting behaviour in parliamentary elections, we can fortunately 
compare Sweden directly with Scotland. In table 5.7 we see votes for the respective 
Green Party in recent elections.75 And in figure 5.3 we see the votes for the European 
Parliament. Whilst the results for the European Parliament have varied greatly over 
time, we may say that in the national Parliaments and in recent European Parliament 
elections the parties are similarly attractive to the voters in the two countries with 
between 5 and 7% of the votes.
75 We here face the problem of two different electoral systems though. The Swedish system is a 
so-called proportional representation (PR) system, where parties get votes in proportion to their 
percentage of votes (over a threshold of 4%). The Scottish system is a combination of a PR system 
and a first-past-the-poll system. Each voter here casts two votes, one in a PR system: the regional 
vote, and one in a first-past-the-poll system: the constituency vote. Some seats in the Scottish 
Parliament are allocated based on the one vote, the rest of the seats on the other vote.
So, we see that the Scottish Green Party did relatively well in, for example, the 2002 vote 
with 6.9% of the regional votes. But in the constituency vote they got 0%. It is likely that voters 
abstained from voting for the Greens in the latter vote since a small party has small chances of getting 
any seats in a first-past-the-poll system. Overall this translated into 5.4% of the seats. In Sweden, in 
2003, the Swedish Green Party got 4.6% of the votes, which resulted in 4.9% of the seats.
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Table 5.7  Green Party voting in the latest parliamentary elections
Scotland 1999 2003
Votes % 3.6 (0) 1 6.9 (0)
Seats % 0.8 5.4
Sweden 1988 2 1998 2002 2006
Votes % 5.5 4.5 4.6 5.2
Seats % 5.7 4.6 4.9 5.4
Source: Scottish Parliament 2006; SCB 2006b
Notes: 
1) Regional vote (and Constituency vote in parentheses)
2) The breakthrough election of the Swedish Green party, that is the first time they took any seats in the Swedish 
Parliament, which has 4% cut-off for party representation.
Figure 5.3  Green Party share of votes in EU Parliament elections
Sources: SCB 2007; BBC 2004; Boothroyd 2007, UK Office of the European Parliament 2007













We shall here summarise our comparisons of Scotland/UK and Sweden. Sweden 
educates more engineers and less scientists than does the UK, which is likely 
reflected in who does engineering-type work in industry. The UK has a stronger 
system for protection of the engineering occupation in the labour market, and a 
system that also appears to give more formal recognition to practical experience. An 
explanation for this difference may lie in the political economies of the two 
countries, where in the UK careers are built somewhat more by moves between 
workplaces. Also, it may be that expertise is marketed and evaluated more informally 
through inter-firm networks in Sweden.
Environmental staff often have a background in science and engineering. At 
managerial level, environmental work is most often done part-time and sometimes 
combined with management of quality or health and safety. Apart from tasks that 
demand science or engineering skills, environmental staff are also involved in 
administrative, communication and management work. Increasingly, environmental 
work is also carried out by other staff, for example engineers.
This interaction between the engineering and environmental areas of education and 
work is in the UK reflected in a complex, interwoven system of professional 
institutes in the engineering and environmental areas. In Sweden occupational 
formation happens primarily through educational attainment, and whereas the 
engineering education is well institutionalised, environmental education – and 
environmental engineering education in particular – appear less well established.
Sweden has a history of pioneering environmental policies. Through the harmonizing 
impact of EU environmental policy, the UK has over the last two decades become 
more similar to other European countries in terms of environmental regulation. Both 
countries today have integrated (that is, independent of medium) permitting.
The Swedish organisational structure for the implementation of environmental 
regulation is fragmented hierarchically and geographically and devolved, as 
compared to Scotland’s unitary and centralised structure (apart from Scottish Water’s 
influence on effluents).
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The contents of environmental permits are similar in the two countries. One 
difference is that in Scotland each production process requires a separate permit, 
whereas in Sweden a permit covers an entire site.
In both countries government collaborates with industry in policy-making, but in 
neocorporatist Sweden environmental NGOs are more involved than in the UK. 
Implementation is probably not too dissimilar in the two countries in terms of 
collaboration versus policing.
It would seem from the data that attitudes among the Swedish public are ‘greener’, at 
least during recent years. Recycling of household waste is also more common in 
Sweden, although that could also be due to the better provision of recycling facilities. 
Swedes are somewhat more active in environmental NGOs. In terms of voting, 
Green Party voting levels are quite similar.
Overall, there seems to be a slight difference between the Swedish and the Scots (or 
British in general where more specific comparison is not possible) in terms of 
environmental attitudes and behaviour, with Swedes being somewhat ‘greener’. Part 
of this may be because environmental concern has been institutionalised for longer in 
Sweden, with a longer history, for example, of a Green Party in the national 
parliament and extensive coverage of recycling facilities.
5.2 Industries: the chemical – dairy comparison
Having discussed the two countries, we shall here discuss the two industrial sectors: 
the chemical and the dairy industry. For each sector we shall discuss the market 
structure as an introduction to the sector, and thereafter the technological and 
environmental dimensions of the sector as they relate to the themes of this thesis. 
Organisational aspects will be covered mainly in terms of the technological or 
environmental expertise found in these sectors.
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5.2.1 The chemical industry
5.2.1.1  Markets
The chemical industry produces a wide variety of products, including petrol, plastic, 
pharmaceuticals and detergents to name but a few. This includes household products, 
but most chemical companies sell to other firms (Cesaroni and Arduini 2001:10).76
The chemical sector can be categorised into a range of sub-sectors. A basic 
distinction is often made between basic (or bulk, or commodity) chemicals produced 
in large quantities at relatively low costs, and fine (including specialty) chemicals 
produced in smaller quantities but at higher costs (and prices) (Mol 1995:129). 
Exactly what industries count as belonging to the chemical sector varies. Sectors like 
pharmaceuticals, plastics and oil refineries are sometimes considered part of the 
chemical sector, but are sometimes excluded. We need to have this somewhat fluid 
definition in mind when interpreting statistics and other sources on the chemical 
sector below. For the purposes of this thesis we are mainly concerned about fine and 
basic chemicals.
The global market is dominated by very large firms, with headquarters in – not least 
– the US, Germany and France (Key Note 2001:5). Many parts of the sector are 
struggling to make a profit because of overcapacity (ibid.:56), although this varies 
and pharmaceuticals are among the more profitable sub-sectors as of late.
Sweden has a comparatively small chemical sector (Löfstedt 2003:416). As we can 
see from table 5.8 nor is the Scottish chemical sector very large. This, however, 
somewhat underestimates the importance of the chemical sector in the UK. Notably 
ICI (Imperial Chemicals Industries) had a role as a national flag ship industry, no 
equivalent of which was ever present in Sweden. ICI was subsequently split into 
several companies. Today, the UK chemicals industry is dominated by a relatively 
small number of large, multinational companies (Richards et al. 2004:389), some of 
which have their roots in ICI.
76 About half in the UK (CIA 2006).
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Table 5.8  Size comparison of chemical sectors
Sweden Scotland
Value added / GDP 4% 2%
Plants 916 623
Employees 38 000 25 000
Sources: IVA 2006; Scottish Executive 2005b; the GDP figure used: Scottish Executive 2005b
Notes:
1) The data includes pharmaceuticals as well as rubber and plastic companies. In the case of Scotland 
refineries are not included.
2) It is not quite clear whether the figure given for Scottish plants is plants or sites. The term used in 
the statistics is ‘units’.
3) Some sub-sectors are made up of large small and medium-sized companies. For example rubber 
and plastic. This has a ‘disproportionate’ impact on the figure for number of plants.
This leads us to another difference between the countries. Some of these large 
chemical companies have their headquarters in the UK (although not in Scotland), 
for example BP (British Petroleum) and Astra-Zeneca, whereas, virtually all Swedish 
chemical companies are foreign owned (Löfstedt 2003:416; IVA 2006:38). For 
example, the gas company AGA was bought in 1999 by the German firm Linde, and 
Nobel Industries was merged in 1994 with Akzo with its HQ in the Netherlands (PK 
2003:5).
This difference in internationalisation can also be illustrated by looking at exports. 
Approximately 70% of chemicals produced in Sweden are exported (PK 2003:4), as 
compared to around a quarter of UK chemical production (Key Note 2001:9).
The major chemical sub-sectors in Scotland are: basic chemicals, pharmaceuticals 
and rubber and plastic (Scottish Executive 2005a). (UK-wide pharmaceuticals 
dominate, CIA 2006). The Swedish chemical sector is strongly dominated by 
pharmaceutical companies, contributing 55-60% of the added value, employment and 
exports of the sector (IVA 2006:38).
The UK chemical sector features some clusters of companies, one of which is located 
to Grangemouth in Scotland (Key Note 2001:39). This cluster grew up around a port 
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and an oil refinery. A cluster with the same background can be found outside 
Gothenburg in Sweden. Other concentrations of chemical companies in Sweden can 
be found close to the largest cities, but also in northern Sweden (PK 2003). An 
important historical root of chemicals companies in Sweden is production of 
chemicals for pulp and paper production, typically located in northern Sweden 
(ibid.).
5.2.1.2  Technology
Given that the chemical sector is so heterogeneous, we shall not here try to describe 
the technology used in any detail. A few general points can be made however.
The chemical industry is capital-intensive, relying on expensive process equipment 
(although this also varies). This equipment is therefore expected to work and pay 
itself off over relatively long periods of time, before any renewed investments.
A basic distinction worth noting is that between continuous and batch production. 
These modes of production have in some ways rather different properties when it 
comes to environmental performance. For example, a batch process may require 
cleaning between batches, which is much less frequently needed for a continuous 
process. Continuous processing is more common for the production of basic 
chemicals, whereas fine chemicals are more typically produced using batch 
processing.
A strong driver (as well as obstacle) to investment in the industry is the over-capacity 
and the ensuing low profitability in many of its sub-sectors. Important rationales for 
investments have therefore been bottlenecks and rationalisation (IVA 2006:38).
The sector is highly innovative, if measured as the share of companies in the sector 
carrying out innovation activities (SCB 2006a:42),77 and more often than in general 
manufacturing firms the innovations were carried out mainly in-house, indicating a 
high level of internal engineering capacity (SCB 2006a:46).
77 The data includes pharmaceuticals, but not refineries or rubber and plastics. The rubber and plastic 
industry is also highly innovative, but less so refineries, as measured this way.
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The chemical sector is a high technology sector in the sense of having a highly 
educated workforce. For example, the share of employees holding a PhD in science 
or engineering is the highest among Swedish manufacturing industries (VINNOVA 
2003:48).78 The share of science or engineering graduates is also very respectable 
(ibid.:48). 
Like other manufacturing industries the chemical industry relies on suppliers for all 
or most of its equipment, and to varying degrees on engineering services. Cesaroni 
and Arduini (2001) investigated the environmental supply to the (Italian) chemical 
industry, and came up with some interesting results. Firstly, they found that most of 
the environmental equipment supply identified was end-of-pipe technology (ibid.:
67). They reflect on this that cleaner technology is more difficult to sell as a 
standardised product (ibid.:66).79 As mentioned in chapter 2, this supports our 
contention that it is difficult to successfully blackbox cleaner technology.
Secondly, they found that among environmental services offered to chemical 
companies, advice on cleaner technology was important (ibid.:67). This service was 
supplied mainly from companies in the engineering sector – as opposed to any 
environmental service companies (ibid.:69), which may reflect that what is labelled 
cleaner technologies may be adopted without any environmental considerations.
5.2.1.3  Environment
Regarding the environmental impact, again, the sector is heterogeneous. 
Nevertheless, it stands out, of course, compared to other sectors in its high use of 
many different chemicals, some of which are highly toxic. As mentioned before, this 
was a reason for it being affected by environmental regulation earlier than most other 
industries.
78 The core chemicals industry has the highest share, even higher than the pharmaceutical industry. 
Refineries has a medium high share, and rubber and plastics has a low share of science and 
engineering PhDs.
79 This comes as little surprise to us given that we have seen that cleaner technology is not a specific 
set of technologies. It should perhaps have been surprising to Cesaroni and Arduini, however, seeing 
as they listed cleaner technologies.
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A basic environmental concern is that the chemical industry is to a very large extent 
dependent on oil as a raw material (Key Note 2001:56). This may be difficult to do 
anything about, although there has been increased interest in recent years in 
renewable raw materials (IVA 2006:45).80
The sheer variety of chemicals used is a problem in itself since it becomes highly 
onerous to keep track of their use, and to work out what their effects are on the 
natural environment. The current proposed EU legislation REACH (Registration, 
Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals) targets this problem (EU 2006).
Cesaroni and Arduini have described what they call the “main trends in the 
development of cleaner technologies in the chemical industry” (2001:10). And whilst 
it is doubtful to label these technologies intrinsically cleaner, they may well offer 
many firms opportunities for cleaner innovations (although the authors do not 
explain how they know this); see table 5.9.
The role of public opinion on the chemical industry’s environmental performance has 
been important (Cesaroni and Arduini 2001:15), following not least a series of 
well-known large accidents like, for example, Seveso. Although local opinion may 
well matter for individual sites, the main influence of public opinion on firms has 
been through regulation (PSI 2003:42). 
80 As part of the green chemistry approach, which puts greater stress on life cycle aspects and resource 
requirements.
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Table 5.9  Technological trends amenable to cleaner innovations
Equipment Continuous reactors, low temp separation processes, continuous 
fluid bed processes, safety systems: e.g. control procedures
Chemicals High-selectivity reactions, reactions producing by-products that can 
be recycled1), biological processes
Products Water-based inks and varnishes, bio-degradable detergent 
intermediates, substitutes for CFCs, biodegradable plastics and 
fibres, substitutes for asbestos
Source: Cesaroni and Arduini 2001:10
Note: The authors did not express this clearly. They might mean recycling of by-products, rather than 
a choice of particular reactions. But since it is listed under chemicals rather than equipment (‘plants’), 
it seems likely that they mean choosing reactions that allow for recycling of by-products.
The chemical industry, because of its long history of being regulated, has 
comparatively well-established in-house capacity for environmental work.81 A recent 
expression of this is the voluntary Responsible Care initiative of the chemical sector 
aiming at continuous improvement of health, safety and environmental performance 
(Responsible Care 2006). The initative started in Canada, but is international, and 
companies in both Sweden (IVA 2006:39) and the UK (Richards et al. 2004:392) are 
taking part. 
Another expression of this is certification to environmental management standards. 
Most Swedish chemical companies are registered with ISO 14001 or EMAS (IVA 
2006:39). Around half of UK chemical companies82 are registered (CIA 2006).
An indicator of the good in-house capacity for environmental work is given by 
statistics on environmental expenditure. Statistics Sweden report that around two 
thirds of environmental expenditure in the sector was spent on internal work (as 
compared to payments and fees), which is higher than other manufacturing industries 
(SCB 2005a:12).
81 In Scotland/UK and Sweden that is. Likely not to be true in, say, China.
82 Members of CIA.
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Environmental work has undoubtedly been costly to the chemical industry (Key Note 
2001:57), but there have also been some economic benefits. Chemical industry firms 
have been able to sell environmental technology to other firms. Cesaroni and Arduini 
(2001:40) found a higher ratio of environmental83 patents in the chemical industry 
compared to other industries. Examples of such technologies include water treatment 
chemicals and catalysts for car exhausts (PK 2003).
5.2.2 The dairy industry
We shall here introduce the dairy industry under the same headings as the chemical 
industry, namely: market structure, technology and environmental aspects.
The main products of the dairy industry are liquid milk, cheese, cream, yoghurt and 
chilled desserts (Key Note 2003:2). A large part of the unprocessed milk is used for 
liquid milk, between 40 and 50% in the UK and Sweden (MDC 2004; SDA 2006). 
To set the scene for the case studies, this section will focus mostly on liquid milk.
5.2.2.1  Markets
Liquid milk is most often seen as a commodity, to a large extent produced and traded 
in bulk, and market growth is generally slow (Key Note 2003:7), especially 
compared to some other dairy segments, like yoghurt (ibid.:12), and sub-segments 
like organic milk. Liquid milk competes with other drinks, like fruit juice, soft drinks 
and bottled water (ibid.:57).
The UK and Swedish dairy sectors are in some ways different, and will be described 
separately below. They share some traits, however. For example, the profitability in 
the dairy industry is in general low compared to other manufacturing industries 
(DSCF 2005:50; IVA 2006:66). The industry in both countries has also undergone 
(and is undergoing) a process of rationalisation (COWI 2000:7; IVA 2006:68-70). 
After Sweden’s entry into the European Union in 1995 it also shared a common 
83 End-of-pipe and recycling technologies.
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regulatory framework with regard to the volume of raw milk produced in each 
country.
The UK
We shall here study the UK rather than just Scotland, since the UK is in many ways 
one market for milk products. Details about Scotland will be given when possible 
and relevant.
In the UK, there are several hundred dairy companies, many which are small (Key 
Note counts 210 local units with less than 10 employees, 2003:126). The sector is 
polarised between many small operators, and a few very large ones. The three main 
producers of liquid milk in 2005 were Arla UK, Dairy Crest and Robert Wiseman 
Dairies (DSCF 2005:50).
Over the last 10-20 years the UK dairy industry has undergone large changes, in 
terms of consolidation and rationalisation. This has been driven by changes in the 
supply and sales markets. 
The supermarkets have grown considerably during this period and now represent a 
large share of food retailing. They have also gained a stronger position in milk sales. 
The distribution of liquid milk used to be mainly through doorstep delivery of bottled 
milk, but this has increasingly been replaced by sales via the large retail companies’ 
supermarkets (KPMG 2003:25).
This has meant that supermarkets have become the dominant customer of (the large) 
dairy companies. And as the supermarkets strive to reduce their numbers of 
suppliers, the dairy companies are now competing for very large contracts with the 
supermarkets.
Part of the battle between supermarkets and dairies is about control of brands. 
Approximately 40% of liquid milk is sold under supermarket own-brands (IVA 
2006:73), attesting to the relatively strong position of supermarkets in the supply 
chain.
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The cost-focussed competition for the trade of a few retail chains has led the larger 
dairy companies to invest in larger, more efficient dairy plants (DSCF 2005:50). The 
investments in new, large plants have in fact led to overcapacity, which has 
weakened the position of the dairy companies and kept profitability in check (DSCF 
2005:50).
Cost competition has also led the trend towards fewer dairy companies through a 
series of mergers and acquisitions (Key Note 2003:22). In spite of this concentration, 
the UK dairy industry is, however, still more fragmented than that of many other 
countries (ibid.:67).
Another driver of change in the dairy industry has been the deregulation of the 
supply of raw milk. The supply of raw milk was first regulated in the 1930s. The 
Milk Marketing Scheme was administered by regional Milk Marketing Boards (for 
example the Scottish MMB), and represented a monopoly in the buying and selling 
of raw milk (DEFRA 2006). The aim was to “provide for orderly marketing of milk 
and an organised representation of producer interests to balance that of the dairy 
companies” (ibid.). The Scheme aimed to keep the prices up, and prioritised the 
production of liquid milk through an end-use pricing structure (Banks and Marsden 
1997:388).
The dairies had under this regime virtually guaranteed (but low) margins, and weak 
incentives to grow. In fact the pricing structure aimed at a stable return on capital for 
the processors of 12.5% (Banks and Marsden 1997:388). The processors had little 
reason to rationalise production.
The market was deregulated in 1994, and the Milk Marketing Board was disbanded 
(Bates and Pattisson 1997:50).84 There were several reasons for this, including the 
84 The mandatory membership for dairy farmers in the MMB was replaced by voluntary membership 
in regional co-operatives (including Scottish Milk in Scotland and Milk Marque in England and 
Wales) (MMC 1999:3). Today, approximately 50% of the raw milk is traded via the cooperatives 
(KPMG 2003:35).
Milk Marque was later split up in three cooperatives, following a report (but no Government 
ruling) from the Mergers and Acquisitions Commission (DEFRA 2006). Scottish Milk later merged 
with one of these three to form First Milk (Eclectic 2006).
Now there are 3 groups: First Milk, Dairy Farmers of Britain (former Zenith presumably) and 
Milk Link (KPMG 2003:35).
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concern of dairy companies about prices and the increasing import of milk (DEFRA 
2006).
Deregulation exposed the dairy companies to fiercer competition,85 but also allowed 
them to consolidate and grow, thus enabling them to meet the challenge from the 
supermarket chains. The UK dairy processing industry is, however, still more 
fragmented than comparable markets, as well as less vertically integrated. Less than 
5% of production capacity is owned by farmer cooperatives (KPMG 2003:30).
Sweden
There are 14 dairy companies in Sweden (SDA 2006). The industry employs 
approximately 7 000 people (in 2004) (IVA 2006:66). There are 37 sites producing 
dairy products, of which 21 produce liquid milk (SDA 2006). 
The Swedish dairy industry is strongly dominated by the company Arla, which buys 
66% (in 2001) of the raw milk (SDA 2001:25). Arla is followed by Skånemejerier 
and Milko buying approximately 12% each of the milk (ibid.). These three firms 
(together representing approximately 90% of the milk bought) are all owned by 
regional farmers’ cooperatives (von Unge 2005:5).
The milk supply was de-regulated in 1989, ending a system of price subsidies for the 
farmers (Sannes 1994). With the entry into the European Union in 1995 came 
re-regulation of milk supply, in the sense of quotas capping the volume of raw milk 
produced.
There are no formal monopolies in Sweden on the raw milk or liquid milk markets, 
but the three cooperatives have refrained from trading in each other’s areas,86 and 
thus have very strong regional positions both on their supply and sales markets 
(Sannes 1994), meeting competition only from a few small dairies.
85 That the EU milk quota system introduced in 1984 caps the domestic production of raw milk to a 
level that is below domestic demand has contributed to the competition between dairy companies for 
milk supply (Banks and Marsden 1997:390).
86 Until early 2006, at which time a price war started in Sweden.
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There is a process of internationalisation going on in the Swedish dairy industry, 
following from changes to the regulation of export and import in the early 1990s 
(Sannes 1994), culminating in the Swedish entry into the EU in 1995 (IVA 2006:65). 
This has increased the import of dairy products, mainly cheese and milk powder (von 
Unge 2005:5), but also for example yoghurt. Another expression of this 
internationalisation process is the merger of Arla with a Danish dairy company in 
2000 (von Unge 2005:6), and the subsequent purchase of a large UK dairy company.
The Swedish retail market has considerably less power in the milk supply chain than 
its UK equivalents. This can be seen, for example, from the fact that the rate of 
own-brand milk sales in Sweden was 14% in 2005, as compared to approximately 
40% in the UK (IVA 2006:73).
In spite of recent mergers and collaborations between companies (von Unge 2005), 
the impression is of the Swedish dairy industry structure thus far being much more 
stable (and less dynamic) than the UK one. It is also strongly vertically integrated, in 
contrast with the UK dairy industry.
5.2.2.2  Technology
The dairy industry is capital intensive, using specialised equipment (Key Note 
2003:48-49), organised in a basic process according to table 5.10.
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Table 5.10  Process steps in liquid milk production
Receipt and filtration/clarification of raw milk





Product-specific processing (incl. ageing, culture 
products and inoculation, churning etc)
Packaging and storage (incl. cold storage)
Distribution
Source: COWI 2000:8-9
Note: Italics specify that this stage is optional, depending on the product produced.
Dairy products can be produced either in batches or using continuous processing 
(COWI 2007:18). Liquid milk processing is more often continuous than, say, yoghurt 
production. 
This basic process is not undergoing any rapid technological change. COWI (2000:7) 
reports on current trends in dairy process technology:
- specialised processes, such as ultrafiltration and modern drying processes, for 
recovery of milk solids,
- more energy efficient processes, and
- electronic control systems, for process efficiency and cost savings.
The most common investment in technology today is in automation (IVA 2006:70).
Although the rate of adoption of new process technology may be comparatively low, 
the dairy industry is increasingly innovative when it comes to products. Regarding 
liquid milk, new innovations include for example organic milk (Key Note 2003:3). 
Other dairy segments – like yoghurt – are, however, more innovative than liquid milk 
(ibid.:12).
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The slow change with regard to process technology does not, however, mean a low 
rate of investments. Investments are being made in larger plants, specialised in a 
limited range of products (COWI 2000:7; Honkasalo 2003:29) and in automation 
(IVA 2006:68-70).
There are several drivers behind these developments. Firstly, there is a need for 
increased efficiency, because of increased (national and international) competition. 
This is met by rationalisation (Honkasalo 2003:29), specialisation and automation 
(IVA 2006:68-70). Another driver of automation is the increased demands from 
retail customers for traceability, because of health and safety concerns (Honkasalo 
2003:29; IVA 2006:68-70). Finally, the industry is competing with an increasing 
range of products, and it is easier to achieve this flexibility in production in a 
specialised plant (IVA 2006:68-70).
Large plants are now typically automated (Honkasalo 2003:30). There is, however, a 
large variation within the industry in terms of efficiency (in part due to the difference 
between new and old equipment, and long investment cycles).
The food sector (data for the dairy sector in specific is lacking) is close to average for 
manufacturing industries in terms of innovativeness (SCB 2006a:42).87 The industry 
is more reliant on co-operation with suppliers for its process innovations than the 
manufacturing average (SCB 2006a:46), which may reflect the low numbers of 
graduates among its workforce (VINNOVA 2003:48).
5.2.2.3  Environment
The input of clean water is mainly used for the cleaning of equipment and work areas 
for hygiene reasons (COWI 2000:7). Effluents rarely contain significant hazardous 
substances, but their potential environmental impact is reflected in such measures as 
organic load, pH, nitrogen and phosphorous content and temperature (ibid.:7). The 
rate of loss of milk to effluent varies between plants, but is typically in the 0.5 – 4% 
range (ibid.:18). The effluent often goes to municipal sewage treatment systems, but 
87 In terms of the fraction of companies who innovated in the period 2002-2004.
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some on-site wastewater treatment (including neutralisation, sedimentation and/or fat 
removal) is common (ibid.:14, 20).
A major use of energy is the production of steam (often from on-site boilers) used for 
heat treatment (pasteurisation, sterilising, etc.) (ibid.:15), but electricity is also used 
for machinery, refrigeration, ventilation, lighting and compressed air 
(drying/evaporation) (ibid.:14, 20). Chemicals (detergents, acids, etc.) are mainly 
used for the cleaning of equipment and work areas (ibid.:52). 
Apart from effluent treatment, an expression of the environmental work at dairy 
companies is the introduction of environmental management systems. Certification is 
underway in both the UK and Sweden (Honkasalo 2003:32-33). 
In terms of cleaner production in the dairy industry, COWI (2000:1) stresses that this 
is as much about how the plant is operated as what technology is used. With regard 
to technological options, the report mentions the following examples:
Table 5.11  Technological options for cleaner innovations
Environmental aspect Technology options
Water usage and 
effluents
Continuous processes, automated Cleaning-In-Place 
systems, the reuse of relatively clean waste waters, the use 
of pigs and plugs to remove product from pipes, sensors 
and diverters to separate product from cleaning water
Energy usage Capture low-grade energy, insulation, more energy 
efficient equipment
Chemicals usage Optimisation to avoid over-use
Source: adapted from COWI 2000:24-26.
In general, COWI also promote automated solutions to the control of equipment and 
processes, although it does note that the increase in automation has also contributed 
to an increase in electricity consumption (2000:21).
Although the main regulation to affect the dairy industry concerns hygiene 
requirements (Key Note 2003:31), environmental regulation plays some role. There 
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is, however, a difference here between Sweden and the UK. In the UK dairies were 
not regulated under the IPC regime (introduced in the early 1990s), and it is not until 
the last few years under the new IPPC88 regime that they have been regulated 
(Honkasalo 2003:27). In Sweden, dairies have been regulated longer than that (at 
least during the 1990s). 
In addition to environmental regulation implemented by environmental authorities, 
public sector water treatment utilities may also exert some pressure regarding 
effluents. It is common for dairies, as we have seen above, to be connected to these 
utilities. In the UK, when there was no IPC regulation in effect, the water treatment 
utilities had some power to regulate the load from dairies on their treatment plants.
There is unfortunately little information available about environmental competence 
in the dairy industry in either country. Honkasalo notes, however, a slight difference 
in attitudes between the UK and Sweden, and reported that some UK dairy 
interviewees implied that environmental aspects were not very relevant to them. She 
further noted that Swedish dairies may share this opinion, but here environmental 
work has been normalised (2003:33). From this we would expect more formalised 
environmental competence in Swedish dairies.
As compared to the chemical sector in-house environmental competence may be low. 
Most (approximately three quarters) environmental protection expenditure in the 
Swedish dairy industry consists of payments and fees as opposed to in-house work 
(SCB 2005a:12), whereas the chemical sector spends more on in-house work.
5.2.3 Comparing the sectors
We shall here draw together the themes of the section, and compare the two sectors. 
It is, however, difficult to compare the chemical and the dairy sectors especially 
since the chemical sector displays considerable internal variation among its many 
88 The main difference between IPPC and the former IPC regime is that IPPC puts a stronger emphasis 
on pollution prevention as opposed to emission standards (Connelly and Smith 1999:308), but it has 
also meant the regulation of some industrial processes that were not formerly regulated.
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sub-sectors. And particularly in the case of the dairy industry there is also important 
national variation given the recent de-/re-regulations of national dairy markets.
Nevertheless, the chemical and dairy industries are similar in that they are both 
process industries, often with low profitability (in general, but this varies with the 
market segment) and a tendency towards overcapacity (although less pronounced in 
the Swedish dairy industry).
An important difference is that the dairy industry predominantly produces goods for 
the consumer market (via the retail sector), whereas the chemical industry sells a 
majority of its products (but by no means all) to business customers. This gives the 
retail sector a key role in the dairy market, but less so in the chemical market. In the 
UK the supermarkets have had a driving role in the restructuring of the dairy 
industry, but much less so in Sweden.
In both sectors we find a variation between bulk production of commodity products 
and production of higher value added products in smaller quantities. This variation is 
more pronounced in the more specialised and varied chemical industry.
The liquid milk segment of the dairy market, which we focus on here, is typically 
seen as bulk production of commodity goods, and thus compares better to the bulk 
end of the chemical industry spectrum. They share a low profitability, capital-
intensive character.
The dairy industry and the UK chemical industry predominantly produce for 
domestic markets. Although the UK chemical industry exports only around a quarter 
of its production, and the UK exports of chemicals are larger than imports (Key Note 
2001:7), the industry is more affected by international competition than the dairy 
industry (especially when compared to the liquid milk segment). The Swedish 
chemical industry stands out in this respect being largely controlled by foreign 
owners, and exporting a large share of its production.
The liquid milk dairy industries are strongly orientated to domestic markets, partly 
because of the limited durability of their products, but also because of recent national 
level regulation and their history of ownership. Deregulation (due to shifting policy 
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priorities in both countries) have opened up this market to international competition, 
but this influence has to date been mainly on other segments than liquid milk. In 
Sweden, the history of strong farmers’ cooperatives owning the dairy processing 
industries appears to have reinforced the domestic focus. Deregulation has increased 
competition in the UK, but this effect has in Sweden been small because of a 
gentlemen’s agreement between the farmers’ cooperatives sustaining near-
monopolies.
The chemical industry is technologically diverse and highly innovative with a good 
in-house engineering capacity. The dairy industry is relatively technologically 
homogenous, less innovative (especially regarding process technology) and is more 
dependent on external technological competence. This difference is less pronounced 
when comparing the dairy industry with bulk chemical production.
Environmentally, the chemical sector stands out, of course, in terms of its use and 
production of a large variety of chemical substances, some of which are toxic. The 
sector is also highly dependent on oil as a raw material. In contrast, the dairy industry 
uses little chemicals, apart from some amounts for the purpose of equipment 
cleaning, and the raw material is milk (although it takes a certain amount of energy 
input to produce milk). The main environmental impact of dairy processing is the 
organic content and the pH of the effluent. The dairy industry often relies on public 
sector effluent treatment works to manage its effluents, whereas the chemical 
industry is often forced to treat its own effluents.
The chemical industry has a longer history of experiencing relatively strong 
pressures from environmental regulation, and has, it seems, a better in-house 
capacity for environmental work.
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6 Chemicals industry cases
We shall here present the two chemicals industry case studies. First the Swedish case 
and then the Scottish one.
The Chemicals Sweden case is the one with the highest environmental ambitions out 
of the four case studies, and gives us a good example of what appears to be 
intentional cleaner technology. It also includes an interesting, open conflict about the 
treatment of ventilation gases. Chemicals Scotland stands out in terms of 
well-established expertise, networks and routines for dealing with the environmental 
aspects of technology.
6.1 Case study: Chemicals Sweden
This case study is divided in four parts. The first part gives a background to the 
study. The second part introduces the project studied. The third part describes some 
of the main decision points in the project and the differing opinions with relation to 
those decisions. The fourth and last part will discuss some themes from the case.
6.1.1 Background
This section will give the background to the case study, in terms of the company, the 
site, and their organisations. Special attention will be given to the engineering 
capacity and to environmental aspects of the site.
6.1.1.1  The company
The company produces healthcare products, coatings and chemicals. Sales in 2001 
were approximately EURO 14 billion, and the company had approximately 66 000 
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employees in 80 countries, 62% of the employees are employed in Europe.89 
Company headquarters are located in the Netherlands.90
The project under study was an expansion project, called EMU 2000, partially driven 
by environmental concerns, at the Emulgol plant on the West coast of Sweden. The 
company bought this plant in the early 90s.
The chemicals part of the company is organised into a number of business units, two 
of which are represented with production units on the site: Surface Chemistry and 
Functionals.91 Within Surface Chemistry there is a sub-unit called Surfactants 
Europe, which includes the Emulgol plant we are studying here.
Within Surface Chemistry there is also a division called Service Unit Sweden dealing 
with IT, economy, environment and facilities. The Service Unit is represented on the 
site. The Site Service Unit also includes an R&D department, which is however 
focussed on products rather than process technologies, and it had no role in this 
project.
Financially Surfactants is doing less well than other parts of the business.92 
Surfactants is however an expansion area, which means investments and expansion 
of production facilities and investments in product related R&D. 
6.1.1.2  The site
The site produces fine chemistry products in four plants. Production is organised into 
two production units: Production Surfactants and Production Ethylene Amide, each 
89 Printed slides provided by the researcher (see Appendix A).
90 We shall here call the company Chemicals Sweden, indicating the location of the site rather than its 
ownership.
91 This section and the next describe the current organisation. When relevant for the analysis 




of which has two plants on the site.93 The project studied concerned the Emulgol 
plant, which is one of the plants of Production Surfactants. The managers of the 
production units report to the site manager as well as to the business unit 
Manufacturing Manager.
The Emulgol plant produces surface chemistry products. The production process is 
complex in the sense that the plant produces approximately 150 products, based on 
approximately 100 different inputs.94 The main input is ethylene oxide, produced on 
site in another plant. The production is based on batch technology, and organised in 
several main steps: catalysis, reaction and after treatment. The plant runs in four 
parallel lines. Thereafter the product is sent to storage.
Production Surfactants employs close to 70 people, almost half of which are 
operators in the two plants.95 There are also employees working on Logistics, Process 
and Quality Control (PQC),96 Maintenance and HSE97 (one employee). 
The PQC unit employs a few process technology engineers. At the time of the project 
this function was part of the Site Service Unit. The process engineers and the 
maintenance engineers constitute the engineering capacity at the site.
6.1.1.3  The environment
The environmental aspects of the plant’s production that are most relevant to this 
study are emissions to water and air.98 Water is among other things used to clean the 
93 Safety engineer
94 Project leader, consultant.
95 Safety engineer 
96 The process engineer, who is now employed at the new PQC group at the production unit, was at 
the start of the project employed in a process engineering group within Service Unit Sweden (SUS).
97 Health, Safety and Environment
98 Consumption of water was also an issue, but closely aligned with the production of effluents. 
Energy consumption was not a main environmental issue.
148
process equipment after running a batch. The waterborne waste is either burnt99 in an 
incineration oven or released into the sea. The exhaust fumes from the oven are 
scrubbed. There is a wet stream from the scrubber that is released into the sea. The 
oven (and scrubber) is a common utility for the four plants at the site, and operated 
by one of the other plants. Some of the gaseous emissions, the so-called ‘ventilation 
gases’, or ‘vent gases’ for short, are also scrubbed. The remaining gases are released 
directly to the air. 
There are also safety and health aspects of the plant activities. Not least ethylene 
oxide – the main input – is highly explosive and needs to be tightly controlled.
The site is operating under a licence granted by the Environmental Court, and 
environmental inspections are carried out by the Municipality as well as the County 
Administration.100
The Site Service Unit is among other things responsible for production-related HSE 
issues. The HSE department staff work as experts in the fields of health, security and 
the environment. They are responsible for production-related regulatory affairs, and 
provide expertise when called upon by the production organisation.101 There is also, 
as mentioned above, an HSE co-ordinator employed at Production Surfactants.
The interviewees in the case study are mainly from Production Surfactants and from 
the HSE department in the Site Service Unit.
6.1.2 The project
This section introduces the project studied. Firstly, by setting out the scope of the 
project. Secondly, by describing the main motives behind the project. Lastly, the way 
the project was organised is presented.
99 When the water content of the waste stream is too high it does not burn, therefore other fuel is 
added.




The wish to expand the plant existed at least as early as 1992.102 In 1994/1995 a 
feasibility study and a further planning project were performed. The planning project 
came up with a detailed budget of 350 million SEK.103 The finally approved project 
had a budget of approximately 245 million SEK.104 The project started in 1996 and 
ended early 1999.
An important technological part of the project was about restructuring the process 
routes. Instead of a complex - but flexible - ‘nest’ of routes, the project created four 
separate routes, each with catalysis vessel, reactor etc. The systems for feeding 
substances into and out of the process were completely changed. The project 
introduced ‘pigging’105 technology for propulsion, a system that uses plugs that are 
propelled through the pipes, and a new recipe-based control system. The drum filling 
facility106 was rebuilt, replacing two smaller facilities. Another part of the project 
aimed at finding a new way to deal with gaseous emissions. Some other parts of the 
project also concerned technological change, but are less relevant for this case study.
As part of the ambition to expand the plant, a new environmental licence had to be 
applied for. The application was filed in 1994.107 The new licence stipulated emission 
limits, but also contained conditions requiring that the company investigate several 
things. The investigations concerned both new measurements of gaseous emissions 
and investigations into potential technological solutions to manage the emissions and 
effluents. This work ran in parallel to the expansion project, but also linked in with 
the project. This will be described in more detail later.
102 Environmental engineer 




107 Environmental engineer 
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6.1.2.2  Motives
The project had a background in concerns for profitability as well as environment 
and safety. The existing plant was badly adapted to the current operations, after 
extensive changes in the range of products since its construction in the 1970s, and 
therefore needed to be modernised.108 As part of the overall company strategy to 
expand production in the area of surfactants, it was decided to invest in an expansion 
project at the Emulgol plant. 
Maintenance of the plant had also been neglected for a number of years, leading to a 
relatively high frequency of accidents and relatively high levels of emissions.109 The 
company had in fact been sued in 1992 for a chemicals release.110 In 1994 the 
company applied for a new environmental permit for all the plants of the site, also 
triggered by a wish to increase the capacity of the plants in the near future. The 
permit stipulated, among other things, new emission limits. The new permit was a 
pre-requisite for the project and partly shaped its content. Improved environmental 
and safety performance was one of the core aims of the project.111
The plant manager claims that the project was initiated purely for environmental 
reasons.112 The environmental problems and the environmental permit were indeed 
important reasons for initiating the project. But the permit itself was also motivated 
by a wish to increase capacity. It is also clear that increased capacity was part of the 
vision developed in the planning project.113 In addition to the HSE aspects and the 
need to increase capacity, the project also aimed at improved cost-efficiency, 





112 Plant manager 
113 Plant manager
114 Plant manager 
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The technological strategy chosen included automation and reduced manual 
handling, thus potentially increasing also labour productivity. Later, a reduction of 
the workforce was implemented. Whether this was an intended outcome was 
contested, as will be described later.
The plan to increase capacity rested on the making of market forecasts. Thereafter, 
the project plan, produced by the plant, was negotiated with the business unit 
manager, and all the way up to the Supervisory Board of the concern. The plans were 
more or less unchanged in this process, apart from the market forecasts that were 
lowered.115 The goal of increased capacity was however kept.
The group working with the planning project, led by the plant manager, first came up 
with a draft plan that would have cost 350 million SEK,116 and they judged that they 
would never get that much money, and decided to reduce the project budget by 100 
million SEK.117 This required priorities to be made, and some ideas for improvement 
were excluded.
According to the plant manager the exclusions affected neither the HSE goals nor the 
capacity goal. Instead it was the productivity goal that had to give, through the 
exclusion of some of the automation measures and some simplification of handling. 
However, one of the most costly things that was excluded was the nitrogen ballast for 
the many tanks in the plant. The main function of the ballast would have been to 
reduce the risk of explosion of the main chemical: ethylene oxide. The nitrogen 
ballast would also have reduced the efficiency of the production, and higher levels of 
management expressed doubts about the technology for this reason,118 which may 





118 Process engineer 
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6.1.2.3  The project organisation
The project was led by a project leader reporting to an internal customer: the plant 
manager, supported by a steering group. There were approximately 30 people 
working full time in the project, organised in groups according to area of 
competence, and led by group leaders.119 The project was divided into eight sub-
projects, each led by a sub-project leader. Each sub-project drew on competence 
from the groups, so that the project was organised in a matrix.
The competence in the project comprised areas like: facility construction, steel 
construction, mechanics, electricity, instruments, process control and process 
engineering. One administrator worked full time on an administrative sub-project.
The core staff consisted mainly of temporarily hired staff from consultancy firms, 
including the project leader. A few permanent Chemicals Sweden employees worked 
full time on the project.120
There was no environmental expert working full time on the project, but staff from 
the HSE department monitored the project with regard to HSE aspects and took part 
in project meetings, as well as contributed extensively in parts of the project with, for 
example, risk assessments.121 The environmental monitoring work in the project was 
carried out by an environmental engineer in the HSE department, and mainly 
concerned issues relating to the environmental permit. The environmental engineer 
testified that, in general, referring to licence conditions helped in convincing others 
about the importance of environmental measures. It was part of the project 
management policy to have someone from HSE in this role.
This absence of full time environmental project workers mirrors the internal 
consultant role122 of the HSE employees. A problem with this, according to some of 
the HSE staff, is that they do not automatically get information until their services 
119 Project leader, consultant
120 Maintenance manager
121 Safety engineer
122 They are not consultants in the sense of an internal market for their services, but in the sense of 
being called upon to contribute on someone else’s initiative.
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are asked for. Another member of the HSE staff said that this was not so much of a 
problem, as nothing stops them from seeking out the information if they so wish.
HSE staff are typically not involved in the early stages of a project.123 The HSE 
manager was in this case involved in the planning stage of this project, but only 
informally. This contrasts with the parallel work that was primarily motivated by the 
environmental permit, where environmental staff had key roles.
6.1.3 Decision points
This section will describe some of the main decisions made in the project relating to 
the technological and environmental aspects of the project. Some of the decisions 
were controversial,124 and the different standpoints will be described, including who 
held which standpoint.
6.1.3.1  The pigging technology
The main environmental improvement in the project was gained through the 
introduction of a pigging system.125 The main function of the pigging system is for 
cleaning pipes after a chemical has been fed through them. Previously this was done 
by washing the pipes with water, producing large amounts of effluent, which had to 
be burnt in an incineration oven.
Some alternatives to the pigging system were considered, namely: reducing the 
lengths of pipe, thus reducing the volume of washing water; rearranging the tank 
storage facility126 (presumably making it less complex and messy, and so reducing 
123 HSE manager
124 Controversy here refers to issues where different interviewees have different opinions, whether this 
has caused open conflict or not.
125 Project leader, consultant
126Tanklagret
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pipe lengths); and introducing campaigns, that is, processing similar products in 
sequence which would reduce the need to wash the pipes between batches.127
Reducing the amount of effluent from the plant was one of the goals of the project.128 
It was motivated not least by the environmental permit. As mentioned above, the 
environmental permit triggered other projects running in parallel with the EMU 2000 
project, aiming at treating the gaseous emissions and the effluents. This included an 
idea to build a new, larger incineration oven to burn some effluents and gaseous 
emissions. The oven previously used to burn effluents was at the time running at 
close to full capacity,129 and any excess water would have had to be transported for 
external destruction. Reducing the amount of effluent reduced the urgency to build a 
new oven,130 which would have been costly. Burning effluent with high water content 
is also quite expensive because of the need for added fuel.
There was also a plan for a new effluent treatment facility, based on, firstly, 
concentration of the effluent by evaporation and, secondly, purification with 
membrane technology.131 However, the reduced volume of effluent achieved with the 
pigging system reduced the need for this treatment facility, and to an agreement with 
the regulator to abandon it.132 The pigging system thus allowed the company to 
improve environmental performance, whilst at the same time avoid or delay costly 
end-of-pipe investments and the, also costly, shipping of effluent for external 
destruction.
The pigging system also brought other advantages. The work environment was 
greatly improved,133 since the washing procedure was largely manual and quite 
messy work, and some of the chemicals handled dangerous. As less chemicals were 
127 Project leader, consultant





133 Project leader, consultant
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lost to washing water with the pigging system, there were also resource efficiency 
gains. The efficient cleaning with the pigging system also meant less contamination 
of products, that is, better product quality.134 
The pigging system also opened up opportunities for automation. The pigging system 
can also be used to feed chemicals through pipes. The pigging system was 
implemented for the feeding of raw material into the process and for feeding the 
products out of it. A new control system135 was introduced for the feeding in of raw 
materials and for the feeding out of products. The pigging system made the 
introduction of the new control system possible. The new control system also 
increased product quality by standardising operating routines. 
6.1.3.2  How to deal with the vent gases?
A complex, part of the project was about dealing with the gaseous emissions, the so-
called vent gases. The vent gas sub-project was driven by the environmental permit 
from 1994, which stipulated that something should be done to further purify the vent 
gases from the site.136 One of the chemical compounds in the vent gases was ethylene 
oxide, for which there was a separate condition in the environmental permit. The 
vent gas condition was not specified for the Emulgol plant, but for the total site. The 
plant, however, represents one of the major sources of ethylene oxide emissions at 
the site. 
The treatment of the vent gases was contested on several occasions. The company 
contested the inclusion of the vent gases in the permit in the negotiations with the 
environmental authorities in the early 90s. According to the environmental engineer 
it was seen as too costly by plant management. Later, during the planning project 
when the project budget had to be reduced, the vent gas treatment was raised as a 
possible exclusion. 
134 Maintenance manager
135 Alternatively called ‘recipe control’ (receptstyrning) or ‘batch control’ (batchstyrning).
136 Project leader, consultant
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Since there was no permit condition specifically for this plant, the vent gas treatment 
could have been managed in a separate project, like the new oven and the effluent 
treatment. It was however included as part of the EMU 2000 project. There were 
several reasons for this. One reason was the idea that there might be possibilities to 
deal with the emissions at source and reduce the need for such end-of-pipe treatment.
Another reason was the commitment of the plant manager. She had a track record of 
leading projects with an environmental profile. Starting as an engineer, her career 
had benefited from doing environmental work, especially when the environment was 
“a hot topic in the company”.137 She here contributed to the decision to include the 
vent gas treatment.
Different technological alternatives for dealing with the vent gases were looked into, 
and abandoned. Firstly an idea involving a separate incineration oven for the 
Emulgol plant using catalytic combustion was investigated.138 After some work on 
this news came from the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration that 
such facilities in the US had been exploding. Risk assessment showed that this 
solution would be too risky. After that an idea about a (re-active, acid-basic) scrubber 
was developed. But this idea was also abandoned, partly because it generated waste 
that would have had to be incinerated.
There also arose some uncertainty as to how serious the gaseous emissions from the 
Emulgol plant actually were. The need to do anything and the continued relevance of 
a measurement of them from 1992-1993 were questioned. 
The plant management argued that the emissions were actually not serious enough. 
This resulted in a dispute over a suggestion for new measurements of the emissions. 
The Chemicals Sweden employed process engineer and others argued that the old 
measurements were not reliable. The plant management, on the other hand, argued 





The project leader claimed that the emissions were very small, supported by the HSE 
manager who argued that they were not that serious.
It may have been a contributing factor to this dispute that the vent gas emissions are 
difficult to measure for several reasons.140 The emissions are very uneven due to their 
origin in a batch process, and measurements need to be made over a period of time. 
They are also in part made up of surfactants, prone to clogging up measurement 
instruments and to creating foam. The gaseous emissions also have a high steam 
content, which further complicates measurement. The measurements that were later 
made took two years to do.
An added uncertainty came from the reconstruction of the plant potentially changing 
the emissions. The vent gas treatment sub-project was scheduled at a late stage 
within the EMU 2000 project, so as to be able to judge the future emissions from the 
plant as accurately as possible.141 On the other hand, this meant that there was little 
time to do any new measurements of the gases. The lack of time to do new 
measurements was one of the arguments used against doing new measurements. In 
the end no measurements were made as part of the project.
It was also a matter of money. According to the HSE manager the vent gas 
sub-project was crowded out budget-wise, by a focus on the core manufacturing 
process. The overall money spent in the EMU 2000 project very nearly equalled the 
budget allocated to it. This means that the money for the vent gas treatment was 
spent on other things, which supports the crowding out argument.
By this time, there were also plans in place for the new incineration oven, which 
would burn not only some of the effluents, but also, it was suggested, the gaseous 
emissions from all the plants on the site. The vent gas treatment work in EMU 2000 
was eventually abandoned, and the responsibility for the problem was transferred to 
the new site oven project.
140 Safety engineer; HSE manager; Environmental coordinator
141 Process engineer
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It is also interesting to note that by this time there was a new plant manager cum 
internal project customer in place. The original plant manager, who had championed 
the inclusion of the vent gases into the project, had by now been promoted to another 
position.
The new site oven was built after the project in 2003,142 and there were then also 
plans to build a pilot facility based on the previously abandoned acid-basic scrubber 
technology. A renewed condition in the environmental permit from 2001 stipulated 
that measurements of the vent gases were to be made.143 Apparently, the company 
failed to convince the regulator that the vent gases were not a problem. New 
measurements were made after the project.
The dispute about money also survived the end of the project. As the vent gas 
sub-project was cancelled, so was the part of the budget dedicated to this work. Some 
people, notably the HSE department environmental engineer, argue that the funds 
should have been made available for the further work needed to investigate the issue, 
but that did not happen. The current plant manager explains that when a project is 
over, it’s over, and the money is gone:
Since this sub-project had progressed so far – and then of course you make sure 
that you’ve got money, that you have a budget and all that – and was then shut  
down, you can interpret this as if the money that we kept such a close eye on 
and actually had received the confirmation that we’d get, that it actually was 
still in some wallet somewhere. But that’s not how it works in real life; when 
you shut a project down, it’s shut down.
6.1.3.3  Implementation and rationalisation
In 1999 the formal project ended, but a lot of implementation work remained. Some 
parts of the project were implemented, for example the new catalysis vessels and the 
new drum filling facility, but lacked formal instructions and routines. Others were in 
142 The Emulgol plant oven would have burnt gases either from only the Emulgol plant, or combined 
with gases from another plant to even out the gas flow from the batch production of the Emulgol 
plant. There is now a separate incineration oven being built on another plant, the gases from which 
were once intended to be mixed with the gases from the Emulgol plant.
143 Environmental coordinator
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place, but did not yet work very well, for example the pigging system.144 And some 
parts were barely in place, such as the batch control system, the implementation of 
which was run as a new project. 
The project had met its budget very well, although work remained on some sub-
projects, and it was decided that it was to end as planned. Apart from the remaining 
implementation work and bugs, there was also a learning period for the operators. 
Not least the new control system, once up and running, required radically new ways 
of working. For these reasons there was somewhat of a bottleneck in terms of 
knowledge about the new system and its implementation.145
The project was approved partly on the basis of forecasts of future market 
developments, indicating a need for an increased capacity. The forecasts turned out 
to have been too optimistic, and when the project was over there was no need for any 
increased capacity.146 
In mid 1999, that is, soon after the project ended, the news came about a major 
rationalisation of the plant. Profitability was too low and there was no demand for the 
planned increased capacity. So to reduce costs Chemicals Sweden laid off close to 
half the workers in the plant.147 This of course lowered their motivation, and with the 
reduced number of workers, the bottleneck was a fact. Implementation slowed down 
considerably. 
The rationalisation created a conflict between the workers and the employer, and the 
union organised the workers’ resistance to the rationalisation. The outcome of the 
conflict was that a plan for a system with three shifts was abandoned, and that 




147 Project leader, consultant
148 Operator
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It is a matter of contention whether the rationalisation can be said to be a direct and 
intended result of the project or not. But the technological changes introduced 
facilitated the reduction of employees.
6.1.4 Discussion
Looking at the plant after the project was over, and after subsequent implementation 
work, the project could be deemed quite successful in relation to its aims. The 
environmental performance was better, the work environment was cleaner and safer 
and the quality of the products was higher. In terms of technology, the batch control 
system had been implemented, and the pigging system was working with 
considerably less problems, contributing to improved resource efficiency. Table 6.1 
lists the main technological decisions studied.
After improving the work organisation the capacity had been increased, and as the 
number of workers had decreased labour productivity had been raised.149 Profitability 
was still low however, and in 2003 there were plans to lay off also white-collar staff.
This case shows an example of what appears to be an ideal-type win-win solution. 
Environmental performance was a part of the core aims of the investment, together 
with resource efficiency, capacity etc. The pigging technology solution improved 
both the environmental and economic performance of the plant, and so deserves the 
label cleaner technology. 
Furthermore, the pigging technology also helped avoid, reduce or delay other 
end-of-pipe investments, and was in this sense an alternative solution to 
environmental problems. The pigging solution did not, however, solve the 
environmental problems completely and there was still a need for end-of-pipe 
measures.
All the end-of-pipe investments made were done in separate projects. In part this 
reflects the site having joint utilities for all the plants, but it was also in part an 
149 Maintenance had been outsourced, which, according to the shop steward, was a technical trick to 
increase productivity as it appears in the books.
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outcome of the controversy about the vent gases. This controversy shows how the 
company had little wish to go beyond the win-win scenarios, but resisted investment 
that would improve environmental but not economic performance.
Table 6.1  Decision points Chemicals Sweden
Decision points Arguments for and against
project capacity, reg., Q,
 cost eff., productivity
core technology
heat exchange cost eff.
pigging reg., RE, Q H&S
-   rearrange storage facility (no) reg., RE
-   campaigns (no) reg., RE
-   oven & ETP (no) reg. cost
nitrogen ballast (no) H&S, reg. cost, prod. econ.
end-of-pipe technology
vent gas treatment (no) reg. cost, T
-   separate oven (no) reg. cost, risk
-   scrubber (no) reg. cost, E
outside project
several other projects, incl. 
hardening of surfaces, new 
drains, new roofs, scrubbing and 
sending more waste to treatment 
company
reg.
Notes: 1) Abbreviations used: reg. = regulation, E = environmental, RE = resource efficiency, H&S = 
health and safety, T = technical difficulties, Q = quality, eff. = efficiency, prod. econ. = production 
economy.
2) Items proceeded with a ‘-‘ means that they were alternative solutions to the next item above 
without a ‘-‘. Items follow by ‘(no)’ means that this option was not chosen.
The company had a rather weak internal engineering function, and had to rely on 
consultants for a lot of the design work. There was however a fairly strong internal 
environmental organisation, with environmental staff both in a separate department 
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and at the plant. The role of environmental staff in the project was limited to 
monitoring the project in terms of regulatory compliance, and coordinating the 
project with the permit driven end-of-pipe projects running in parallel.
The environmental staff appear to have had a relatively limited influence in the 
project. Their input at the planning stage was marginal. During the project their main 
influence was based on the environmental permit, but as we saw from the vent gas 
controversy, even these permit conditions could be questioned. In spite of an alliance 
with some of the in-house engineers they failed to save the vent gas treatment.
In contrast, the plant manager in the internal customer role appears to have been able 
to champion environmental performance. It was in part down to her that the vent gas 
treatment was initially included in the project initially. It is interesting that it was 
subsequently excluded after she had been promoted to another position.
6.2 Case study: Chemicals Scotland
As mentioned in chapter 4 the fieldwork for this case study was aborted after a 
misunderstanding. This means that the resulting case study is somewhat less detailed, 
but there are still interesting results to discuss.
6.2.1 Background
This section will give the background to the case study, in terms of the company, the 
site, and their organisations. Special attention will be given to the engineering 
capacity and to environmental aspects of the site.
6.2.1.1  The company
Chemicals Scotland has its origin in a large UK chemicals group. The company was 
part of the chemicals and pharmaceuticals business that was subsequently spun off. 
In a second spin off deal in 1999 Chemicals Scotland was formed and bought by two 
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investment companies.150 The head quarters are now in Manchester, where the main 
R&D centre is also located.151 There are four manufacturing sites, three in England 
and one in Scotland.
Chemicals Scotland produces fine chemicals. The company is organised in business 
‘sectors’ corresponding to different product markets (and sub-divided into business 
‘units’ relating to market segments).152 The business sectors include agrochemicals, 
fine chemicals, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. The business units commission 
production from the manufacturing units and control their investments.153 A 
particular manufacturing unit may produce for one or several business units.
6.2.1.2  The site
The Scottish site produces among other things fluoroaromatics for agrochemicals, 
inks and dyes.154 Over the last ten years the product range has shifted from dyes 
towards inputs for biotech and pharmaceuticals. Apart from its own products, 
Chemicals Scotland also sells manufacturing capacity.
At the Scottish site there is, apart from the manufacturing organisation, among other 
things also an analytical department and a process technology (PT) department. The 
PT department, staffed by engineers and scientists, develops and scales up 
production processes for new products, commissions new equipment, and helps with 
trouble shooting in manufacturing.155 The analytical department does environmental 
and other chemical analyses. There are approximately 800 employees at the site in 
total.156
150 Process engineer - project leader
151 Technical director
152 The company was unfortunately not willing to provide a proper organisation chart.
153 There is some leeway for the site, in that it decides on how some overhead costs are charged.
154 Technical director
155 Environmental technology consultant
156 Approximately 150 people were laid off in 2003.
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Product ideas typically derive from the R&D centre in Manchester, apart from the 
biotech and pharmaceuticals areas, in which the company has no products of its own, 
and does only contract manufacturing. The PT department is thereafter responsible 
for the scaling up of processes for manufacturing. Development projects are 
organised in commercial project teams, consisting primarily of staff from PT, 
manufacturing and business units.157
6.2.1.3  The environment
There is a range of products produced at the site, with differing environmental 
profiles. Several of the chemicals handled are toxic. Some are explosive and/or 
volatile. The existing system for handling emissions and effluents includes scrubbers 
and an effluent treatment plant (ETP).158 The final effluents are released into a large 
estuary.
The site is regulated by SEPA under the IPC legislation. There is one environmental 
permit per production process including the utilities. The pressure from the regulator 
had decreased over recent years:
A lot of the experimental and development work we used to get involved in, in 
testing, has gone down dramatically. And I suspect that the reason why it… 
dare I say, I don’t think there’s as much pressure from SEPA these days.159
The company is not certified according to ISO 14001, but has an environmental 
management system. As part of this system, environmental performance contributes 
to how salaries are set for the operations managers (who represent the business units 
at the site).160
The environmental aspects of process development projects are worked through 
according to a methodology called ‘PTD-SHE studies’ (Process Technology 
157 Environmental technology consultant
158 Technical director
159 Technical director. Another reason why the amount of testing has gone down is a changed 
monitoring regime – a change driven by the regulator.
160 Technical director
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Development – Safety, Health and Environment studies). The methodology 
encompasses both the product and the production process. Its origins lie in 
methodologies for environmental assessments and safety assessments, which have 
been integrated by the Environmental Technology Consultant (see below).161 
The PTD-SHE methodology prescribes a series of studies to be carried out during the 
course of a development project, from the lab stage to a review after the process has 
been operating for some time.162 The individual studies involve different members of 
staff depending on the focus of the particular study. The results of the studies include 
an environmental impact assessment and an occupational health statement. See table 
6.2.
There are several environmental experts at the site. There is a Site Environmental 
Advisor managing permits and contacts with the regulator. There is also a corporate 
(internal) consultant specialising in environmental technology based in the local PT 
department. Furthermore, there are three Advisors on environment, safety and 
occupational hygiene respectively at corporate level who may get involved in 
projects at the site.
The Site Environmental Advisor’s role deserves further comment. He admitted to not 
having any environmental qualifications, and had got his job through having good 
contacts with the regulator, from having been involved in previous work on setting 
up the ETP. He was at the time a manager in the manufacturing organisation.
161 In spite of this formal integration it was called ‘SHE studies’ or ‘Hazards studies’ depending on the 
interviewee and his/her particular perspective.
162 The starting point of the methodology is adapted to particular projects depending on what stage of 
development the product and the associated production technology is when the project begins.
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Table 6.2  PTD-SHE studies163
Study no Description
0 At the lab stage; about what chemical reaction routes to choose
1 A preliminary risk assessment
2 Identifying major hazards
About the raw materials and the 
chemical process
3 About the production process equipment
(at this stage there are engineering line diagrams available)
4 After the production process is built
5 A review some time later
The analytical department also includes a laboratory, which among other things does 
environmental monitoring and analyses, and is responsible for the effluent treatment 
plant. The company also buys environmental (and other) analytical services from a 
lab in England owned by its former parent company.164
There is a well-developed, informal network between the Technical Director,165 the 
Environmental Technology Consultant, the site Environmental Advisor and the 
corporate Environmental Advisor. Several of these have a long history of working 
with environmental aspects of technology in the company. Current issues are 
discussed in the network on a daily basis:
And generally sort of share half a dozen e-mails a day, and things like that.  
Even though we’re in different departments and different locations on the site.166
163 The accounts of the PTD-SHE studies vary somewhat between interviewees, and this description is 
a compromise between these accounts. The table gives a good overview of the types of activities 
involved though.
164 Technical director
165 Full title: Technical, Development and Environmental Manager.
166 Environmental Technology Consultant.
167
The overall impression is of an ambitious environmental organisation, and well-
developed routines for dealing with the environmental aspects of technology, 
supported by a long-standing informal network. This ambitious environmental 
organisation was set up when the company was part of the large UK chemicals 
group.167 And in spite of the current environmental ambition level being somewhat 
lower under the new owners and because of a difficult financial situation,168 as well 
as the reduced environmental pressure from the Scottish environmental regulator, the 
(formal and informal) environmental organisation had remained intact.
6.2.2 The project
This section introduces the project studied. Firstly, by setting out the scope of the 
project and the main motives behind the project. Secondly, the way the project was 
organised is presented.
6.2.2.1  Scope and motive
The project concerned contract manufacturing of an intermediate for a fungicide at a 
volume of 600 tons per annum. The deal was made in 1999/2000. The customer 
contracted out initial volumes to two competing manufacturers, with the aim of later 
producing some of the substance in-house and selecting only one of the two suppliers 
for continued production.169 The customer provided the basic chemical process, and 
supplies the raw material.
Chemicals Scotland had not produced this product before. The basic motive for the 
company was to acquire this new line of business.
167 Technical director
168 Process engineer - project leader
169 Process engineer - project leader
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The chemical process provided by the customer was not optimised. This was left to 
the contractors. The initial budget was £7.0m, but had to be reduced to £4.4m to meet 
the financial limits set by the Board. The project eventually ended up at £5.8m.170
Chemicals Scotland was able to design the process into an existing plant at the site 
with excess capacity, which helped in keeping investment costs down. The process 
was also designed and planned for a somewhat smaller initial capacity, later to be 
increased up to 600 tons by further process optimisation.171 Another strategy to keep 
costs down was to opt for continuous processing for parts of the process, which 
reduced costs but created logistical difficulties to be overcome by buffering of the 
fluids.172
Environmental performance was not a core motive for Chemicals Scotland. 
However, the project completed the PTD SHE studies according to the company 
norm.173 The company also had to get a new environmental permit for the new 
production process.
6.2.2.2  Project organisation
The internal customer of the project was from one of the business units in the 
Agrochemicals Sector (division) of the company. Most of the members of the project 
were engineers from the Process Technology (PT) Department at the site. Also the 
project leader was a process engineer from the PT department. No consultants or 
supplier staff were involved.
Some of the staff working in the project were, however, from other parts of the 
organisation than PT. A Work Station Manager represented Manufacturing in the 
project. The Site Environmental Advisor handled contacts with SEPA (and the lab in 
England), and monitored the potential impact on the ETP from the proposed 
170 Process engineer - project leader
171 Process engineer - project leader
172 Process engineer - project leader
173 Work station manager
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technological solutions. The Environmental Technology Consultant (affiliated with 
the PT department, but formally corporate staff) led an early PTD SHE study. A 
Corporate Safety Advisor led another of the PTD SHE studies.
6.2.3 Decision points
This section will describe some of the main decisions made in the project relating to 
the technological and environmental aspects of the project. Some of the issues were 
disputed. The controversies were between the (external) customer and Chemicals 
Scotland.
Early on in the project alternative chemical reaction routes were investigated, but 
none was found. This work was done as part of PTD-SHE study 0, and led by the 
Environmental Technology Consultant.
6.2.3.1  Toxic effluent
One of the environmental problems encountered was that some of the chemicals 
involved, including both the raw material and the product, are toxic. The effluent 
from the process is therefore also toxic. The chemicals are toxic to humans as well as 
for fish in the recipient water body, should the effluent by accident end up there, and 
for microbes, which could disrupt the functioning of the effluent treatment plant.174 
Apart from in-house testing, tests and analyses for human toxicity were also made by 
the customer, and tests and analyses for aquatic toxicity (fish) and micro-toxicity 
(microbes)175 were made by the English lab.176
Containment was the basic solution strategy to deal with the toxic effluent.177 An 
investigated design change for the effluent was a trip alarm system alerting staff to 
174 Safety advisor
175 Criteria used were COD levels – measure of micro-toxicity - and probabilities of spillages.
176 Site environmental advisor
177 Process engineer - project leader
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overflow from the open tanks, but hazards analysis showed that this was not 
necessary. Another design change was to reduce the toxicity of the effluent by UV 
radiation. Extra operator checks would also have been necessary. It was however 
shown that the acidity of the existent effluent would help reduce the toxicity.178 
Furthermore, the microbe flora of the effluent treatment plant managed to adapt to 
the new effluent. The microbe adaptation was helped by a soft start, where at first 
only small amounts of the effluent was sent to the treatment plant. It was, however, 
necessary to use a large storage tank to even out the flow to the treatment plant. A 
large amount of work and money was spent on dealing with the toxicity problem.179
There was initially a leakage where the product was filled into the transport vessels. 
This was primarily seen as an occupational health problem, rather than an 
environmental one. The problem was pointed out several times early on by the work 
station manager, but was not acknowledged by the others in the project. At the time 
of the start-up review, the problem was acknowledged. The solution was to set up 
new hoods and, later, antistatic hoovers.180 The customer was unhappy about the 
spillage.
The vessels themselves also leaked, which caused a dispute with the customer. The 
product eroded the rubber of the lining of the vessels. The solution was eventually to 
replace the rubber lined vessels with much more costly enamel lined ones.181
The rubber lined vessels also created another problem. Initially the customer 
complained about black specks in the product, which turned out to come from the 
rubber linings.182 As this was not covered by the product specs from the customer, 
there was a dispute as to whether Chemicals Scotland needed to do anything about 
this. In the end they did solve the problem.
178 Site environmental advisor
179 Process engineer - project leader
180 Work station manager
181 Work station manager
182 Work station manager
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6.2.3.2  Volatile organic compounds (VOCs)
Apart from the toxicity related problems, there were also problems with the volatility 
of a solvent used. This required a new agreement with the environmental regulator 
(SEPA) about VOC emissions standards, since the site had not had any VOC 
emissions before. A new agreement was reached after lengthy negotiations.183
Some of the chemicals involved are highly explosive when in contact with oxygen. 
After risk analyses it was decided that a nitrogen ballast was needed to keep oxygen 
out of the process, and thus reduce the risk of explosion and to abide by safety 
regulations.184 The nitrogen ballast also helped contain the volatile compounds. 
Apart from that, planned releases were also introduced, and the gas from them sent to 
a condenser. The gas could then be recovered and reused.185
6.2.3.3  Other gases
A third problem related to the sulphur dioxide content of the ventilation gases. 
Testing and analysis was carried out, including wind modelling. The solution was to 
send the gases to an existing scrubber, which had enough free capacity. (The effluent 
from the scrubber goes to the effluent treatment plant).186
Back balance vents were introduced to deal with nitrogen gases leaking when tanks 
were filled.187 The vents lead the gases back to the emptied tank. Back balance vents 
were also used to contain the volatile solvent.
183 Process engineer - project leader
184 Safety advisor
185 Process engineer - project leader
186 Process engineer - project leader
187 Work station manager
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6.2.4 Discussion
The project was successful in terms of getting the new process up and running. At 
the time of the interviews production was under way.
The main environmental aspects of the project were toxic effluents and the VOC 
emissions. The VOCs could be dealt with by getting a new permit from SEPA and by 
using existing equipment. The toxic effluent was dealt with mainly by containment 
and by using existing end-of-pipe equipment including the ETP. The main decision 
points are summarised in table 6.3.
The project strategy was to comply with regulation, whilst minimising costs. There 
were also large overlaps between environmental and safety concerns. Compliance 
with safety regulations was also important.
Table 6.3  Decision points Chemicals Scotland
Decision points Arguments for and against
project as a whole new business
core technology
chemical route change (no) none found
higher efficiency (no) capacity, RE planned for a later date
nitrogen ballast H&S reg., avoiding 
explosion
enamel vessels customer, H&S, E
end-of-pipe technology
ETP, soft start, storage tank reg., cost
-   UV (no) reg. not necessary, cost
recovery of VOC reg., cost
scrubbing of SO2 reg., cost
back balance vents reg. cost
hoods and hoovers customer, H&S cost
Notes: 1) Abbreviations used: reg. = regulation, E = environmental, RE = resource efficiency, H&S = 
health and safety.
2) Items proceeded with a ‘-‘ means that they were alternative solutions to the next item above 
without a ‘-‘. Items follow by ‘(no)’ means that this option was not chosen.
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Several interviewees said that Chemicals Scotland had “a good working 
relationship” with the regulator.188 There were, however, also some complaints about 
how long time it took to get the new VOC agreement and how much information 
they required. There were also differing statements made about how useful the 
technological ideas coming from the regulator were. The company nevertheless got 
the permit and permit conditions needed. Pressure from SEPA was not considered 
very strong.189 The company however complied with the regulation.
Resource efficiency improvement was not a central aim of the project. The new 
production line was set up, and substantial optimisation to increase capacity and 
improve efficiency was planned to take place after the project. The nitrogen ballast is 
the main example of core technology investments that improved environmental 
performance.190 The nitrogen ballast can be given the label cleaner technology since 
it reduced the amount of emissions produced. But, interestingly, it did not improve 
resource efficiency. Nor was it introduced with the intention of reducing emissions. 
This was a fortunate side effect rather than an aim.
The main environmental measures were end-of-pipe rather than cleaner technology, 
mainly drawing on existing equipment, thus avoiding a large share of the potential 
costs of end-of-pipe investments.
The company’s organisation is well set up for dealing with the environmental aspects 
of its technology. This is mainly because of its substantive PT department with a 
considerable number of engineers (and scientists), but also because of its general 
environmental expertise.
It is also worth noticing that the environmental organisation spans the 
environment-technology boundary. The company has a specialist on environmental 
188 Although, as mentioned in chapter 4, my contacts with the regulator staff somehow managed to 
cause a great deal of disturbance, which suggests that the relationship was rather fragile.
189 Technical Director
190 Depending on where one draws the line between the production process and transport, the enamel 
vessels could perhaps also be considered cleaner technology.
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technology, and the Technical Director is part of the environmental-technological 
network. Whilst the Site Environmental Advisor was mainly involved with getting 
the new permit and generally liaising with SEPA, the Environmental Technology 
Consultant led an early SHE study, which had the potential of changing the core 
chemical process.
As mentioned above, the Site Environmental Advisor had gotten his job mainly 
through having good contacts with the regulator, in spite of limited environmental 
expertise. This testifies to the importance paid to the relationship with the regulator, 
but also to the limited role of the advisor in the project.
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7 Dairy industry cases
We shall here present the two dairy industry case studies. As in the previous chapter, 
one each from Sweden and Scotland.
The Dairy Sweden case is the largest investment project studied, but perhaps the one 
with the lowest environmental ambitions. The relationship between the regulator and 
the company is interesting, both in terms of the role of a third party – the Municipal 
effluents treatment utility – and the regulator’s focus on the procedural aspects of 
compliance, which contrasts with the virtual absence of any material compliance. 
The Dairy Scotland case stands out in the disconnection between the environmental 
organisation and the investment project. The company has a formal, relatively 
ambitious environmental organisation, which, however, had close to no impact on 
the investment project studied. The late intervention from the regulator (Scottish 
Water) also makes it an interesting case of what happens when environmental 
motives are added ‘after the fact’.
7.1 Case study: Dairy Sweden
As in the previous chapter, this case study is divided in four parts. The first part gives 
a background to the study. The second part introduces the project studied. The third 
part describes some of the main decision points in the project and the differing 
opinions with relation to those decisions. The fourth and last part will discuss some 
themes from the case.
7.1.1 Background
This section will give the background to the case study, in terms of the company, the 
site, and their organisations. Special attention will be given to the engineering 
capacity and to environmental aspects of the site.
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7.1.1.1  The company
The company is one of Sweden’s largest dairy companies. It is a producer 
cooperative owned by dairy farmers. The company structure changed during the 
project studied after a merger between Dairy Sweden and a Danish cooperative dairy 
company in 2000.191 Headquarters are now in Denmark, and the former Swedish 
headquarter in Stockholm now houses the management of Division Sweden. 
The merger between Dairy Sweden and the Danish dairy company has been followed 
by a series of acquisitions. The largest market is today the UK, after the acquisition 
of a majority holding in a UK dairy company in 2003.192 The company now has 
approximately 70 dairy plants and around 21 000 employees.193
The Swedish dairy market is undergoing change due to increasing international 
competition. Dairy Sweden has for a long time enjoyed a very strong position in the 
Swedish dairy product market.194 Competition on basic milk products used to be 
strong only in a few localities, leaving Dairy Sweden in a virtually unchallenged 
position in most of its regional market. There was more competition on cheese and 
specialty products (for example yoghurts). 
Now foreign dairy companies, for example the Finnish company Vallio, have entered 
the Swedish dairy product market.195 Competition is still strongest in the long 
longevity specialty products, for example yoghurts. This is also the market segment 
exhibiting the largest growth.
191 Current Environmental Coordinator
192 Annual report
193 Annual report
194 As mentioned in chapter 5, the Swedish dairy market was until recently effectively three regional 
monopolies.
195 Current Environmental Coordinator
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7.1.1.2  The site
The case study is of a project at a site (site A, see figure 7.1) in eastern Sweden, 
which before the project produced a limited number of basic milk products (skimmed 
and whole milk, cream and ‘filmjölk’196).197 The plant (plant A1) has a few lines for 
the production of these basic milk products, produced by continuous processing. 
Figure 7.1  Sites and plants
The project included a move of the production of specialty products from a site (site 
B) in a nearby town.198 The two sites are 3 miles apart. A new plant (A2) was built 
for this purpose next to plant A1. The site is now one of the company’s two centres 
for the production of so called ‘cup products’.199 Plant A2 now produces specialty 
products in batch production. The total number of products is more than 100.
196 ‘Sour milk’, a Swedish fermented milk product.
197 Corporate Environmental Specialist
198 Corporate Environmental Specialist




Plant B, shut down
Plant A1 Plant A2, new
Move of 
production
Before the move the combined number of employees was approximately 530. Today 
the total is around 350 employees.200
There is a Technical Department at the site, with approximately 40 employees, most 
of who work with maintenance, but also with investments, purchasing, etc. Some of 
the technology staff are project leaders with responsibilities for particular areas, 
including ‘projects’, that is, investments.
There is also some technology staff at corporate level. They are by and large active 
in the same areas as the local technical staff, but get involved only in larger 
projects.201 (There is also at division level a so-called Innovation Department 
responsible for product development, but it was not directly involved in this project).
7.1.1.3  The environment
The main environmental aspects to dairy plants are the loss of product to waste, 
chemicals usage – mainly for cleaning and waste treatment – and energy 
consumption (cleaning of equipment, heating and cooling of the products).202
A main reason for the loss of product to waste is caused by switching from one 
product to another. Sometimes the flow of the new product is used to expel the 
remaining old product. The part of the flow where the two products mix is separated 
out as a special waste flow called ‘switch milk’.203 Sometimes it is necessary to rinse 
the equipment with water between products, and then clean it with a strong lye 
solution. This is the main use of chemicals in the plant. The rinse and the cleaning 
produce two waste flows: the rinse water and the cleaning liquid.
There are possibilities to reuse the rinse water – a mixture of milk and water also 
known as ‘white water’. The rinse water can sometimes be reused for later rinses. 
200 Technical Manager
201 Technology Manager
202 There are important environmental impacts from the transport of raw materials and products as 
well, but that is outside the scope of this study.
203 My translation of the Swedish ‘gränsmjölk’.
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Some of the white water is regularly sent to a local biogas plant.204 The remaining 
rinse water and the used cleaning liquids are treated by treatment works run by the 
local Municipality. Dairy Sweden is the single largest source of effluents for the 
works. Before piping the waste to the works, some of this waste stream with a high 
pH caused by the cleaning chemicals is neutralised at the site.205 Dairy Sweden pays 
the Municipality for treating the effluent.
The plant has two boilers fuelled with oil providing energy. The company also buys 
in steam from a Municipality-owned energy plant. The most energy demanding part 
of the process is the cleaning, where hot water and water vapour are used.
The site has an environmental permit, which is granted by the County and monitored 
mainly by the Municipality environmental unit. The permit specifies limits to 
releases of liquid waste in terms of among other things volume, organic content and 
pH.206 The permit also specifies that the company investigate various technological 
options (more on this later). 
Before any major investment, the permit requires the company to do environmental 
impact assessments and show that they are using best available technology.207 The 
permit does not necessarily specify what this is; the company has to show that there 
are no better practicable options.
The company also has an environmental management system, and has set 
environmental targets for its activities.
At the site there is one employee working half time with environmental coordination. 
The Environmental Coordinator convenes a group of employees from different parts 
of the site dealing with environmental issues. A main responsibility of the local 
204 Municipality Environmental Officer
205 Consultant/Project leader
206 Application for new permit
207 Municipality Environmental Officer
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Environmental Coordinator is to deal with issues relating to the environmental permit 
and contacts with the regulators.208 
At the corporate level there is a group of four environmental specialists, which are 
contact persons for different parts of the division, as well as specialising in various 
environmental areas like chemicals, transport and permits.209
The environmental coordinator left the company after the project, and was later 
replaced. Meanwhile the position was moved to another part of the site organisation, 
under the controlling function. This was in part due to a rationalisation as the 
position of operational coordinator was reduced from a full time to half time job, and 
the two positions were merged.210 This may not be the only reason why this happened 
though.
There were differing opinions about this move. The subsequent environmental 
coordinator said she regretted not working closer with the technology staff, as good 
relations with them was of great importance to her job. A member of the Technology 
Department, who had previously been manager of that department, argued that the 
environmental coordinator’s job was basically a monitoring and control type job, and 
that it should therefore be kept separate from the technology work oriented towards 
creating new technical solutions and potentially new environmental problems.211 This 
implies that he saw environmental considerations as something that should be taken 
after the fact, rather than proactively when developing new technical solutions. He 
further pointed to the risk of environmental work being crowded out economically in 
the technology department:
 It can very easily happen that you put all that to one side. At least so long as no 
one goes to jail, like someone said.
208 Former Environmental Coordinator
209 Corporate Environmental Specialist
210 Current Environmental Coordinator
211 Site Engineer
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This view was echoed by the current Technology Manager, who emphasised that 
having a full time environmental coordinator was uneconomical, that is, to his mind 
there was not enough work for an environmental coordinator to do for a full time 
position.
This change also meant a reduction in local environmental expertise. Before the 
project there was one Environmental Coordinator at each of the two sites.212 Now 
there is one, and she does environmental work only half time. In contrast the current 
number of site engineers is larger than what existed in total at the two sites 
previously.
7.1.2 The project
This section introduces the project studied. Firstly, by setting out the scope of the 
project. Secondly, by describing the main motives behind the project. Lastly, the way 
the project was organised is presented.
7.1.2.1  Scope
The project’s origin lay in an investigation about the re-localisation of the production 
of speciality products. One of the options investigated was to concentrate the 
production of specialty products. By concentrating production Dairy Sweden hoped 
to achieve better use of existing equipment, as well as creating larger groups of 
employees with expertise on specialty products.213
A decision was made that the specialty products produced at site B were to be moved 




214 Current Environmental Coordinator
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This case study will focus on this investment project, which ran from the start of 
1999 towards the end of 2001. As mentioned above, the main part of the project was 
constructing a new plant (A2) beside the existing one (A1) on site A, and moving the 
production of specialty products at site B into the new plant (A2).
As part of the investigation an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was 
performed. The environmental permit specifies that Dairy Sweden has to do an EIA 
for all major changes of production.215 The EIA was produced by a local consultancy 
firm. The assessment showed that fewer plants and newer equipment would lead to 
more efficient plants and reduced waste. On the other hand increased transportation 
would offset those gains and the net effect was slightly worse environmental 
performance.216
In 1998, before the main project started, a small part of the production at plant B 
(non-flavoured yoghurt and sour cream) was moved to plant A1.217 During the main 
project more of the equipment was brought from plant B to the new plant (A2), but 
some new equipment was also bought in.218 
Some changes to the existing plant at site A (plant A1) were also made as part of the 
investment project. An automated control system and an IT business system were 
introduced, replacing earlier manual handling of production control.
The original budget was 430 million SEK.219 Additions were later made to the 
project, so that the budget then totalled 530 million SEK.220 The project ended up 
costing more than the revised budget.
215 Municipality Environmental Officer
216 Corporate Project Manager
217 Application for a new environmental permit
218 Consultant/Project Leader
219 Approximately £31m.
220 Approximately £39m. Corporate Project Manager – note that this was not the project leader, and 
that ‘Project Manager’ here is a position rather than a role in the project.
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7.1.2.2  Motives
A main motive for the project was increased production capacity, including the 
possibility for future expansion, mainly in the growing area of specialty products.221 
A second main motive was increased cost efficiency. This was to be achieved 
through better utilization of equipment, and through a reduction of the number of 
employees.222
Environmental considerations were not given high priority in the project. The 
environmental improvements that resulted were side effects. The site engineer 
elaborated on this:
When it comes to the environmental part… The target was really flexibility, and 
reduced product losses. And with the losses, there’s an environmental gain. And 
with the general improved efficiency you also improve environmentally. There’s  
hopefully less energy use and all that.
The permit was renewed first in 1999, when it was clear that the production at site B 
was to be moved to site A.223 (The permit was renewed again after the project, in 
2003, in part because the amount of organic substance in the effluent was too high.)
The company itself proposed the level of organic substance in the wastewater of the 
first permit. It was calculated by adding the production of site B and by extrapolating 
some trends.224 According to the corporate environmental expert who did the 
calculations, the level was also set “for pedagogical reasons”, implying that the 
company thought they could have managed a lower level. The environmental 
authority subsequently approved the proposed level. Notably, the Municipality 
effluent treatment works also approved of the level. The dairy plant effluent is the 
main load on their plant, and the carbon of the waste stream is actually beneficial to 
the carbon nitrogen balance of the biological treatment at the works.225
221 Consultant/Project leader
222 Technology Director
223 Corporate Environmental Specialist
224 Corporate Environmental Specialist
225 Environmental Consultant
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7.1.2.3  Project organisation
The project reported to a company steering group, chaired by the corporate Technical 
Director, who was also responsible at corporate level for environmental affairs. 
The project went through several phases, each with its own formal organisation.226 
After the re-localisation investigation (with contributions from site staff), there was a 
planning phase detailing the requirements for the project. Then followed a 
programme phase dealing with the technological and organisational solutions to 
those requirements. After that, followed a construction phase, and lastly an 
implementation phase. After the project further optimisation was needed. The 
number of participants varied greatly. In some phases, notably in the construction 
and implementation phases, several hundred people were working on the project. 
The project organisation for each phase was also divided into ‘functions’ like quality, 
process technology, purchasing etc. 
The project was also complex in terms of the involvement of people from different 
organisations. Two construction companies were hired to build the new plant.227 Two 
process equipment suppliers - Supplier Sweden and Supplier Denmark - supplied 
most of the new equipment. In addition to this there were several other companies 
involved supplying various specialised products and services.
Two consultancies were heavily involved in the project. The main project leader and 
his closest co-worker were from a consultancy, Plant Tech, oriented towards the 





Figure 7.2  Some of the main companies involved in the project
The largest number of consultants came from a consultancy, Dairy Tech,229 which 
specialised in dairy process technology. The Dairy Tech consultants were hired by 
Dairy Sweden to work in the planning phase of the project.230 These consultants did 
several things including simulations and leading parts of the project. Some Dairy 
Tech employees were also hired by Supplier Denmark to work on the project in the 
implementation phase.
The contacts with the environmental authorities and the utility were managed by the 
environmental staff, and this work did not involve the technical staff nor the other 
project workers even though reducing the loss of raw materials to the waste stream 
was one focus of the project work. In the words of one of the site engineers: 
The permit was handled by [the division level environmental expert]. We didn’t  
see anything of that in the project.
229 Dairy Tech had previously been the central, technical division of Dairy Sweden, but was spun off 
approximately 15 years prior to the project. Dairy Tech was spun off after a period of intensive plant 
construction in the hope of getting contracts from other dairy firms. Dairy Sweden at first kept a 
minority share of the company, but later sold all shares. The consultancy had been traded a few times 
after that and was at the time of this project part of a larger engineering consultancy. In spite of this, 







Supplier Denmark Supplier Sweden
Dairy Tech
The local environmental coordinator, who was positioned in the Technology 
Department, did have a role in the investment project. In his own words, his job was 
to “be the environmental controller of the dairy into the project”. His role has not 
been mentioned by any of the other project workers. His words also hint at a 
monitoring and control orientation of his work and of his role in the project, rather 
than a more proactive or cooperative role.
7.1.3 Decision points
This section will describe some of the main decisions made in the project relating to 
the technological and environmental aspects of the project.
7.1.3.1  Energy
In an early phase when the various project requirements were translated into a more 
concrete design for the new plant, the project team realised that the planned costs 
would severely exceed the project budget. This led to an effort to reduce the costs 
through a range of changes to the design.231
Most of these cuts did not have any direct environmental effects, but one of the cuts 
made was to replace a planned additional oil fuelled boiler with energy from the 
district heating plant.232 The decommissioned plant had had an oil-fuelled boiler. 
There were discussions with the Municipality-owned energy company and with a 
professor of energy systems from the university in town about how to solve the 
heating function. 
231 Some changes were made to the core process, including the omission of some valves and 
interconnections between different pieces of equipment, thus losing some of the production flexibility. 
Mostly though, it was other so-called ‘side-functions’ that had caused the increase in projected costs, 
and this is where most of the cuts were made. This included a smaller building offering somewhat less 
space for future expansion, and less floor space between machines, though still within the limits set by 




The need to cut costs thus contributed to the switch from the investment in a boiler to 
signing up for district heating. The Technical Director (who was also the internal 
customer) also claimed that she took a stand for this for environmental reasons:
Because I insisted on that, to not install new oil fuelled boilers in existing,  
durable plants. It was like: here, but no further.
Reducing the energy costs was however an aim in the project, mostly for cost 
reasons.233 Heat exchange technology was used extensively. The Dairy Tech engineer 
however claimed that more use of heat exchange could have been made in relation to 
the cleaning process, but that this would mean too high investment costs.
The process lines in the new plant were arranged vertically rather than in the 
traditional horizontal configuration.234 One reason for this was to benefit from gravity 
in propelling the process flows between different stages of the process. This solution 
was also more compact and offered shorter distances between different pieces of 
equipment, thus reducing pipe length. Reduced pipe length means a smaller use of 
cleaning liquids and less product waste. On the other hand the tower built to 
encompass the vertical lines was in some ways difficult to ventilate and to keep at the 
right temperature.
This problem was exacerbated by the wish to have a glass wall on one side of the 
plant.235 This was done to exhibit the process to the town population. The glass wall 
transmits heat both out of and into the plant, in ways that is not desirable, which adds 
to the ventilation and heating problem. This solution is not energy efficient, and there 
was on-going cooperation with the local university to deal with this after the project 
ended.
7.1.3.2  Product losses
One of the design parameters of the project was to reduce the fraction of raw 
materials being lost to waste. A main driver for reducing the product losses was the 





loss of more expensive raw materials, for example the jams used for flavoured 
yoghurts and other products.236 The consultant Project Leader explained: 
Now, the amount of jam used is decisive for the price of the product. And when 
you change the product often, and clean in between, a lot of jam disappears in 
the drains, and it’s at least ten times more expensive than the product. And 
because of that it is very important that you make sure to minimise the losses.
The Technology Manager also expressed a concern for losing “our owners’ 
products” as a problem in itself, which reflects the fact that the company is owned by 
dairy farmers.
Although reducing product losses was not a core motive behind the move of 
production, the switch from the old manual plant to the new automated one in itself 
helped in reducing losses according to the plant Technical Manager. The Dairy Tech 
engineer specified this further by saying that automation gives better hygiene, which 
reduces the need for cleaning. 
During the project it was discovered that the amounts of organic substance in the 
waste stream were higher than expected.237 There were several reasons for this, one 
of which was the increasing range of products that required more frequent cleaning 
of the equipment.238 The new products were also on average fattier than the old ones, 
which made emptying the equipment more difficult and resulted in more material 
being lost in cleaning. The increased use of fatty raw materials however boosted the 
attention to reducing product losses in the project. 
There was a special limit in the environmental permit for the release of fat239 and the 
Municipality Environmental Department was concerned about the company not 
keeping within the limit. The Municipality run treatment works did not however 
mind the extra fat, which diffused the pressure from the Municipality.240 There was 
then a discussion whether to immediately apply for a change in the permit. It was 
236 Environmental Consultant
237 Corporate Environmental Specialist
238 Environmental Coordinator
239 Separable fatty acids
240 Environmental Coordinator
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decided to wait until after the project, when there was to be a new application for an 
environmental permit anyway. The environmental expert and the local environmental 
coordinator made this decision.241
Several ideas were suggested for reducing product losses, some of which were 
implemented, others not. There was some discussion regarding the possibility of 
having longer batches, and thus reducing the need for cleaning. The Municipality 
Environmental Department supported this idea. The corporate level product 
development staff had however set limits for batch lengths due to hygiene and 
longevity reasons, and the idea was not implemented.242
Separation of waste flows allows more choice in managing them. One measure 
introduced in the project to improve separation was to introduce new sensors: 
conductivity meters, which facilitated improved flow control and separation.243 This 
meant that the white water could be separated out better from the other rinse liquids.
Another measure was to build a new waste stream measurement facility, enabling the 
engineers to more accurately and quickly locate problems in production causing 
irregular waste flows.244 This was done on the initiative of one of the local engineers, 
who had had experience of the difficulty in the existing plant of locating the source 
of irregular waste flows. Special money was allocated to this addition to the project.
There was also an idea to introduce longer times for draining the equipment after 
batches, thus gaining more product and reducing losses. This would however have 
meant longer gaps between batches, and was turned down because of its impact on 
production economy.245
241 Environmental Coordinator
242 Corporate Environmental Specialist
243 Corporate Environmental Specialist
244 Site Engineer
245 Corporate Environmental Specialist
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It is sometimes possible to expel a product from the equipment using the following 
product without cleaning the equipment between the batches.246 This is acceptable if 
the second of the products is more flavoured than the preceding one. Production runs 
are thus run in sequence - called campaigns - from unflavoured to heavily 
flavoured.247 Campaigns were introduced.
An alternative to expelling a product from the process with the following product is 
to clean the equipment using pigging technology. Pigging technology works by 
propelling a pig - a soft ball - through the pipes. The Danish process technology 
supplier proposed this, but the idea was abandoned during the budget crisis 
mentioned above.
One reason for abandoning this technology was the high investment cost of the 
technology.248 Pigs require special valves in the piping and these valves are more 
expensive than ordinary ones. There were also concerns about the degree of 
flexibility pigging technology offers in terms of being able to reconfigure the 
equipment. There were also questions about hygiene when using pigs. A visit to a 
cosmetics and hygiene products company who were using the technology however 
showed that this would not be a problem. Finally, both the site engineer and the 
corporate Project Manager mentioned a lack of in-house experience of this 
technology as a reason for not going ahead with it.249 The Project Manager said: “We 
do very little technology development, and perhaps had not enough internal  
competence for this”.
246 Consultant Engineer, Dairy Tech 
247 It is actually a bit more complicated than that. For example, it is also a matter of fat content.
248 Site Engineer, Corporate Project Manager
249 Site Engineer, Corporate Project Manager
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7.1.3.3  Chemicals use and waste treatment
As mentioned above increased automation could be expected to lead to a reduced 
need for cleaning, which might reduce chemicals usage. The project also introduced 
a Cleaning In Place (CIP) system, thus automating the cleaning process itself.
One waste stream from the cleaning is strongly alkaline from the use of lye. It is 
neutralised in a special utility by mixing in a strong acid. The neutralisation utility 
was expanded in the project by adding another buffering tank due to the increased 
volume of production.250 The company also switched to a new, weaker acid (from 
sulphuric to carbonic acid) in spite of higher cleaning costs.
According to the environmental permit, Dairy Sweden had to investigate the 
possibility of building a treatment plant on site. This was done by an environmental 
consultant in a separate project towards the end of the main project (as described in 
more detail below). The consultant recommended not building it, arguing that it 
would require the sludge to be transported to the Municipality treatment works 
anyway, and that it would be costly. The Municipality Environmental Officer 
interviewed agreed that it would be too costly, and this option was not mentioned in 
the subsequent renewed permit. An important factor was also, as mentioned above, 
that the Municipality treatment works needed the organic content of the waste stream 
for their biological treatment.
7.1.3.4  The cleaner technology investigation251
Dairy Sweden also used consultants in the environmental activities running in 
parallel with the project. The environmental consultancy that had prepared the 
environmental impact assessment for the project also produced a report setting out 
possible actions to improve the environmental performance of the reconstructed plant 
during the project. 
250 Current Environmental Coordinator
251 This section is based on the interview with the environmental consultant, unless otherwise stated.
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As part of the 1999 environmental permit, the company was required to do an 
investigation into the possibilities of reducing the amount of organic substance in the 
wastewater by changes to the production process, or, alternatively, to improve the 
company internal waste treatment. The report was prepared in response to the permit, 
and did not originate in the project.252 
The report was prepared by a consultant, who belongs to a local consultancy firm and 
had been working for Dairy Sweden many times over the years. Indeed, Dairy 
Sweden had been his main customer since the beginning of his consultancy career 
approximately 20 years earlier. The report was produced mainly by interviewing 
employees at the local site, both white and blue collar staff.
The resulting list of possible actions was compiled from the interviews and set down 
in the report. The consultant described his input as mainly the compilation of 
knowledge already existing in the firm, but perhaps existing as isolated islands of 
knowledge. Thus, a benefit of the report was to gain an overview of already available 
ideas, rather than bringing new options to the attention of the company.
As mentioned above, the main reason to produce the report was given by the 
environmental license, rather than by any strategic consideration of environmental 
issues in the project. This was reflected by little communication between the 
consultant and the project management. Moreover, there was not much 
communication between the consultant and the environmental expert responsible for 
hiring him, nor was the consultant involved in what happened to the report and its 
recommendations after it was delivered. The work done thus appears to have been an 
easily specified and easily separable task.
The origin of the report was also reflected in its emphasis on how bad the idea was to 
invest in a new waste treatment plant. The consultant admitted to having placed some 
additional emphasis on this, whilst also stressing his belief in the correctness of the 




 So I’ve chosen the wording a bit in that direction. Even if factually it is that  
way, certainly. But you do emphasise the image that it is a completely insane 
idea to have an internal treatment plant in a food industry etc, etc. And that’s  
the way you do that, a bit. Maybe you’d been more to the point and candid if it  
had been a fully internal investigation they’d ordered. Because now it will be 
dealt with by a regulator.
The report had little direct impact on the parallel investment project,253 partly because 
that was not the intention behind commissioning the report, but it was also a matter 
of timing since the report was produced towards the end of the project. In spite of the 
limited direct impact on the project, several of the options mentioned in the report 
have subsequently been implemented as part of the ongoing effort in and after the 
project to reduce the amount of raw material lost to waste. This is perhaps not so 
surprising as the report mainly summarised already existing ideas. The report from 
the cleaner technology investigation was appended to the new permit application in 
2003.
7.1.3.5  Implementation
The installation of the new equipment was delayed due to problems with the 
construction of the new building.254 The efficiency improvements promised in the 
Environmental Impact Assessment were not fully realised.255 This caused some 
friction between Dairy Sweden and Supplier Denmark. These delays also meant that 
the time available for optimisation in the project was reduced. 
Subsequent further optimisation work reduced the problem, but discharge levels were 
still high. After the project, in 2003, when the environmental permit was renewed the 
discharge limits were increased to reflect the higher level.256
253 Corporate Environmental Specialist
254 Consultant/Project Leader
255 Corporate Environmental Specialist
256 Current Environmental Coordinator
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7.1.4 Discussion
The project was by and large successful, although costly. The new plant was more 
efficient than the decommissioned one, and the quality of the products was good.257 
Environmental improvement was never a core motive for the project, and the 
outcome in environmental terms was mixed.
As described above, the fat content of the discharges were too high during the 
project. The (delayed) optimisation efforts at the end of and after the project 
somewhat reduced this problem. Right after the end of the project the company 
applied for a new environmental permit, and was then granted a more generous 
condition regarding organic substances.258
Table 7.1  Decision points Dairy Sweden
Decision points Arguments for and against
project capacity, cost eff.
core technology
heat exchange RE
more heat exchange (no) RE investment cost
district heating cost, E
vertical plant, glass wall capacity, image, RE
automation (before project) RE
sensors RE
measurement facility efficient trouble shooting
campaigns RE
longer batches (no) RE hygiene/longevity
draining times (no) RE prod. econ.
pigging (no) RE cost, flexibility, lack of 
experience
CIP automation RE
weaker cleaning acid reg.
Note: Abbreviations used: reg. = regulation, E = environmental, RE = resource efficiency, Q = 
quality, eff. = efficiency, prod. econ. = production economy.
257 Technology Director
258 Corporate Environmental Specialist
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There was little effective pressure from the regulators. In part this was because the 
Municipality treatment works were happy to receive the effluent, irrespective of 
whether it was above permit limits or not. The Environmental Department in the end 
accepted the case made by Dairy Sweden and the treatment works for higher 
discharges. In contrast, the cooperation with the Municipality energy company 
resulted in improved environmental performance.
The Municipality Environmental Officer stressed that Dairy Sweden performs well, 
and that their environmental organisation is well structured. From the point of view 
of the Municipality the relationship is an open one. It is hard to see any direct link 
between the limits set in the permit and the changes made in the project. There 
appears to have been a cooperative relationship, not least on behalf of the regulator.
In terms of environmental innovations this case is mostly about the environmental 
benefits gained from business-as-usual efficiency motivated investments. This is 
clearly shown by the efforts to reduce product losses. Investments were made that 
improved efficiency and as a side effect environmental performance, unless costs 
were seen to be too high. The only exception seems to be the switch to a weaker 
cleaning acid, which yielded no efficiency gains and meant higher costs.
No end-of-pipe investments were made, reflecting the weak regulatory pressure. 
Several of the technologies invested in could be described as cleaner technology, in 
that they improved environmental performance whilst also giving economic benefits. 
This was almost without exception not intentional environmental improvement 
though. Nor were these decisions related to regulatory compliance.
The exception is the deal with the Municipality regarding district heating 
championed by the Technical Director cum internal customer. Here environmental 
improvement was an explicit motive, alongside cost savings. It is interesting that the 
Technical Director had (like the internal customer at Chemicals Sweden) benefited in 
her career originating in engineering from doing environmental work.
Apart from this, there was a very clear separation between environmental and 
technological work in the project. Environmentally motivated initiatives either by 
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environmental or technological staff had little role to play in technical developments. 
For example, the work on the permit was managed by the corporate environmental 
expert with the help of the local environmental coordinator, and had virtually no 
impact on the project. We even saw, in relation to the move of the environmental 
coordinator position after the project, that there was some resistance among the 
engineers to cooperating with the environmental staff.
A further testimony to the separation between technology and environment is given 
by the report prepared by the environmental consultant. That task was intimately tied 
up with the work relating to the environmental permits, and in spite of its relevance 
for planning technological improvements, it was not extensively used as an input for 
that.
7.2 Case study: Dairy Scotland
This case study is structured in the same way as the previous ones.
7.2.1 Background
This section will give the background to the case study, in terms of the company, the 
site, and their organisations. Special attention will be given to the engineering 
capacity and to environmental aspects of the site.
7.2.1.1  The company
Dairy Scotland is one of the three largest dairy companies in the UK. Its origins lie in 
Scotland, but the head quarters are now in England. The company has approximately 
3 000 employees, and operates five dairies and more than ten depots. In addition to 
these sites, operations include the distribution of milk. The company has been 
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expanding at a rapid pace through acquisitions from the 1970s onwards, and since 
the late 1980s also through the construction of three new plants.259
The company is strongly focussed on the production of milk. Apart from milk it also 
produces some juice, cream and ice cream, but unlike the other major dairy 
companies no cheese. Supermarkets represent a large part of the sales. The company 
has been doing well financially. It is listed on the London Stock Exchange.260
7.2.1.2  The site
The site studied is located in Scotland. The plant is one of the older, smaller plants of 
the company and was up until the project studied largely manual in operation. The 
only part of the plant to have been automated before was the cleaning in place (CIP) 
unit.261
The plant has a wider range of products than the newer plants. Apart from the basic 
skimmed, semi-skimmed and whole milk, production at this site includes school 
milk, organic milk, GM free milk, cream and juice.262 This relatively large range of 
products requires a large number of different packaging types and packaging 
machines, but also that the production is run in batches with frequent changeovers.
There is at central level a Technical Director, reporting to the Productions Director. 
The Technical Director is responsible for maintenance, engineering and 
environmental management. Working for the Technical Director are three specialist 
managers, one for each of these areas. At site level there are engineering teams of 
four to five engineers dealing mostly with maintenance. This means that most 
259 Annual report
260 Annual report
261 ‘Cleaning in place’ systems allow cleaning of equipment (and pipes) without opening or 
dismantling any of the equipment.
262 Technical Director
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technical staff work with maintenance. There were plans to increase the number of 
people working on engineering at the site level.263
Investment ideas are compiled annually by the Technical Director.264 After deciding 
which ideas are to be given priority budgets are allocated to the sites for projects run 
by site project champions. If a project is deemed to be high risk or high cost, group 
level staff may retain control of the budget and the project leadership. This procedure 
has been made more formal in recent years, and for any substantial investment a 
detailed justification needs to be written, whereas previously things were done in a 
less elaborate fashion.
7.2.1.3  The environment
The main environmental impact of the plant’s operations derives from the liquid 
effluent. The effluent is discharged via the sewers to the local Scottish Water 
treatment works, apart from some of the effluent that is sent to a nearby plant for 
processing in a reverse osmosis recovery plant. The recovered product is sold off. 
Another environmental aspect of the operations is of course the energy used.
The effluent is made up largely of spillage, discarded product and water from the 
cleaning of the equipment. The chemicals used for the cleaning give some of the 
effluent a high pH. The effluent contains fatty and other organic substances from the 
milk and, not least, the cream. At some times of the year like Christmas and Easter 
there are peaks in the amount of fat discharged.265
The plant is regulated by Scottish Water, but at the time of this study not by SEPA. 
Scottish Water charges the company for the trade effluent discharged based on the 
organic content (measured as biological oxygen demand, BOD, and chemical oxygen 
demand, COD). Scottish Water also sets limiting conditions on the discharge 
263 Technical Director
264 Technical Director
265 Environmental Manager, Trade Effluent Advisor
199
consent. These conditions concern pH, suspended solids and total fat, but not BOD 
or COD.266 There are no reporting requirements in the consent.
In spite of quite ambitious environmental work at the central level, the plant was 
performing poorly before the investment project studied, with discharges of fatty 
substances well over consent limits and high pH effluent.267 Possible reasons for this 
are a high turnover of site managers slowing down improvement efforts, and a 
history of little or no attention from Scottish Water with regard to the discharge 
levels.
The company as a whole has a recent history of environmental work. It started off in 
the late 1990s with a waste minimisation project driven by the Quality Systems 
Manager. This led on to an effort starting in 2002 to certify the operations according 
to ISO 14001. All operations are now so certified. The certification work was led by 
the Productions Director and, later, the Technical Director.268 The organisational 
focus of the environmental work has thus shifted from the quality function to the 
production and technical functions. The driver for this work has been a desire to be 
attractive in the eyes of investors and customers.269 At the moment the focus of the 
environmental work is applying for IPPC permits, in response to new legislation.
The current environmental organisation, which was set up in 2001, is led by a 
company level steering group chaired by the Productions Director. Since 2002 there 
is an Environmental Manager, who leads the day-to-day company level 
environmental work, and who is the main contact for Scottish Water in the company. 
The Environmental Manager liaises with an environmental group at each site. The 
groups are led by local Environmental Champions, usually a production manager. 
Efforts are made to include maintenance engineers in the site level groups.270
266 Trade Effluent Advisor





The Environmental Manager is the only member of staff working exclusively on 
environmental issues. For some issues consultants are used, for example training and 
some more technical work like modelling. In early 2004, coinciding with the end of 
the project studied, a consultant was hired to do a waste minimisation review for all 
the sites.
The formal organisation at Dairy Scotland is in some ways conducive to the 
integration of environmental expertise with technological expertise. The Technical 
Director is also responsible for environmental issues at group level. Environmental 
work actually started off as part of the remit of the Quality Systems Manager, but the 
responsibility was later transferred. Both the Technical Director and the 
Environmental Manager emphasised the benefits of organising technical and 
environmental work together, in spite of overlaps also with quality and health and 
safety issues.
Environmental procedures include Environmental Impact Assessments and a risk 
procedure for investment projects, and the monitoring of the environmental targets of 
the Environmental Management System.271 These routines are however relatively 
new to the company and not quite well established. The Technical Director said:
It’s very easy to think: you put in a new… new equipment in, without really  
considering, the cream waste, or the paper waste… You know, it is difficult.  
We’re trying to just put things in place, to make sure that the right people are 
made aware at the right time, and… because we’re still a young company,  
we’re growing very fast, it is difficult. But I think we’re getting there. Slowly.
The plant studied has had no requirement to report environmental performance to 
regulators, and according to the Environmental Manager the company does not 
measure environmental performance as well as it ought to.
There is no separate budget for environmentally motivated investments.272 Ideas for 
environmental improvements are dealt with in the same way as other suggestions. 
The Environmental Manager has a role in investment planning and budgeting. When 




send them to the Environmental Manager for approval, although this does not always 
happen. 
In spite of the Environmental Manager’s formal position reporting to the Technical 
Director, his tasks do not include any technological work. Furthermore, the 
Environmental Manager said that he did not work closely with the technology 
managers (engineering and maintenance) who are also at the HQ and who also report 
to the Technical Director. The Environmental Manager claimed to want to work 
more closely with them, but that they were not very interested in this. In contrast, he 
works increasingly closely with one of the health and safety staff. The Environmental 
Manager also reported that he did not know the site engineers.
The separation of technology from the job of the Environmental Manager can to 
some extent be explained by the history of environmental work being driven by the 
Quality Systems Manager. It is sometimes seen as a management system similar to 
the quality system, rather than as technology.273 But the separation is also a matter of 
expertise. The Environmental Manager explained: 
A lot of the waste minimisation stuff, I don’t have an input in at all, because it’s  
the job of Production Managers, Site Managers, technicians whatever, who 
have specialist knowledge that I don’t have about the dairy process… I think 
because so much of the job is taken up by legal compliance, and a lot of people-
work, I don’t have a lot of time to be thinking: how could we improve that? How 
could we send less trucks to [site x] from [site y], because of air emissions or 
whatever. I don’t have time to actually focus in and look at that. Unfortunately!
7.2.2 The project
This section introduces the project studied. Firstly, by setting out the scope of the 
project. Secondly, by describing the main motives behind the project. Lastly, the way 




The project studied mainly concerned the automation of the plant. Previously, the 
plant had been manual, apart from the cleaning system which was now to be re-
automated. In addition to the new automation system, some pieces of equipment – 
mostly some new pipes and valves – were added. The project also included the 
introduction of a management information system.
Only part of the plant was automated. The pasteurisers were left manual. After the 
pasteurisers there are separate lines for milk and cream. The milk lines were fully 
automated, but the cream lines only partially.274
Apart from automation, the project also included efforts to improve the recovery of 
product from waste streams.
7.2.2.2  Motives
There were several motives behind the project. A central motive for automating the 
plant was demands from customers on traceability,275 that is, the ability to document 
every stage of the processing of an individual product, say a bottle of milk. This 
could be done manually, but was seen to be facilitated by an automatic system. 
Automation was also seen to give better repeatability of operations, with the hope of 
securing an even quality of the products.276
Traceability and repeatability could be said to be aspects of the ability of 
management to control operations, of quality control. A related motive was increased 
transparency of operations, through the documentation of all operation actions and 
through the management information system. The supplier software engineer 
working on the management information system said: 
And another thing is reporting how things are done, and what. It’s like a big 
brother watching what is done. So it’s an audit system.
274 Supplier/ Software engineer
275 Technical Director, Supplier/ Software engineer
276 Technical Director
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There was also a perception that the plant was run down and in need of upgrading. 
For example, the existing control system for the cleaning unit was not working well, 
and also the company did not know very well how it worked.277 The Technical 
Director captured a more general sense of moving forwards: 
Let’s do it. Let’s bite the bullet. And prove that we’re trying to move forwards.  
And prove the systems. And prove the standards.
There were also hopes that the automation would improve environmental 
performance, especially relating to the effluent. This was done partly for 
cost/efficiency reasons, as product going down the drains is product not sold,278 but 
perhaps also as part of the overall environmental work of the company. There was 
later on regulatory pressure from Scottish Water, but not during the planning of the 
project. Those pressures were initiated at a later stage. Less emphasis was put on 
reducing chemicals or energy use, perhaps because of smaller financial incentives.279
7.2.2.3  Project organisation
Dairy Scotland has little in terms of in-house staff to do this kind of work, and the 
design work in the project was performed by a supplier. Dairy Scotland had 
previously relied on another supply company, but for this project chose the UK firm 
Process Supplier. Process Supplier had previously quoted for the construction of 
another plant, and had also more recently been awarded a project improving the 
reverse osmosis plant at a nearby site. 
At first Dairy Scotland had taken in quotes from its regular supplier, but then the 
Technical Director was employed and got involved with the project, and he wanted 
to get quotes in from an alternative supplier. One reason for this was to avoid being 
locked in to the particular solutions of the old supplier. It was hinted that there had 
also been some problems on a previous project using this supplier.280
277 Supplier/ Senior Project Engineer
278 Technical Director, Supplier/ Project Manager
279 Technical Director, Supplier/ Project Manager
280 Technical Director
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The initial planning and supplier procurement had been done by the Production 
Director, the Site Manager and a Project Champion at the site. Later the Technical 
Director became Project Manager (internal project customer). The Project Champion 
was replaced during the project. One of the supervisors on the site was also involved. 
There were a team of maintenance engineers at the site, but they were not heavily 
involved.281 The Environmental Manager was not involved in the project. The 
Technical Director, in his capacity of Project Manager, took care of the 
environmental impact assessment.
The dairy industry is a central market niche for Process Supplier, but they also work 
for other companies like breweries. Process Supplier supplies some types of process 
equipment and provides design services. The company has approximately 200 
employees and is part of an international group of suppliers. The company is based in 
England.
The project members at Process Supplier were mainly from its Engineering Division 
doing process as well as mechanical design, and from its Automation Division 
designing the control system and the management information system. There were 
also a few commissioning engineers involved as well as electrical and software 
engineers subcontracted in. The Project Leader had a mechanical design background, 
and was seconded by a Senior Project Manager from the Automation Division. 
Process Supplier has no environmental staff.
The design work started with the process engineers. They specified the process on a 
relatively abstract level embodied in two types of documents: a functional design 
specification (FDS) and piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID).282 Based on 
these documents the mechanical designers specified the actual physical layout of the 
equipment and what specific pieces of equipment to use.283 Also based on these 
documents the software engineers designed the software for the control system.
281 Supplier/ Senior Project Engineer
282 Sometimes called process and instrumentation diagrams.
283 Supplier/ Senior Project Engineer
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The project ran from the beginning of 2003 until early 2004. After the plant was up 
and running, Dairy Scotland was not satisfied with the results and Process Supplier 
was forced to come back and re-commission the plant.284 There are remaining 
problems in the plant, and Process Supplier has subsequently been hired again to 
optimise things further.
7.2.3 Decision points
This section will describe some of the main decisions made in the project relating to 
the technological and environmental aspects of the project, especially the focus on 
recovery.
7.2.3.1  Recovery
The plant collects so-called reclaimed product from for example broken packages, 
and sells it off. At some dairy companies such reclaim is fed back into the process, 
but Dairy Scotland does not do this for quality reasons.285 The reclaimed product is 
lower grade than the milk going to the supermarkets, but can be used for, for 
example, cheese production. Since Dairy Scotland does not produce cheese, the 
reclaimed product is sold to other manufacturers.
One of the major environmental considerations to be taken in this project was the 
focus on white water recovery. White water is mixed milk and water from for 
example flushing out the equipment with water (‘piping out’), which is part of the 
cleaning cycle. The white water was previously sent to the sewers.
In the project studied new recovery tanks were added to collect not only reclaim but 
also white water from the process. The recovered liquid is then shipped for 
processing in the recovery plant at the nearby site, and then sold off. Apart from the 
new tanks efforts were also made to adjust the process, both hardware and software, 
so as to facilitate the separating out of recoverable white water. 
284 Technical Director
285 Supplier/ Project Manager
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A central motive behind the recovery efforts was to increase revenues, by being able 
to sell more product. Avoiding putting the white water into the sewers may also 
reduce the charges from the water authorities, although during the planning stage of 
the project those charges were low. The Technical Director explained the motive 
behind the recovery: 
Our waste is down, costs less money. It helps the environment, but it costs us 
less money. So I suppose it’s financially driven. That’s being totally honest!
Scottish Water had for a long time paid little attention to the discharges from Dairy 
Scotland. With the hiring of a new Effluent Trade Advisor renewed sampling was 
made, and the charges were raised considerably. Pressure was also put on the 
company to reduce the strength of the effluent, especially fatty substances, since they 
risked causing problems in the treatment works. The advisor said:
But I had to say to them at a number of different occasions that if things weren’t  
to improve, then obviously we would have had to look at the option of taking 
enforcement action, whatever form that took. So, they were aware of that.
This increased pressure from Scottish Water occurred when the project was well on 
its way. This led to a strengthened focus on recovery in the project, according to the 
Technical Director. But the main technical decisions had already been made, and 
little if any design changes were made because of the increased regulatory pressure.
 
7.2.3.2  Other environmental issues
Apart from the recovery, the automation has probably given some environmental 
gains by increasing the accuracy and efficiency of operations. Dairy Scotland and 
Scottish Water agree that there have been some improvements to the effluent after 
the re-commissioning of the plant. The increased pressure from Scottish Water also 
generated more discussion in the project about the environmental aspect of the 
automation efforts. Again, however, the main decisions had already been made and 
the awakened environmental interest did not affect the technological solutions 
chosen.
207
As mentioned before, there were at some times of the year large peaks in the effluent 
from the dairy. After pressure from Scottish Water, it was decided to recover the 
liquid from the washing of the cream tankers coming back from delivery. This liquid 
had previously been sent to the sewer. The washing now actually takes place at the 
nearby site with the recovery plant instead of at the site studied. The peaks have been 
successfully reduced.
There was not much focus on reduced chemicals use in the project. The Technical 
Director suspected that there might be more chemicals used now than before, due to 
more cleaning. Neither was energy savings a concern in the project. Some gains were 
however made since the cleaning is now done in half the time after automation. 
(There is in fact a trade-off to be made between the strength of the chemicals used 
and the temperature - and thus the energy usage - of the cleans). The pH of the 
effluent remains high.
The management information system was not designed to facilitate the monitoring of 
environmental performance. A lot of relevant data, for example water usage, was 
included in the system, but not brought together to display environmental 
performance. The Software Engineer at Process Supplier said that this could 
relatively easily have been done, but there was no demand for this kind of display.
7.2.4 Discussion
The project was successful in terms of automation delivering traceability, 
repeatability and transparency. However, after the project there were continuing 
problems in terms of efficiency relating to the optimisation of the operations of the 
plant and to parts of the recovery system.286 There was also some uncertainties 
relating to the effluents due to the fact that there were not sufficient data on past 
performance, and it was therefore difficult to measure improvements.287 The effluent 
probably improved somewhat.288 The fat content has been reduced – especially 




was after the project considering relaxing the corresponding consent limits. There are 
however outstanding problems with the pH levels.
The main environmental improvement of the project was the effort to recover as 
much as possible of the white water. The original motivation behind the investment 
in recovery was the income generated from selling off the re-processed milk.
The impact of the renewed regulatory pressure from Scottish Water is interesting. It 
generated the initiative to wash the cream tankers, which was organised outside the 
main investment project. The impact on the actual investment project appears to have 
been mainly discussions. Environmental improvement became a topic for discussion, 
but appears to have had little effect on the technological choices made. This was the 
case not least because of the timing. The main decisions were already made. The 
recovery as well as the automation came to be seen to be about also environmental 
performance, but this had little material effect on the technology.
These two technologies are cleaner technology in the sense that they reduce the 
effluents. But this was not part of the original motivation for investing in these 
measures. Environmental improvement was at first an unintentional side effect. Over 
the course of the project it did however come to be part of the motivation for both the 
recovery and the automation, but without any changes made to the technology. The 
technology was re-labelled as environmental, rather than re-designed.
288 Technical Director, Effluent Trade Advisor
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Table 7.2  Decision points Dairy Scotland
Decision points Arguments for and against
project traceability, Q, RE
core technology
automation and control 
system
traceability, Q, RE, (reg.)
recovery RE, revenue, (reg.)
outside project
cream tanker washing reg., revenue
Notes: 1) Abbreviations used: reg. = regulation, E = environmental, RE = resource efficiency, Q = 
quality.
2) ‘(reg.)’ indicates that regulation became a motive after the main decisions were made.
Environmental improvement thus emerged as a priority rather late in the project. And 
this happened in spite of a formal environmental impact assessment carried out by 
the Technical Director.
The environmental focus in the project was also rather narrow, focussing only on the 
organic content of the effluent, whereas other aspects like chemicals use and the pH 
of the effluents, or energy use were largely ignored. It is noteworthy that the 
environmental management system had a broader scope including targets for, for 
example, energy use, but that this had little impact on the project.
The narrow focus of the environmental work in the project may be explained by the 
absence of SEPA regulation, and that Scottish Water’s remit only includes the 
effluents. Scottish Water also seems to have given higher priority to reducing the 
organic content than to managing the pH, which corresponds well to the focus in the 
project on the organic content, but not the pH.289 
The environmental organisation at Dairy Scotland is formally quite well integrated 
with the technical and production organisations. The Environmental Manager is 
however quite isolated form the technical work, in spite of reporting to the Technical 
289 Dairy Scotland has now applied for an IPPC permit from SEPA, and this may broaden the focus of 
the environmental work in projects at Dairy Scotland henceforth.
210
Director. It is not clear what impact it would have had on the project had he been 
involved, but one may speculate that there would have been a broader environmental 
focus.
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8 Environmental concerns in innovation processes
We have in the previous two chapters seen cases that vary in many respects, but 
which have some important things in common. Firstly, they were all primarily about 
investments in core technology, in production process technologies like vessels and 
pipes, cleaning systems and control systems, although, to varying extents, the cases 
also included other technology, like buildings and end-of-pipe technology. This 
means that we are here studying investments of great importance for the core 
business of these companies. Secondly, we saw that regulatory demands were a 
central factor in terms of taking the environment into account (or not) in all the cases, 
(although, there were also instances of individuals promoting environmental 
improvements independently of regulation). These two factors, investments in core 
technology and the impact of environmental regulation, set up the space this chapter 
will analyse.
Environmental concerns were not necessarily seen as core business in these 
companies, but they are central to this thesis. There was in the cases a tension 
between the environment and core business. The discussion in this chapter will 
revolve around how the environment – in terms of environmental motives, work and 
staff – was integrated into or separated out of the core technology innovation 
processes studied.
The principal component of our analytical framework (as introduced in chapter 3) is 
the decision-making process. We shall discuss the relationship between motives and 
technological outcomes with respect to environmental performance. We need to 
understand how environmental motives were aligned or clashed with other motives, 
and who promoted what goals and agendas and why they did so, in innovation 
projects. Special attention will be given to any differences between the technological 
outcomes from projects that were and those that were not influenced by 
environmental motives.
We shall in the analysis focus on the roles of different actors, and seek to answer 
questions about who promotes environmental performance, why anyone would do 
so, and under what circumstances such promotion is successful or unsuccessful. 
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Special attention will be paid to the roles of engineers and environmental staff, who 
may influence the environmental performance in innovation work and decisions 
relating to technology, and their expertise and work.
The actors’ behaviour is here seen as in part shaped by organisational structures, but 
the actors also bring their creativity as well as private life commitments to bear on 
their professional life. The analysis will explain the actors’ behaviour as a result of 
the interaction between structure and action, in terms of the division and formation of 
expertise, career choices and opportunities and the relative status and power gained 
from positions on internal and external labour markets.
We shall use the concept of the company social constitution (see chapter 3), as a 
main resource for the analysis. This concept has in the past been used to discuss 
primarily conflicts of interest between employees and employers, although taking 
further actors, divisions and antagonisms into account. For the purposes of this 
analysis, we need to re-interpret the concept somewhat (as indicated in chapter 3) to 
include two different, but linked lines of conflict.
Firstly, and most obvious, there is a potential conflict between the company and the 
regulator (denoted 1. in figure 8.1). Here the regulator may want to see more 
environmental improvements than the company, and different actors in the firm may 
perceive regulatory requirements in different ways. The relationship between the 
regulator and the company – and its internal actors – forms an integral part of the 
company social constitution, and has consequences for the organisation of 
environmental and technological work.
Secondly, there is a potential line of conflict and competition in the company 
between groups closer to the core and those closer to the periphery (denoted 2. in 
figure 8.1).290 That a group is close to the core means that it has effectively claimed 
the status of core competence, by successfully aligning itself with the perceived 
central strategies and objectives of the company. We shall here focus on the 
relationship between the process engineering and environmental functions, where 
290 Note that this model should not be taken to imply any a priori assumptions about actual conflicts 
in the case companies. Whether there is conflict or alignment of interests is an empirical question.
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process engineers most often occupied a more central position, and distinguish 
between company social constitutions that contribute to linking the two groups 
together in collaboration, and those that instead favour separation. The company 
social constitution concept captures those organisational structures that contribute to 
the shaping of this relationship, including informal networks, routines, distributions 
of skills and expertise, etc.
Figure 8.1  Two linked lines of conflict









The company social constitution is a central component of the analytical framework. 
The concept highlights the evolving organisational structures of the company, and 
how they shape decision-making. A core issue here is if and how environmental 
concerns come to be embedded in (or excluded from) organisational structures, 
routines and practices.
This analytical framework will enable us to discuss the key empricial findings of this 
thesis, which are:
- There was a tendency towards the separation of administrative environmental 
work and environmental staff from technological work, especially in cases with 
weak regulatory pressure. But there were also integrative social constitutions 
reflecting a history of stronger regulatory pressure. Environmental staff could 
then span the boundary between environmental and technological work, instead 
of merely serving as buffers between the company and the regulator.
- Apart from the systematic monitoring of project work performed by 
environmental staff, there were also environmental champions promoting 
environmental issues. Successful championing was primarily associated with a 
category of staff having made careers from engineering positions into 
management based in part on environmental merits. Organisational structures 
shaped both these careers and the promotion opportunities that emerged in the 
projects.
- The integration of environmental motives required alignment with economic 
motives, typically resource efficiency. Such alignment could happen ex post, in 
the form of re-interpretation of the technology without any material effects. 
Moreover, there are situations where cleaner technology does not offer economic 
advantages.
This chapter will discuss each of these three findings in the following three sections.
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8.1 The integration of environmental work and staff
The empirical focus of this section is on the relationship between on the one hand 
environmental work and environmental staff and on the other hand technological 
work291 and engineers. Regulation played a central role in this relationship. In 
particular, we shall show that regulation shaped the role of environmental work in 
relation to the investment projects studied, with weak regulatory pressure 
manifesting itself as a focus on administrative environmental work, carried out 
separately from the technological work.
Moreover, we shall show that environmental staff were the weaker part in this 
relationship (in general, but especially – and unsurprisingly – when it comes to 
technological work). But also that regulation played a central role in forming this 
relationship, both in terms of giving environmental staff a lever of influence over 
decisions made in the projects studied, and in the longer term shaping of the 
relationship between environmental staff and engineers. Based on these results we 
shall be able to propose a solution to the unresolved issue in the literature (as 
discussed in chapter 2) regarding whether environmental staff should be seen as a 
buffer against regulatory pressure or as a boundary spanner within the organisation.
We shall here use the concept of the company social constitution (CSC) to capture 
both the relationships between the companies and the regulators, as well as the 
relationships between the environmental staff and the engineers. At a more detailed 
level, we shall find it useful to focus on the division of expertise and on the 
organisational ‘distance’ between the actors. The division of expertise and the 
relative power of groups of experts will be discussed in terms of monopolies on work 
and knowledge in the organisations, as well as tradability on internal and external 
labour markets. The organisational distance will be assessed with reference to 
patterns of formal co-location and informal cooperation. 
291 Technological work is here used as shorthand for mainly process design work. Furthermore, the 
identification of technological work with engineers should not be seen as implying that they were the 
only ones doing such work. We shall later, for example, discuss to what extent environmental staff 
can be said to have done technological work. Also, one would expect production employees to 
involved in technological work, but that is not the focus here.
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The narrative of this section moves from separation of environmental and 
technological work and staff towards integration, from the ‘separating’ CSCs of the 
dairy cases towards the ‘integrating’ CSCs of the chemicals cases. In the first 
sub-section (8.1.1) we discuss the tendency to keep administrative environmental 
work separate and describe the tasks on which environmental staff had a monopoly. 
In the following sub-section (8.1.2) we discuss the relative power of environmental 
staff and engineers, based on their respective monopolies on tasks and knowledge, as 
well as their positions on internal and external labour markets. This discussion will 
show that environmental staff are the weaker party of the two, and that the onus is on 
them to facilitate cooperation. In the last subsection (8.1.3.) we discuss how 
regulatory pressure could give environmental staff a level of influence over 
technology, depending on the integrative organisational structures that may develop 
over time in companies exposed to strong regulatory pressure. We here contrast 
formal co-location with informal collaborative structures, to shed light on the 
important informal integrative mechanisms present in, mainly, the chemicals cases. 
8.1.1 Separate environmental work
Weak regulatory pressure tended to lead to a separation of environmental work from 
the technological in the projects, and a focus on administrative environmental tasks. 
This happened in the dairy cases, where the regulatory pressure was weaker. Dairy 
Scotland represents an extreme case in that no environmental work was done in the 
project, and that the one full time environmental staff member had no role in the 
project, corresponding to the absence of any environmental permit.
But even in the Dairy Sweden case, where there was an environmental permit, 
environmental work and staff were to a large extent separated from the technological 
work in the projects. The focus here was instead on administrative work, in terms of 
for example reporting back to the regulator. As we saw previously, the municipality 
environmental inspector expressed her satisfaction with the orderly environmental 
administrative work of the company, including their environmental management 
system. Even the environmental technology review mandated by the environmental 
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permit in this case, was separated from the project, and done for the sake of keeping 
the regulator happy.
There was a connection in the Dairy Sweden case between environmental work and 
staff and the project. The local Environmental Coordinator sat in on project 
meetings, monitoring the technological work for permit implications, but this had 
little effect on the choices made, confirming the weak regulatory pressure. 
The overall effect of the permit was to generate administrative environmental work, 
which related to – but was kept separate from – the project. The environmental staff 
were here limited to a buffer role, keeping the regulator happy, leaving the rest of the 
staff to get on with the project.
In this situation, environmental staff have no obvious need for engaging with 
on-going technological work (and as we shall see later, they may not get the 
opportunity to do so). Their more immediate concerns are to provide the permit 
applications, reports etc. required by the regulator, whilst on behalf of the company 
making sure that regulation does not become a problem, for example that the 
requisite permits are in place. This also involves negotiations with the regulator (and 
here engineers may get involved, providing local, technical expertise) regarding 
permit requirements. 
There is here a tension in the role of environmental staff. On the one hand they 
represent the company interest in keeping the regulator happy and staving off any 
difficult or costly permit requirements. On the other hand environmental staff may 
have an interest in raising the profile and urgency of environmental work in the 
company, and one way of doing this is to have more stringent permits.292 Either way, 
environmental staff had a monopoly on permit-generated administrative work, and in 
the short term this is enough to keep the job, and does not require environmental staff 
to engage with technological work.
Apart from this regulation-generated administrative work, the main task of 
environmental staff in the companies was to manage the formal environmental 
292 One would therefore expect higher level managers to also be involved in negotiations of new 
permits, controlling any such tendencies of environmental staff.
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managements systems. In no case, however, did the environmental management 
system have a direct impact on the projects293, which further illustrates the separation 
of environmental and technological work. 
This separation of environmental work mirrors a separation of environmental and 
technological work in the companies in general. Table 8.1 lists the core tasks of the 
environmental staff in the cases.
Table 8.1  Core tasks of environmental staff
Work directly related to regulation
- Applying for permits
- Reporting to regulators
- Liaising with regulators
Environmental management work
- Participating in or leading environmental steering groups
- Managing the environmental organisation
- Educating employees
- Environmental auditing
What is not clear from this table is how little technology-related work the 
environmental staff were doing. Table 8.2 lists the main technology-related tasks 
mentioned by the environmental staff interviewees. This includes the monitoring of 
project work mentioned above, and to which we shall return later when discussing 
the role of environmental staff in the chemicals cases were the regulatory pressure 
was stronger. The table also includes engineering/science-type work, which was 
done by very few of the environmental staff members interviewed.
293 No interviewee referred to formal environmental management systems to explain the decisions 
made regarding technology.
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Table 8.2  Technological work of environmental staff
Technological work
- Setting up routines (project handbooks etc.)
- Monitoring project work for permit implications
- Engineering/science type tasks: design work, literature studies, lab work
We can conclude that in cases with a low regulatory pressure there is a tendency 
towards the separation of environmental work and staff from technology. The focus 
of their work is instead on administrative work generated by the regulatory permits, 
and on environmental management systems, which were also largely disconnected 
from technological work. Administrative environmental work is in this sense a 
means for the company to present itself to the regulator in a way that does not open 
up any negotiations about its technology. This role fits well with the notion that the 
environmental function is mainly a buffer between the company and the regulator.
In this role environmental staff has little immediate need for cooperation with the 
engineers. There may however be situations in which environmental staff have 
opportunities to expand their remit and engage with technological work. We shall 
later see how strong regulatory pressure could change the role of environmental staff. 
But first, we shall analyse the relative power of environmental staff and engineers in 
the companies.
8.1.2 The relative power of environmental staff and engineers
Environmental staff were relatively weak players in the firm, having limited 
monopolies on work and knowledge, and thus rather circumscribed expertise. Whilst 
having moderately good opportunities on external labour markets, they also had, as 
compared to most of the engineers, less well protected local expertise. This was 
mirrored by an oftentimes asymmetrical relationship between environmental staff 
and engineers, with the onus on environmental staff to adapt and facilitate 
cooperation.
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This section will discuss the relative power of the environmental staff and the 
engineers, based on the status of each group’s expertise, using the model introduced 
in the theory chapter of the tradeability of expertise on internal and external labour 
markets. This will be followed by an introductory discussion of the impact of the 
power asymmetry on the relationship between the two categories of staff. This theme 
will be further elaborated in the next section.
In terms of work tasks, environmental staff had a monopoly on the kind of 
administrative, regulation-generated environmental work described above, as well as 
the day-to-day running of the formal environmental management systems. This task 
monopoly did not, however, translate into any monopoly on knowledge about the 
environmental performance of the plants. Most environmental staff did have some 
such knowledge294, but as the conflict about the vent gases295 at Chemicals Sweden 
shows, also engineers and production staff claimed knowledge about the 
environmental performance based on their knowledge of the underlying production 
process. It was also the case that most of the environmental staff296 were not involved 
in day-to-day measurements of effluents and waste, which could have provided them 
with a basis for claiming expertise regarding environmental performance. The 
expertise of environmental staff thus has a central administrative or procedural 
component, relating to permits, the environmental management system etc., whilst 
most environmental staff appear to have less recognised expertise regarding how to 
achieve substantive change to the company’s environmental performance. 
Many (4 out of 8) environmental staff also had some environmental education. (All 
apart from one if we include courses in biology and energy). This contributed to the 
second main component of their expertise, which we may label ‘environmental 
expertise’, and which includes some scientific understanding of environmental 
294 The Environmental Manager at Dairy Scotland is an extreme case in that he in fact had little 
knowledge about environmental performance of the plant in questions. This is presumably mainly 
explained by the absence of a permit in this case, and there thus being no requirement that he collate 
environmental data.
295 About how serious the problem with the vent gases were and whether to invest in treatment of 
them.
296 A clear exception would be the Environmental Technology Advisor at Chemicals Scotland. He 
could, in fact be classified both as engineer and as environmental staff.
221
impacts as well as knowledge about environmental policy. This environmental 
expertise also contributed to them performing their regulation-related work.
From this it follows that the core expertise of environmental staff is to a substantive 
degree ‘occupational’ rather than local and organisational (Williams and Procter, 
1998:201).297 Both the administrative-procedural expertise, and the environmental 
expertise are to large degrees not specific to the particular company. This expertise 
contributes to the external tradability of environmental staff.
All the environmental staff, however, also had some local, organisational experience. 
Either from long service in environmental positions (3 out of 8) or from having been 
recruited from other parts of the company (5 out of 8), mainly production. This 
testifies to the companies valuing their local experience.
Through their work with the formal environmental organisation, they are also in 
contact with people and the work of many parts of the company (or site, depending 
on their remit) operations. Some were appreciated for their experience, and 
well-integrated into company networks (including technology-related ones – we shall 
discuss this more in the next sub-section). Nevertheless, environmental staff had little 
company-specific knowledge that no one else had, that is, no monopoly on any local, 
organisational knowledge.
The backgrounds of the environmental staff point towards high entry thresholds, in 
the sense that all had university-level degrees. However, as mentioned only half of 
them had any environmental education, and in few cases full environmental degrees. 
It was rather the case that their formal environmental training, if any, was bundled 
with engineering or science expertise. And, as we saw in chapter 5, there is less 
well-developed occupational protection for ‘industrial environmental staff’ than for 
engineers. Whilst there is a clear occupational element to the expertise of 
environmental staff, it is weakly protected. Those environmental staff having 
external career backgrounds had held jobs in diverse sectors, testifying to the 
297 The notions of ‘local’ and ‘organisational’ expertise are here taken to be synonymous, that is, 
referring to expertise relating to the particular company and/or site.
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tradeability of their occupational expertise, and to moderately good opportunities on 
external labour markets.
The promotion opportunities for environmental staff on internal labour markets are 
unclear. There were some senior environmental specialist positions in the 
companies298, but very few environmental line management positions. An exception 
was the SHE Manager at Chemicals Sweden. In fact, most line managers with 
environmental responsibilities were in these cases technical managers with an added-
on environmental responsibility (rather than the other way around). 
There are thus indications that environmental staff have limited career opportunities 
in the environmental area, but there might be career opportunities in other areas like 
quality or perhaps health and safety. For example, the new site environmental 
coordinator at Dairy Sweden worked half time with quality.
We shall now turn to the engineers, and shall later be able to compare the two 
categories. The core expertise of the engineers was design (and maintenance), on 
which they had an internal monopoly (although in most cases competing with 
consultants). The engineers were also involved in project management and liaison 
with, mainly, production.
The engineers had a distinct local, company-specific component to their expertise. 
This is supported by them having the explicit role in the projects of bringing in their 
local knowledge (and retaining project experience for the line organisation after the 
projects), in those cases where consultants were used.
If we look at the career backgrounds of the engineers, those that had held other 
engineering jobs had done so in other process industries (pharmaceuticals, pulp and 
paper etc.). There is thus a sectoral component to their expertise (Fincham et al. 
2005:3), which would appear to be less local and specific than local knowledge, but 
less generic than occupational expertise.
The Swedish engineers all had degrees in engineering fields (mainly mechanical, 
process and IT). In the UK this was replaced or complemented by certificates and 
298 Apart from Dairy Scotland with only one, junior environmental staff member.
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membership of professional bodies. The engineers thus had well-developed 
occupational expertise, backing up good opportunities on external labour markets.
There were also relatively good internal career opportunities in some of the 
companies. At Dairy Sweden and Chemicals Scotland, which had large numbers of 
engineers employed, there were also engineers in both senior specialist positions and 
in line management positions (technology management mainly, but also for example 
production).
There were, however, large differences between the companies in terms of the 
engineers’ internal career opportunities. In both the Swedish cases there had been 
efforts to reduce the number of in-house engineers. At Chemicals Sweden the 
maintenance function was largely outsourced and for process engineering the 
company relied heavily on consultants, leaving a small number (2-3 each) of 
maintenance and process engineers at the site (and any central engineering resources 
were not available for local use). At Dairy Sweden there were a fair number of local 
engineers (approximately 15), but the central engineering function had been spun off, 
but subsequently re-built. Dairy Sweden was at the time of the project back at a ‘full’ 
complement of engineers both locally and centrally. Chemicals Scotland was the 
company with the largest number of in-house engineers, with a large process 
technology department (and a separate maintenance function), the size of which was 
boosted by them having merged process and product development. At Dairy Sweden 
there were 3 central engineers, and some maintenance capacity at site level. There 
were, however, plans to hire more process engineers and to place them at site level.
We thus have Chemicals Scotland and Dairy Sweden with large numbers of 
engineering positions, both at site and central level, offering good career 
opportunities, both as specialists and in technology management. At the other 
extreme is Chemicals Sweden, with sustained efforts of keeping in-house 
engineering numbers down, and few opportunities within the technology area. 
Finally, we have Dairy Scotland with very few engineers (but possibly increasing 
opportunities, at least at site-level, if recruitment plans go ahead), who also had 
problems in the relationship with the supplier due to the lack of internal engineering 
capacity.
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Table 8.3 summarises the power of engineers and environmental staff as based on 
their internal and external labour markets. The engineers have a stronger position on 
external labour markets based on a more distinct, and better protected occupational 
expertise. (Unlike environmental staff their external labour market has a strong 
sectoral slant.) The position on internal labour markets varies for the engineers, but 
there is a need for the local technological knowledge of the in-house engineers 
making it difficult to do without at least a small number of them, and to replace 
them. The environmental staff had less well-protected local expertise.299 
This asymmetry in tradeability contributed to making environmental staff the weaker 
party in the relationship between environmental staff and engineers. If and when 
environmental staff transcend their role as buffers against the regulator, and start 
cooperating with other actors in the company, the relationship with engineers 
becomes important. Several of the environmental staff commented on the importance 
of a good working relationship with the engineers for their work. 
Table 8.3  Tradability of environmental staff (E) and engineering (T) 
expertise
Labour markets 
/ type of expertise
Less protected expertise 
/  undeveloped labour 
market
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Especially, of course, if environmental staff want to influence technological choices 
this relationship becomes crucial. For example, the alliance between the 
environmental staff and the local engineers at Chemical Sweden in the vent gas 
conflict testifies to the importance of the relationship with engineers for 
299 This glosses over some variation. There were a few (3) environmental staff with more formidable 
formal environmental qualifications and/or long in-house experience.
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environmental staff to influence technology decisions. But this is also a matter of 
raising the profile of environmental staff in the companies. Environmental staff may 
well welcome a broader interest in and a higher level of concern for environmental 
issues in the company, making their expertise be in higher demand. This would entail 
leaving the relative security of administrative work, and engaging with a broader 
range of firm actors, including engineers.
When the two spheres of environmental and technological work did meet, the onus, 
however, was often on environmental staff to adapt and to facilitate cooperation. The 
environmental staff were dependent on the engineers, rather than the other way 
around.
On the most concrete level, the environmental staff sometimes had a role of being 
internal consultants, contributing their expertise at the demand of the engineers (or 
others). As we saw in the cases, environmental staff were rarely involved in the early 
stages of project planning, even though important decisions relating to environmental 
performance were made at this stage.300 The demand for their services was then 
missing, and they had little possibility of negotiating access for themselves and their 
expertise.
A further indication is given by the educational backgrounds. Half of the 
environmental staff had engineering degrees (and some of them had worked in 
production), whereas only a small minority of the engineers had any environmental 
education. This engineering knowledge was useful to the environmental staff when 
cooperating with the engineers, but it was clearly up to the environmental staff to 
provide such ‘interactional expertise’ (Collins and Evans 2002:244). 
The importance of environmental staff adapting to the engineers can be illustrated 
with the following quote. The current Environmental Coordinator at Dairy Sweden 
said in the context of collaborating with the project engineers: “it’s important with 
good relations with the technology side. It becomes hard work otherwise. The thing 
is to not be a too rigid greenie, but to be able to see things holistically”.
300 There were some minor exceptions to this, mainly in the chemicals cases, as will be discussed later.
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We have here seen how environmental staff were the weaker party in comparison 
with engineers in terms of monopolies over work and knowledge, as well as on 
internal and external labour markets. Furthermore, we have see how, in relation to 
technological work, the environmental staff were dependent on the engineers, and 
that it was up to the environmental staff to adapt and facilitate cooperation. In the 
next sub-section we shall discuss how strong regulatory pressure impacted on this 
relationship.
8.1.3 Co-location vs. co-operation
There were many examples of environmental staff and engineers being located close 
together, but this did not mean that they were necessarily cooperating. Environmental 
staff were not always seen as relevant to engineering work, and the lack of 
cooperation was in some instances even exacerbated by active resistance to 
cooperation on behalf of the engineers. The company social constitution was tilted 
out of favour of the environmental staff.
Regulation is what brought cooperation. Regulation gave participation opportunities 
to environmental staff, and thus added a boundary-spanning role for them in addition 
to the one of being a buffer. In the longer term regulatory pressure could engender 
integrative organisational structures, and shift the company social constitution from 
separating out environmental work and staff, to a more integrating, collaborative 
mode. The remainder of this section will discuss the formal and informal 
organisational relationships between environmental staff and engineers, and the 
impact of regulation on that relationship.
The environmental staff were organised differently in the case companies, both in 
terms of their distribution across the site and central levels as well as with which 
other functions they were co-organised. Table 8.4 lists the other functions with which 
environmental staff were organised at local and central levels. Note that 
environmental staff were also sometimes distributed across several functions at the 
same level. 
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This distribution means that the environmental staff were spread out with few staff in 
any particular organisational location. Each symbol in table 8.4 represents between 
one (or a half even, for half-time jobs) and three environmental staff members. And, 
further, that there were few examples of organisational units comprising only 
environmental staff.
The table also gives an indication of the complex relations between the 
environmental function and other functions: process engineering, production and 
health and safety. (There was also a relationship between the environmental function 
and the quality function in the dairy cases, but it played little role in the case studies, 
and mainly concerned the periods before or after the projects studied). 
Table 8.4  Organisational distribution of environmental staff
Site Central
Chemicals Scotland    T, P 1)  H&S
Chemicals Sweden P, H&S
Dairy Sweden T E
Dairy Scotland T
Abbreviations: T=process engineering, P=production, H&S=health and safety, E=‘pure’ 
environmental unit
Notes: 1) The distinction between the site and central levels breaks down at Chemicals Scotland, since 
some of the organisationally central staff were physically located at the site. Effectively there were 
site, central and site/central environmental staff.
A few patterns stand out in terms of co-location. In particular, in all cases, apart from 
Chemicals Sweden, some of the environmental staff were co-located with process 
engineers. 
In the chemicals cases, some environmental staff were also co-located301 with health 
and safety staff. There are also more clear overlaps between these two areas in this 
industry than in the dairy industry. In several instances in the two chemicals case 
projects health and safety and environmental concerns favoured the same 
301 That is, located in the same basic, lowest level organisational unit.
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technological solutions. Likewise in the chemicals cases there were some 
environmental staff co-located with production. 
The formal co-location of environmental staff and engineers did not, however, 
necessarily mean close cooperation. Especially in the dairy cases the relationship was 
distant and even fraught. A clear case here is the Environmental Manager at Dairy 
Scotland, who was co-located at the central level with two engineers (process and 
maintenance respectively) plus the Technical Director, who also had environmental 
responsibility added to his remit. In spite of this, the Environmental Manager 
reported that he did not work much with his engineering colleagues (apart from his 
boss, the Technical Director), and that they showed little interest in environmental 
work. In the project studied the Environmental Manager ended up having no role at 
all (even though the Technical Director was the internal client).
In addition to such lack of interest, the relationship could even be tense. The attitude 
of the Technical Manager at the Dairy Sweden site illustrates this. He said that 
having in that position had the added environmental responsibility amounted to 
sitting between two chairs, both coming up with technological solutions, and 
scrutinising this work from an environmental perspective. He also stated that there 
was a large risk of the environmental work being crowded out. He clearly saw the 
environmental aspect as separate from and in conflict with technological work. It was 
for him a limitation rather than a driver. Interestingly, the Environmental Coordinator 
position at the Dairy Sweden site was subsequently moved to the quality function, 
away from the engineers.
In the dairy companies there was then a clear distance between environmental and 
technological work. The company social constitution in these cases consisted of an 
unresolved conflict of interest regarding cooperation between environmental staff 
and the engineers, and an asymmetrical relationship meaning that the engineers could 
ignore the environmental staff, or, as in the Dairy Sweden case, even keep them 
away from their own work.
The presence of environmental permits integrated environmental staff into the 
projects. In the cases with environmental permits (all apart from Dairy Scotland), 
229
some environmental staff had the role of monitoring the projects for permit 
implications. This role involved sitting in on project meetings and discussing design 
proposals. This monitoring role did not mean that environmental staff had much 
influence over the decisions though. At Dairy Sweden very few concessions were 
made to regulatory requirements. As we saw above, the focus here was mainly on 
administrative environmental work, done separately from the project.
In the chemicals cases, the regulatory pressure was stronger, and regulatory 
requirements had to be taken into account. This gave the environmental staff 
monitoring the projects more influence. The environmental engineer at Chemicals 
Sweden explained, speaking of cooperating with the engineers in projects: 
But then you talk about it and discuss the preconditions and demands and then 
you reach a good solution together. So that everyone can sigh a bit. But I  
thought it was really good: if it is a demand from the authorities it’s not a 
problem.
The monitoring role was not so much about coming up with technological solutions 
as about defining what the problem was. It was about translating between proposed 
design solutions and permit requirements (or at least making sure that that translation 
occurred). This is further illustrated by the vent gas conflict at Chemicals Sweden. 
The conflict there was about the actual environmental performance of the plant, and 
thus about whether there was a need for the vent gas treatment, that is, whether there 
was a problem to be solved. Any direct influence of environmental staff in this 
monitoring role was on problem definition, and so indirectly on the technological 
solutions by changing the criteria used to judge proposed designs.
In the Chemicals Scotland case, the environmental staff were well represented in the 
project and had an active role. Apart from the site Environmental Advisor monitoring 
the project, the senior Environmental Technology Advisor led the SHE studies 
starting at a relatively early stage, and was also involved in working out the solutions 
to, for example, the problem with the toxic effluent.
Regulatory pressure thus enabled a boundary-spanner role for the environmental staff 
in relation to technology. This did not mean that they abandoned the administrative 
tasks, but, rather than only being the buffer between the company and the regulator, 
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the environmental staff were now also able to contribute their expertise in the 
projects.
In the short term, environmental permits meant that environmental staff could take 
on a monitoring role, and in cases with stronger regulatory pressure, environmental 
staff had some influence. In the chemicals cases, which had a history of stronger 
regulatory pressure than the dairy cases, the companies had also developed 
organisational structures that helped integrate environmental and technological work 
and staff.
The by far clearest example of this was Chemicals Scotland who had a well-
established routine for scrutinising design proposals at an early stage of a project 
from an environmental point of view. The company also had a member of staff 
specialised in the environmental aspects of the company’s technology – the 
Environmental Technology Advisor. He was in fact the only interviewee who should 
be classified both as engineer and as environmental staff.302 Furthermore, there was a 
well-developed environmental-technological network in the company dealing on a 
daily basis with environmental aspects of technology, involving the Technical 
Director, the Environmental Technology Advisor and the Site Environmental 
Advisor. At Chemicals Sweden there were similar networks. But the smaller number 
of in-house engineers limited the company’s possibilities of setting up specialised 
environmental-technological staff and routines.
A history of regulatory pressure also opened up career opportunities for engineers 
doing environmental work, producing managers with an engineering background and 
some environmental skills. We shall discuss this issue more in the next section.
We may note that having large numbers of in-house engineers helps create these 
integrative structures. Both in terms of specialisation among the engineers, but also 
in terms of building a working relationship between environmental staff and the 
engineers. Some of the environmental staff commented on preferring in-house 
engineers to consultants for this reason. Environmental staff with an engineering 
302 There were other environmental staff with engineering backgrounds, or called environmental 
engineer, but the environmental technology specialist was the only one doing much engineering-type 
work.
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background, and the contacts developed by environmental staff in running the 
environmental management systems would also appear to favour such relationships. 
At the end of the day, however, it was regulatory pressure that brought cooperation.
We have seen how with regulatory pressure applied over time, the company social 
constitution can resolve the conflict between environmental staff and engineers 
regarding cooperation, and become manifest in integrative organisational structures. 
In the chemicals cases the company social constitution favoured cooperation, and 
environmental staff and work were better integrated, rather than separated out as in 
the dairy cases.
We should note, however, that such a development from a ‘separating’ towards a 
more ‘integrating’ constitution is not irreversible (as implied by the environmental 
determinist literature discussed in chapter 2). The interviewees at Chemicals 
Scotland pointed towards a somewhat weakening regulatory pressure, and a worse 
financial situation with the current investment company owners, threatening the 
environmental ambitions, and thus the environmental-technological structures still in 
place. Furthermore, the environmental management system at Dairy Sweden fell 
apart (after the project studied here) when the then Environmental Coordinator 
resigned. Given the less integrated organisational structure at this company, this had 
less impact on technological work, but the preconditions for integration got even 
worse.
A final comment is worth making about the role of environmental management 
systems. In themselves they had little impact on the projects, or on cooperation 
between environmental staff and engineers. Nor did the mere mentioning of 
environmental issues in formal technology management systems (project handbooks 
and the like) have any great impact. It was regulatory pressure that brought 
environmental considerations into play, via for example more elaborate 
environmental-technological routines, like the SHE studies at Chemicals Scotland.
To conclude, we have seen how the company social constitution may change to a 
more cooperative mode over time given regulatory pressure. This enabled a 
boundary-spanning role for the environmental staff, who got to contribute their 
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expertise, and influence technological work. In either role, as buffers or as boundary 
spanners, the work of environmental staff was tied up with regulation. Regulation 
was the main lever of influence for the environmental staff, and the main legitimator 
of their expertise.
8.2 The formation of environmental championing
In the previous section we saw that environmental staff had a role (in companies with 
an environmental permit) in monitoring the technological work in the projects for 
permit implications, but they were not the only ones promoting improved 
environmental performance. This systematic promotion of environmental issues can 
be contrasted with more contingent environmental championing performed by other 
staff in some of the cases. 
We have two examples of successful championing, both from Sweden. In both, the 
internal clients successfully promoted environmental performance. At Dairy Sweden 
this was the Technical Director making sure that the planned oil-fuelled boiler was 
replaced with district heating, and at Chemicals Sweden it was the Plant Manager 
who made sure to include the vent gas treatment in the main investment project, 
rather than treat it as a separate, permit-driven project, in the hope of finding a 
cleaner technology solution. 
In this section we shall discuss these environmental champions in terms of what they 
achieved, and seek to provide an explanation for this that is sensitive to both 
structure and action aspects. We shall thus avoid an essentialist analysis of 
environmental champions (which as we saw in chapter 2 is common in the 
literature), whilst also avoiding making them structurally determined ‘dupes’. 
Empirically, this will be achieved through investigating both the – private, career and 
positional – interests of the environmental champions, and the structurally shaped 
opportunities given to them in the projects, as well as earlier during their careers.
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8.2.1 Environmental merits in engineers’ careers
We have earlier described environmental and engineering work as to a large extent 
separate (with the Environmental Technology Advisor at Chemicals Scotland as a 
notable exception). And whilst it is true that the engineers did little environmental 
work in the projects, or in general, there were also examples of engineers who had 
benefited previously in their careers from doing environmentally motivated work, 
and developed hybrid environmental and technological expertise.
We have one example from each company of people with engineering degrees who 
had started off in engineering positions and had made careers into management in 
part based on environmental merits. They are listed in table 8.5.We here have three 
Technical Directors, all of which had an added on responsibility for environmental 
affairs. Three of the four were also the internal clients to the projects studied.
Table 8.5  Managers with engineering backgrounds having benefited 
from environmental merits
Position Project role
Chemicals Sweden Plant Manager Internal client
Dairy Sweden Technical Director Internal client
Dairy Scotland Technical Director Internal client
Chemicals Scotland Technical Director (Unclear)
These four managers highlighted that having done environmental work in the past 
had contributed to their careers. The environmental merits303 mentioned are listed in 
table 8.6. Apart from technical work, their merits also included managerial (apart 
from technology management) and administrative tasks. Some of this work overlaps 
with environmental staff tasks, but was for each person combined with 
environmental merits of the technology type. These individuals had bundled some 
environmental skills with their technical and managerial skills.
303 By ‘merit’ we do not mean an inherent quality, but a recognised achievement.
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Table 8.6  Environmental merits
Type of work In more detail
Technology Managing environmentally motivated investment projects
Managing operations and maintenance of end-of-pipe utilities
Environmental lab-work
Management Establishing environmental management systems
Building up environmental staff capacity
Administrative Applying for permits etc.
This was not the only ‘environmental career path’ open to engineers, however. As 
mentioned before, there were also engineers who had moved into full time 
environmental staff positions (indeed this was a relatively common background 
among environmental staff). We should also note the one example of the senior 
environmental technology specialist at Chemicals Scotland. These three 
environmental career paths are visualised in figure 8.2.
All three career paths represent formation of hybrid expertise, that is, people 
developing bundled expertise across traditional knowledge boundaries (Fincham 
et al. 1994:22). The management path is here the least environmental one, in the 
sense of doing some environmental work, but not full time. It was a matter of adding 
another, secondary skill (denoted by a small letter in figure 8.2), rather than full 
specialisation on environmental (or environmental and technological) work. A full 
combination, or hybrid, of actively used environmental and technological skills was 
unusual (as denoted by the grey environmental technology specialist path in the 
figure).
There were, as we have seen, some possibilities for engineers of picking up 
environmental merits in engineering, but also perhaps via a period in an 
environmental position (one or two cases in the data), for a future management 
career. There is, however, a risk for an engineer of staying too long in an 
environmental position. As we have seen environmental staff do little technological 
work, and there is a risk that his or her engineering skills will not be maintained and 
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up-dated due to lack of use. This in turn may be detrimental for opportunities of 
going back to engineering, and into technology management positions.
Figure 8.2  Environmental career paths and skills combinations for 
engineers
Notes: Abbreviations used: T=Engineering, E=Environmental, M=Managerial. 
Small letters indicate secondary skills, and letters in parenthesis indicate skills once possessed and 
currently at least at risk of not being updated and maintained due to lack of use. 
The grey path indicates that this was uncommon – only one example in the data.
Figure 8.3 shows this possible path via an environmental position. It also illustrates 
that no interviewees started off in the environmental area and moved into 
engineering. This certainly limited their possibilities for a technology management 
career, and – as we saw earlier – senior environmental responsibilities were often 
held by technical managers limiting the line management careers in the 
environmental area. (There could, however, be line management career paths for 
environmental staff via other areas, for example quality, but given the selection of 












Figure 8.3  Engineering and environmental career paths
Notes: Dots and arrows indicate start and end points respectively. Grey, again, denotes that this career 
path was unusual.
The motivations mentioned by the former engineers going for these environmental 
career paths reveal some important things regarding the internal labour markets. For 
some it was just another job that came along. This was the case, for example, for the 
Site Environmental Advisor at Chemicals Scotland (who, interestingly, got his job 
based solely on his good relationship with regulator staff from previous work, and 
who said he had very little environmental knowledge).
In contrast, for some, it was a matter of being attracted to environmental issues as a 
‘hot topic’. They hoped to further their careers by achieving results in an area were 
they could be expected to be highly visible. This happened in the dairy industry in 
the 1990s, but earlier in the chemicals industry, reflecting that sector’s longer history 
of regulatory pressure. This motivation was mainly mentioned by some of those 
engineers going for a management career.
For some it was also a matter of aligning private life environmental interests with 
their professional lives. This was mentioned by some of those going for 
environmental staff jobs, sometimes mentioning in the same breath the career 
penalties such a move brought in terms of for example salary, as evidence that they 






Also some of the engineers going for ‘green’ management careers mentioned private 
life environmental commitments as a contributory reason for their career choices. 
Whatever their motivations, private life and/or career interests, these management 
careers with an environmental element brought them into good positions to champion 
environmental performance in the projects studied.
We have in this section seen different examples of environmental-technological 
careers, that is, people bundling engineering and environmental skills into different 
combinations of hybrid expertise. The two main such career paths led from 
engineering to an environmental staff position, and from engineering to management 
(in at least one case via an environmental staff position). In the case studies the latter 
careers had (in 3 cases) led to the position of Technical Director with an added on 
environmental responsibility, and the managers were (in 3 cases) the internal clients 
of the project. Having the experience of being rewarded in their careers for doing 
environmental work, they were now in a good position to influence the projects and 
champion environmental issues. Some of them did, as we shall see in the next sub-
section.
8.2.2 Structured opportunities of championing
As we saw in table 8.5 the internal customers in three out of the four cases had made 
such careers. Their position in management enabled them to take on the internal 
client role in the projects, which was arguably a relatively powerful one. The internal 
customers were involved in early stage planning of the projects, and approved any 
later changes to them (or led steering groups who made such decisions). This gave 
them some leeway in terms of making decisions promoting environmental 
performance. As we mentioned above, the two internal clients in the Swedish cases 
took this opportunity. 
These opportunities were shaped by the company agendas. In the Chemicals Sweden 
case the inclusion of vent gas treatment in the project was motivated by the win-win 
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argument that expected resource efficiency gains would make the costly end-of-pipe 
treatment redundant, which is well in line with the general emphasis on explicit win-
win solutions in this project. In the Dairy Sweden case the district heating solution 
was not only environmentally beneficial, but also cheaper than the proposed new 
boiler, according to the Technical Director. Virtually no extra costs were accepted in 
this project for the sake of environmental performance improvement. The 
championing opportunities available were thus shaped by the company agendas, but 
the champions did also have an impact, and were successful in contributing to 
improving environmental performance.
We need to account also for the other two potential champions. In the Chemicals 
Scotland case the Technical Director was not given the internal client role, and so 
had less influence on the project.304
In the Dairy Scotland case the Technical Director, who like the others with this title 
had an added-on environmental responsibility, did not use his internal client role to 
promote environmental performance in the project. Contributing factors to this were 
the low environmental ambition level in the company and the absence of an 
environmental permit. We can also note that he did not express any strong private 
life environmental commitments, and the low priority given to environmental 
performance in the company meant that there were no rewards for environmental 
initiatives. Table 8.7 shows the pattern of factors that distinguished this case from the 
two Swedish ones, and explains the absence of championing in the Dairy Scotland 
case.
We have here seen that the championing of environmental performance in the cases 
had an impact on the project outcomes. The discussion has further shown that this 
was done by managers in the internal client role, which gave them a relatively large 
influence over the projects, although the opportunities for environmental 
championing were still shaped and limited by the company agenda. Also, these 
managers had started their careers as engineers and benefited from environmental 
merits in their careers. They had thus had career reasons for bundling environmental 
304 It is unclear what his role was in the project if any. He was however part of the environmental-
technological network, in which other members contributed to ensure compliance.
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skills with their technological and managerial skills. Private life environmental 
commitments also played a role in motivating them to take championing initiatives.





Dairy Scotland No No No
Dairy Sweden Yes No Yes
Chemicals Sweden Yes Yes Yes
As compared to those engineers who took the plunge into full-time environmental 
staff positions, these managers stayed firmly within the core business part of the 
companies. That way they were rewarded with both clearer career prospects and 
opportunities (although contingent and intermittent) to promote environmental 
performance.
In terms of how to theoretically understand champions, we can thus conclude that 
championing behaviour is shaped both by the individual’s own career and private life 
interests and the structured company context. The context mattered both for the 
current championing instances, and over time, by producing managers with bundled 
environmental and technological skills. To avoid essentialism we should talk of 
potential environmental champions, who given the right opportunity may engage in 
environmental championing as a behaviour, rather than calling some people 
environmental champions irrespective of the structured context in which they act.
We may now also add the production of potential champions to the integrative 
structures the company social constitution may contain. Regulatory pressure shapes 
management career paths for engineers willing to bundle environmental skills with 
their technological and managerial skills, thus creating another mechanism that can 
contribute to bridging the gap between technological and environmental work.
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8.3 The integration of environmental motives
In the previous section two sections we have seen that environmental staff monitored 
the projects for permit implications (when the companies had environmental 
permits), and that in some cases the internal clients championed environmental 
improvements. Whereas the environmental staff could mainly influence problem 
definitions that set the criteria used to judge technological proposals, the champions 
could also directly influence what technological solutions to choose.
In this section we shall focus on the impact of environmental motives on 
technological decisions. Especially we shall discuss the impact on core technology, 
and the relationship between environmental and the resource efficiency motives 
which were prominent in several cases. We shall show that the impact on core 
technology (when any) depended on environmental motives being aligned with other 
motives, notable resource efficiency ones, since otherwise environmental 
improvements were seen as being too expensive. But, when thus aligned, it is not 
clear that the environmental motives added anything, apart from a new interpretation 
of what the technological solution was about. When resource efficiency was seen as 
a problem (in economic terms), the problem was already defined and adding 
environmental criteria did not clearly lead to any changed priorities.
We shall also briefly discuss the end-of-pipe investments done, mainly in the 
chemicals cases reflecting higher regulatory pressure, and the inherently larger use of 
toxic chemicals in this industry. End-of-pipe ideas were integrated into the projects 
when there were hopes of avoiding (or at least reducing) costs through resource 
efficiency or the use of existing equipment. So, as for core technology, 
environmental motives here had to be aligned with economic motives to be 
integrated into the projects. When end-of-pipe solutions were costly and hard to 
avoid, they were organised in separate projects.
This section brings together several theoretical themes. We shall see how 
environmental motives needed to be aligned with other (broadly speaking 
economical) motives to be integrated into (core and end-of-pipe) technology 
decision-making. This reflected the relatively weak position the environmental 
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function had in the companies. Furthermore, we shall discuss how the company 
social constitutions shaped how environmental motives could be integrated into 
decision-making. A separating constitution lead to environmental concerns being 
ignored, whereas an integrating constitution lead to integration of environmental 
concerns, but such motives then had to be aligned with other interests.
In this section we shall also return to the issue of how to understand the concept of 
‘cleaner technology’. By using an analytical framework which treats intentions 
(motives) separately from the technological outcomes, we shall be able to distinguish 
between ‘unintentional’, ‘intentional’ and ‘ambitious’ cleaner technology, as 
discussed in chapter 2. 
We saw examples of unintentional cleaner technology, where environmental 
improvements were an unintended side effect (as in the Dairy Scotland case, until the 
increased regulatory pressure led to the re-interpretation of the technology), and 
intentional searches for cleaner technology win-win solutions (as in the Chemicals 
Sweden case). We did not see, however, any unambiguously ambitious cleaner 
technology.
8.3.1 Environmental motives in core technology decisions
We shall here summarise the role of environmental motives and their impact on the 
technological outcomes.305 In the projects studied environmental motives had to – 
with very few exceptions – be aligned with other motives to be integrated, that is, to 
be part of the motives for a go-ahead decision regarding a technological solution. 
There were virtually no instances were environmental motives alone motivated the 
technological solution chosen. 
With respect to core technology environmental motives were often aligned with 
resource efficiency motives. Other commonly aligned motives include quality and in 
the chemicals industry also health and safety. Where environmental motives were not 
305 The motives are listed per technological decision in tables in the discussion section of each case 
study.
242
so aligned, they were seen to be too costly. Environmental motives in those cases lost 
out because of (mainly) investment cost and production efficiency concerns.
We may also note that environmental motives were almost always defined by current 
regulation, rather than volunteered by the company itself. For example, the Technical 
Manager at Dairy Sweden said in response to a question about whether there were 
any environmental experts involved in the project: “No. It was common sense I  
would say. But what we had was an environmental permit … So, that’s what affected  
us”. The consultant project leader at Chemicals Sweden on environmental values: 
“Well, values… We have the targets very clear – there’s an environmental permit  
here”. The Safety Engineer at the same company said about the VOC emissions after 
the project:
Interviewer: The outcome – was it too much in any sense?
Safety Engineer: Borderline case. We don’t have any direct permit conditions  
[for VOCs from this particular plant on the site] … Since this was related to an 
actual condition in the [site-wide] permit, this probably was the most critical  
part for [this project].
We can here see the tension between environment and the core economical concerns. 
Environmental motives were not strong enough in themselves to affect decisions, and 
had to be aligned with more well-established core business concerns. In cases with 
weak regulatory pressure and separating CSCs – the dairy cases – environmental 
motives were not integrated. A quote from the Technical Director at Dairy Scotland 
illustrates this: “it helps the environment, but it costs us less money. So, I suppose it’s  
financially driven. That’s being totally honest!” The consultant Project Leader in the 
Dairy Sweden case: “It was really a lot of heat exchange [technology] to recycle the 
heat. That as well is connected to costs. Even if the energy cost is a small fraction of  
the cost of the product it’s still money”. 
In cases with stronger regulatory pressure and integrating CSCs – the chemicals 
cases – environmental motives were integrated, and aligned with core business 
interests. For example, the Environmental Engineer at Chemicals Sweden said with 
regard to the aims of the project: “it was about achieving better quality, better  
243
environmental performance, better safety and more product and better profitability,  
with a modern plant”.
It is also worth noticing the virtual absence of voluntary environmental action, and 
the lack of pro-activity. This is notable given the attention in literature to these 
drivers (Aragón-Correa 1998; Meredith and Wolters 1994:25; Marshall et al. 2005), 
and particularly given that two of the cases are in the chemicals industry with its long 
history of relatively strong regulatory pressure and public scrutiny. This leads us to a 
certain scepticism regarding the claims made in the literature about the future of 
self-regulation, and also shows the value of not studying only best practice cases 
(compare discussion in section 4.2.2).
We have seen how environmental motives were, in the chemicals cases, aligned with 
core, mainly economic motives. We may now ask what the environmental motives 
contributed when there were also other, not least resource efficiency, motives 
present. This discussion will also shed new light on the concept of ‘cleaner 
technology’.
To achieve this we may compare and contrast cases of cleaner technology 
innovations (as defined by the environmental outcomes).306 Chemicals Sweden 
appears to provide a textbook example of cleaner technology. The piping technology 
introduced improved resource efficiency (and quality) as well as reduced 
environmental pollution. It was also a case of an intentional search for a win-win 
solution; both motives were present from the start. We called this scenario 
‘intentional cleaner technology’ in the literature review. It was even the case that, to 
some extent, this was a choice between end-of-pipe and cleaner technology. The vent 
gas treatment was initially a part of the project, with the motivation that resource 
efficiency gains might render it unnecessary, or at least reduce its size and cost.
It is interesting to compare this case with the new control system at Dairy Scotland. 
This innovation did in fact improve the environmental performance, but that was not 
why it was initially planned. At the start of the project the control system was 
306 There were clear cases of this in all cases apart from at Chemicals Scotland where resource 
efficiency improvements were postponed until a later stage.
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motivated by other motives: traceability, resource efficiency and quality. Only after 
the regulator started applying pressure half way through the project did 
environmental improvement become a concern. The solution was then not to change 
anything material about the proposed design, but to re-interpret the technology as 
also delivering environmental advantages. In this case, then, environmental 
improvement was initially just a side effect, and even an unintentional one.
We may also compare with the Dairy Sweden case where resource and cost 
efficiency were central motives behind the project in its entirety, and several of the 
suggested technological solutions, some of which were adopted. Environmental 
motives played little part in these decisions at the time, but the outcomes could later, 
in the interviews, be described as delivering environmental benefits. The Technical 
Director at Dairy Sweden said about the new plant: 
I think the biggest improvement was to shut down the old site … we don’t have 
that kind of impact here that we had in [the nearby town]. So in total we have a 
lesser environmental impact today. It’s new technology; you discharge less. We 
built with new technology. 
The Environmental Coordinator at Dairy Sweden on improvements in energy 
consumption: “it gets better when you construct a new plant. New, more efficient  
equipment”. The actors in this case may have been aware at the time of the project of 
the environmental side effects, but that is not clear and the point here is that such 
concerns played little role at the time.
The two dairy cases exemplify what we called ‘unintentional cleaner technology’ in 
the literature review, and they show that environmental motives could be attached to 
core technologies ex-post through re-interpretation of the technology. This raises 
questions about what happened in the Chemicals Sweden case. Did the presence of 
an environmental motive from the beginning in this case mean that it had more of an 
impact on the technological choices made, or was the environmental motive also in 
this case attached to the core technology without making any material changes to it 
because of this motive? To rephrase the question, would the piping technology have 
been introduced, and on the same scale, even without the environmental motive? We 
do not know this. The environmental motive was present, and aligned with other 
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motives, and we can not say that it did not have an impact. However, it did not add 
anything independently of the other motives. It was not, therefore, an example of 
‘ambitious cleaner technology’ to stick with the terminology from the literature 
review. 
In the literature review we also raised the question about whether and how 
environmental motives may reinforce a search for cleaner technology initiated for 
other reasons (as suggested by Clayton el al. 1999:219). In the Chemicals Sweden 
case the environmental motive contributed to the decision regarding the pigging 
technology, but it is not clear that it makes any sense to say that it reinforced the 
search for cleaner technology. Reinforcement presupposes a sequence of events 
where the search pre-dates the addition of an environmental motive. This did not 
happen in the Chemicals Sweden case.
All in all there is little evidence to say that environmental motives adding anything 
extra to, or reinforced, searches for cleaner technology in these cases. There is no 
clear case where environmental motives raised the level of ambition regarding the 
environmental performance of core technology as compared to any pre-defined level. 
This is not to say that environmental motives did not matter for the technological 
choices made. At least in the Chemicals Sweden case this motive did matter. But it is 
to say that environmental motives only mattered insofar as they could be aligned 
with other motives. Environmental motives did not motivate any improvements to 
environmental performance through core technology innovations over and beyond 
what could be motivated also by other motives.
We have seen examples, then, of intentional and unintentional cleaner technology. 
This distinction also reflects the role of the actors in the projects. Resource efficiency 
was pushed by management, and the solutions delivered by the engineers. As we 
have seen the environmental staff had little effective influence in the dairy cases 
(none in the Dairy Scotland case). In the Chemicals Sweden case the environmental 
staff had some influence, in line with the stronger regulatory pressure, and the 
environmental benefits of the core technology innovations were in this case 
intentional, although not obviously ambitious. There was clearer evidence of the 
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influence of environmental staff in the case of end-of-pipe technology, as we shall 
see in the next section.
8.3.2 End-of-pipe
Finally, we shall briefly discuss the end-of-pipe innovations. These mainly occurred 
in the chemicals industry, reflecting stronger regulatory pressure, as well as the 
inherently broader range of toxic chemicals used and potential ways of damaging the 
environment.
Proposed end-of-pipe solutions were treated as part of the main investment projects 
when it was possible to use existing end-of-pipe equipment as in the case of 
Chemicals Scotland, or when there was hope of avoiding them or at least reducing 
their size and cost through cleaner technology solutions as in the example of the vent 
gas treatment at Chemicals Sweden. When this was not the case, that is, when they 
generated cost and were unavoidable, as regards the other end-of-pipe investments at 
Chemicals Sweden, the end-of-pipe investments were ‘spun-off’ as separate projects. 
This reinforces our picture of environmental things as something to be separated 
from core business, unless they can be aligned with economic benefits.
The cases also shed new light on the grey zone between cleaner technology and 
end-of-pipe technology (note that this is an analytical grey zone and does not mean 
that there was necessarily a choice to be made between cleaner and end-of-pipe 
technology). We have in the cases seen several examples of this. There were cases of 
recovery – of substances from effluents and of energy – in the case studies. It could 
be argued that this is cleaner technology, since even though the waste is produced, it 
is then fed back into the processes and thus after a detour is no longer waste. 
Waste/pollution production is avoided.
A perhaps more interesting example is given by the nitrogen ballasts proposed in 
both the chemicals cases. In both cases the ballast had the potential to reduce gaseous 
waste flows. At Chemicals Scotland the ballast was necessary for compliance with 
health and safety regulation, but also to avoid explosions, and we thus have a clear 
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case of a cleaner technology offering both environmental and technical (ultimately 
economic) benefits. In contrast, at Chemicals Sweden the ballast was not necessary, 
and would in fact have slowed production down somewhat. This lack of economic 
advantage makes it tempting to call it an end-of-pipe application, but since it would 
have caused less waste to be produced we should by rights call also this application 
cleaner technology. We thus have an example of cleaner technology not offering 
economic advantages. If nothing else this shows that we should avoid including 
economic advantages in the definition of the concept (for example, for McMeekin 
and Green, 1994:2, lowering production cost is part of what cleaner technology 
means). It also illustrates the difficulty of associating the concept of cleaner 
technology with a specific technology. Whether it is cleaner or not depends on the 
particularities of each application.
For the end-of-pipe investments in both Chemicals cases the environmental staff had 
important roles. Given what we discussed above about the lack of reinforcement, the 
impact of environmental staff was more distinct when it came to end-of-pipe than 
core technology decisions.
In this section we have discussed the integration of environmental motives into 
innovation processes and their impact, when any, on the technological solutions 
chosen. This discussion has confirmed earlier results showing that resource 
efficiency is an important motive behind cleaner technology innovations (Malaman 
1995:2; Clayton et al. 1999:238). Especially in cases with weak regulatory pressure 
and separating CSCs, it was apparent that environmental motives are not necessary 
for cleaner technology solutions when resource efficiency is already a priority. This 
may be called unintentional cleaner technology.
We also saw that in cases with strong regulatory pressure and integrating CSCs, 
environmental motives were integrated into the innovation processes, and even into 
decisions relating to core technology, but only if they were aligned with other 
motives. There were, thus, examples of intentional cleaner technologies, where the 
project participants searched for win-win solutions, but we did not, however, see any 
ambitious cleaner technology where environmental motives reinforced or added 
anything extra to resource efficiency motivated innovations. Instead, we saw 
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examples of technologies being flexible enough to be re-interpreted as cleaner 
technology, after the relevant decisions had already been made.
With this in mind, it became clear that the impact of environmental staff being 
present in the projects was clearer when it comes to end-of-pipe innovations. The 
main task of environmental staff in the projects was to monitor design proposals and 
ensure translation between them and regulatory requirements. In the case of 
end-of-pipe technology, such environmental motives clearly added something, and 
when unavoidable led to material changes to the technological solutions.
We have in this section been able to reach a new, more nuanced understanding of 
cleaner technology. A distinction has been made possible in the analysis between 
unintentional, intentional and ambitious cleaner technology, reflecting different ways 
of linking, or not, environmental motives to core technology innovations. This 
analysis has, in turn, been made possible through selecting not only ‘best practice’ 
cases where environmental motives are central, but also less environmentally 
ambitious cases. 
8.4 Conclusion
We have in this chapter used the concept of the company social constitution to 
capture the organisational tendencies in the cases to separate or integrate 
environmental work, staff and motives from core technology innovation. We have 
seen separating constitutions in the dairy cases with weak regulatory pressure 
manifesting itself as a focus on permit-generated environmental work, resulting in a 
buffer role for environmental staff. This was contrasted with the chemicals cases 
with more integrating constitutions and stronger regulatory pressure. Here 
environmental motives played a bigger role in the projects, and environmental work 
and staff were more integrated into the projects. The environmental staff were then 
able to add a boundary-spanning role to their repertoire. This was facilitated by 
integrating organisational structures in the shape of environmental-technological 
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networks and routines, built up over time in companies with a history of 
comparatively strong regulatory pressure. 
The relatively weak power of the environmental staff as compared to the engineers 
made the former dependent on the latter for cooperation, and the onus was on 
environmental staff to facilitate cooperation. In cases with separating constitutions 
the engineers could to a large extent ignore environmental staff, and there were even 
indications of some tensions between the groups. Regulatory pressure gave 
environmental staff a stronger position and a lever of influence, and over time a more 
integrating constitution could result.
There were two main career paths during which environmental and engineering skills 
were bundled to form environmental-technological hybrid expertise. Firstly, 
engineering was a common background of environmental staff, and a help to them in 
facilitating cooperation with engineers. Secondly, there was a category of people 
who had started off as engineers, and who had made managerial careers in part 
thanks to environmental merits. This second career path, which stays closer to the 
core of the company’s concerns, offered – it seems – more rewards for those 
pursuing it, whilst also giving them – intermittent – opportunities to champion 
environmental issues in innovation processes.
Environmental championing should be understood both in terms of action and 
structure. The potential champions acted based on their career interests as well as 
private life commitments, whilst also both in their past career choices and in the 
current situation adapting to those opportunities offered to them by the organisations. 
The production of such potential champions with bundled technological, 
environmental and managerial skills can be seen as another integrative mechanism, 
facilitating the effective integration of environmental motives into innovation work.
We saw that environmental motives could be integrated into core technology 
innovations, in cases with integrative company social constitutions, by aligning the 
environmental motives with other motives, especially resource efficiency. In the 
Chemicals Sweden case we saw this happening, and a search for win-win solutions 
resulted in an ‘intentional cleaner technology’ solution. In contrast, in cases with 
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separating constitutions and weak regulatory pressure, environmental motives were 
largely absent from the innovation processes. Also in these cases cleaner technology 
solutions were chosen, but without environmental motives. The resulting 
environmental improvements were then un-planned side effects of ‘unintentional 
cleaner technology’ innovations.
Interestingly we saw that technologies could also be re-interpreted ex-post, that is, 
after the design solutions has stabilised. Environmental motives could then be 
‘discovered’ and added to the technology, without any material changes to the 
design. For example in the case of the control system at Dairy Scotland, the 
technology was in this way flexible enough to take on this new layer of meaning. 
The possibility of re-interpretation raises questions about what environmental 
motives actually add when there are other motives for cleaner technology present. 
We have not seen any clear examples of ‘ambitious cleaner technology’, where 
environmental motives added something that was not motivated by for example 
resource efficiency concerns.
The main theoretical contributions from this analysis concern the conceptualisation 
and categorisation of ‘cleaner technology’, how to explain championing in terms of 
both structure and action, and the modification of the company social constitution 
concept to suit the case of environmental aspects of innovation. We shall discuss the 
theoretical implications of this study in more detail in the next chapter.
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9 Conclusion
At the heart of this thesis is the fundamental issue of whether our use of technology 
can be made ecologically sustainable. The optimistic ecological modernisation 
theory has great hopes for the integration of ecological rationality and for the 
potential of the introduction of new technologies to reduce environmental impacts, 
whereas the more pessimistic green Marxism emphasises the irreconcilability of 
environmental and profitability concerns, and sees technology as an instrument 
towards the latter goal. Where ecological modernisation is somewhat vague about 
how ecological rationality will come to be integrated into firms, green Marxism 
would highlight the continued need for state intervention in the form of 
environmental regulation (whilst not necessarily assuming that this will be sufficient 
or effective). 
The focus in this thesis is on questions about how and why environmental 
considerations impact or not on technological design choices in investment projects 
in process industries. From this we can see how investment projects both offer 
opportunities and set up constraints on the effective promotion of environmental 
concerns.
In the following two sections we shall sum up answers to the research questions set 
out in the introduction and discuss the contributions to theory of this thesis. The last 
two sections of this chapter will discuss the main implications of the methodological 
choices made, and set out issues for further research.
9.1 Empirical results
The research questions have effectively been answered in chapter 8. We shall here 
sum up the main points of those answers.
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1. What is the impact of environmental intentions on the technological outcomes,  
especially on core technologies?
In the case of core technology, we saw that for environmental motives to be 
integrated into the investment projects and the core technology innovation process, 
they had to be aligned with other motives, most often resource efficiency motives.307
Such integration of environmental motives could happen both before and after the 
major decisions relating to the design solution had been made. In the latter case, 
environmental motives did not affect the technology materially, and what actually 
happened was a case of business-as-usual innovation, with environmental 
improvements being unintentional side effects. The technology was re-interpreted as 
being environmental, rather than being materially affected.
There were also cases of technologies being cleaner in the sense of reducing the 
production of pollution and waste, whilst at the same time not being economically 
advantageous.
2. How do any environmental concerns that firm actors may have affect the 
decisions made in innovation processes?
We have identified two categories of staff who promoted explicit environmental 
motives: environmental staff and environmental champions. Environmental staff had 
the role to monitor the projects (in cases with an environmental permit), and when 
the regulatory pressure was strong enough they had some influence on the 
technological work in ensuring that permit requirements were translated into criteria 
for the technological design work. They thus contributed to problem definitions 
rather than directly to the design of new technological solutions.
In cases with what this thesis has identified as integrating company social 
constitutions, environmental staff were more central to the companies. The 
environmental staff in these cases had a boundary-spanning role, whilst also acting as 
a buffer between the company and the regulator. In cases with a separating company 
307 End-of-pipe technologies could sometimes also be aligned with other motives, mainly cost savings 
through the use of existing equipment, and only then were they integrated into the main investment 
projects.
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social constitution the engineers could afford to ignore the environmental staff, or 
even actively keep them at a distance. Strong regulatory pressure made for successful 
promotion in the sense of intentional searches for win-win solutions, as mediated by 
environmental staff in their boundary-spanning role.
Environmental champions were individuals who had accumulated experience from 
different areas of work. Like many of the environmental staff they had hybrid 
expertise encompassing engineering and environmental skills, but for these managers 
their environmental skills were secondary rather than primary skills. These 
environmental champions had career as well as private interests in doing some 
environmental work.
In three out of four case studies such individuals were also the internal project 
clients, and so had some direct influence on the decisions made. The environmental 
championing, however, still had to be adapted to the company context, and aligned 
with other motives, for example cost savings. The championing opportunities they 
had were thus limited and shaped by the company agenda.
3. What are the structurally determined organisational limits and opportunities to 
the integration of environmental concerns into firm innovation processes? 
We have seen how engineering and environmental expertise is formed and deployed 
in a relatively stable matrix of conflicts of interest: the ‘company social constitution’. 
We have further seen a difference in the company social constitutions in terms of 
integrating or separating environmental motives, work and staff in relation to 
innovation processes. A history of strong regulatory pressure could engender 
integrative organisational structures in terms of environmental-technological 
networks and routines, where otherwise these two areas of work would be kept 
separate.
An integrating company social constitution allowed for the integration of 
environmental motives into the investment projects, but only if it could be aligned 
with other motives. With a separating constitution environmental motives were not 
made part of the agenda.
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It is worth noticing that the construction over time of integrative organisational 
structures is not an irreversible process (as implied by the environmental determinist 
tendency identified in the literature in chapter 2). There were cases where 
environmental-technological organisational structures fell apart, or were threatened 
by changing company fortunes.
9.2 Contributions to theory
This section will be organised around fours aspects of this research. Firstly, we shall 
discuss and criticize the concept of ‘cleaner technology’. This is followed by 
theoretical contributions regarding organisational politics. Thereafter, we shall 
discuss the results of applying a Science and Technology Studies perspective to the 
topic of environmental aspects of innovations, which has been dominated by 
management research. Finally, we shall see what implications this study has for 
ecological modernisation and green Marxism.
9.2.1 ‘Cleaner technology’
We shall in this section argue that the notion of ‘cleaner technology’ (and as a 
consequence ‘environmental innovation’) is a misleading concept, for several 
reasons.
Firstly, as already discussed in chapter 2, cleaner technology is not a universal class 
of technologies, as is sometimes assumed (see for example Murphy and Gouldson 
2000:36; del Río González 2005:22). Typically, clean technologies are not available 
off-the-shelf as ‘black boxes’, but rather have to be developed in situ to fit in with the 
existing plant and processes. Studying firms, we should speak of cleaner innovation 
rather than cleaner technology.
This also means that we should reconsider some of the arguments for why cleaner 
technology has not delivered on its promises. It is not because the technology is new 
(Malaman 1995:2), or, specifically, newer than end-of-pipe technology (Murphy and 
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Gouldson 2000:36). The technology used for cleaner innovation does not have to be 
new, just more efficient than that what the company had before. Nor is it because 
up-take has been low (as assumed by Clayton et al. 1999:2). Since cleaner 
technology is not a (universal class of) technology, this argument is no longer 
relevant. The question is rather why few companies have tried to find win-win 
solutions. We shall return to this question later.
Secondly, the concept of ‘cleaner technology’ is ambiguous and conflates several 
different types of innovation. These types are different in terms of the underlying 
motives, the outcomes and likelihood of occurrence. Figure 9.1 shows the different 
cases identified. 
Starting from the top we can make a first distinction between those process 
technology innovations that lead to environmental improvements, and those that do 
not. The former case corresponds to a definition of ‘cleaner technology’ by outcome 
(O-CI), and the latter we may by extension name ‘dirtier technology’. Thereafter, we 
may also make a distinction between those O-CI innovations that are the result of 
intentional searches for cleaner technology (I-CI) and those that are unintentional 
(U-CI). Here the former case corresponds to a definition of ‘cleaner technology’ by 
intention. Lastly, we can distinguish between cases where environmental motives are 
prioritised over economic ones (A-CI), and those where environmental motives are 
as important as (or less important than) economic motives (win-win-CI). The former 
case we shall here call ‘ambitious cleaner innovation’, and the latter case corresponds 
to intentional searches for win-win solutions. 
It is worth noting here that reality may be less clear-cut than these categories 
indicate. If it is uncertain whether there has indeed been an environmental 
improvement, then the boundary between dirtier innovation and unintended cleaner 
innovation may be unclear. And exactly how important does the environmental 
intention have to be to categorise the innovation as win-win? Nevertheless this 
categorisation is useful for distinguishing between what are often rather different 
categories of innovation in terms of environmental motives and outcomes.
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Figure 9.1  Different cases of ‘cleaner technology’ innovation
We have in our case studies seen examples of most of these categories. For example, 
in the Dairy Scotland case the changed cleaning routines meant more use of 
chemicals than before: dirtier innovation. Most of the innovations observed with 
beneficial environmental outcomes were driven by resource efficiency motives rather 
than any environmental considerations: unintentional cleaner innovation. The 
pigging technology at Chemicals Sweden was driven by resource efficiency, but also 
– to some extent – by environmental concerns: win-win cleaner innovation. We have 
not seen any example of ambitious cleaner innovation. If we stick to the vocabulary 
set out in the introduction chapter, we may now also say that business-as-usual 
innovation, that is, those cases without any environmental motives, includes dirtier 

























Most of the innovations we have studied in this thesis are unintentional cleaner 
innovation. This reflects the methodology used in two ways: firstly, we wanted to 
avoid the asymmetry of studying only ‘best practice’ cases, which are more likely to 
be cases of win-win cleaner innovation, and secondly, we selected those 
technological choices that had some relevance for environmental outcomes. 
Technologies adopted that did not make any environmental difference, for example 
some of the software for the control systems, are therefore less likely to have 
appeared in the case studies. They would here be subsumed under the ‘dirtier 
innovation’ category. But this result also reflects a reality. It is interesting that we 
have seen so few examples of ambitious and win-win cleaner innovation, especially 
since we have studied two chemicals industry cases with their comparatively more 
acute potential environmental impacts. We shall discuss this more below.
With this categorisation in place, we are now in a better position to discuss different 
definitions of ‘cleaner technology’. Let us first consider definition by outcome (O-CI 
in figure 9.1). This definition captures all the process technology innovations that 
improve environmental performance, and many of those also give economic benefits. 
This definition thus seems to correspond well to what we have previously thought of 
as ‘cleaner technology’.
But this category appears to be dominated by unintentional cleaner innovation, 
driven by resource efficiency (and other non-environmental) concerns. The 
technology used for such innovation is sometimes new, but only in the sense that all 
investments are made in established and new rather than obsolete technology. 
Investment in new, more efficient technology is not a new phenomenon, and we 
know that this has not been enough to manage the environmental problems of 
manufacturing industry. By this definition ‘cleaner innovation’ is not necessarily 
new, but nor has it delivered enough environmental improvement.
A further problem with this definition is that it is all too easy to apply ex post. As we 
have seen the ‘environmental-ness’ of the technology was sometimes a result of 
re-interpretation after the fact of the technology, that is, after the design choices had 
already been made.
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This fits well with the idea of bounded rationality. In the case of Dairy Scotland, 
regulatory pressure induced the company to re-frame the project in environmental 
terms, and to discover the environmental benefits it was getting from the 
technological choice it had made. (Maybe if the environmental manager had been 
involved in the project the company would have been aware of this earlier). The 
technology was in this sense flexible enough to allow this new interpretation.
But this was also a case of the company trying to ‘blackbox’ (Scarbrough 1995) the 
technology and present it as environmental as an afterthought.308 Had it considered 
the environmental aspects of the technology earlier in the project, the outcome may 
have been different. This possibility is obscured when the label ‘environmental’ is 
attached ex post. This illustrates how the concept of ‘cleaner technology’ may reify 
environmental intentions, and impute such intentions where there are none. See 
diagram 1 in figure 9.2.
Let us now move on to the option of defining ‘cleaner technology’ by intention 
(I-CI). We have here confirmed that win-win solutions are possible. The pigging 
technology at Chemicals Sweden is the clearest example of this from this study. But 
we have also seen that intentional cleaner innovation does not necessarily offer any 
economic benefits. By comparing the decisions made regarding nitrogen buffers in 
the two chemicals cases, we may conclude that the technology would have offered 
environmental benefits but its reduction of production efficiency made it less 
appealing for the companies. In the Chemicals Sweden case the idea was abandoned 
for this reason, but in the Chemicals Scotland case it was adopted because of safety 
regulation requirements and to ensure production. In the former case there were 
hopes of the buffer reducing emissions, thus making it intentional cleaner innovation, 
had it been adopted.
308 Note that this was not a case of blackboxing the technology as a way of commodifying it, but as a 
way of making the adoption of technology seem environmental. We may also say that it was 
blackboxing of innovation rather than blackboxing of technology.
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Figure 9.2  Illustrations of some types of cleaner innovation
Note: ‘RE’=resource efficiency, ‘EI’=environmental improvement.
We may draw several conclusions from this. Firstly, since cleaner innovation does 
not always offer any economic advantages (compare McMeekin and Green 1994:2), 
it is inaccurate to see it as always embodying win-win solutions. See diagram 2 in 
figure 9.2. Again, there is reason to be wary of the blackboxing of 
environmental-ness. Secondly, the cases of uneconomic cleaner innovation studied 
(admittedly a limited number) suggest that companies do not voluntarily engage in 
cleaner innovation unless it also offers other, economic advantages. In this sense, 
environmental concerns are subordinated to economic ones.309 It is ultimately the 
economic benefits of cleaner innovation that attract companies, and when it does not 
offer any such benefits investment will be scarce, unless compelled by regulation 
(compare end-of-pipe innovation).
309 Note also that the ‘opposite’ case of economic considerations outweighing environmental ones 























But if win-win cleaner innovation is possible, why has it not delivered on its 
promises? Some reasons for this have already been provided by Clayton et al. 
(1999). Their observation was that when resource efficiency drivers are strong and 
well established, there may be little difference between what can be considered 
cleaner technology and what is good engineering practice (ibid.:241). There is then 
little scope for environmental considerations to add anything. However, given 
bounded rationality, environmental considerations may reveal new opportunities to 
improve resource efficiency, and thus also environmental performance (ibid.:219), 
that is, what we previously called ‘environmentally induced cleaner technology’. See 
figure 2.1. Even when there are opportunities for profitable investments improving 
resource efficiency, they may go unnoticed, and a lack of attention to environmental 
concerns may help explain why that is the case. We would propose that this is 
possible especially in cases where resource efficiency is a less strong driver.310
To sum up, the concept of ‘cleaner technology’ is misleading for several reasons. 
Firstly, it is not a universal class of technology, and it is better to speak of ‘cleaner 
innovation’ as a situated activity. With this in mind, we may conclude that cleaner 
innovation as an activity is not new – it is only new as an intentional approach to 
improving environmental performance. Furthermore, the technologies used for 
cleaner innovation may be new or well established ones, and the uptake of those 
technologies is not generally low. Cleaner innovation as an intentional approach is 
newer than end-of-pipe innovation, but the technologies used for cleaner innovation 
are not generally newer than those used for end-of-pipe innovation.
Secondly, the term conflates different cases of innovation with different motives and 
different outcomes. Through this ambiguity the term lends itself to reification and 
imputation of environmental intentions where there are none. Environmental 
improvements are more often the unintentional side effects of process technology 
310 We may also attempt to clarify one detail. Clayton et al. also claimed that environmental 
considerations could ‘reinforce’ existing, on-going searches for resource efficiency. See figure 2.1. 
Whilst we have not seen any clear examples of this – the pigging technology at Chemicals Sweden is 
the main candidate for this, but it is not clear that environmental considerations are what made the 
project team expand this part of the project – it seems possible that reinforcement could work though 
induction, and that during a search for resource efficiencies, attention to environmental performance 
could reveal new such opportunities. This is however speculation, and it is still unclear what 
‘reinforcement’ means in this context.
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innovation done for other reasons, than intended outcomes. The term can too easily 
be used to justify business-as-usual innovation, which we know is not enough.311
Thirdly, cleaner technology may not offer the economic advantages the term is 
usually understood to imply. The term ‘cleaner technology’ thus obscures the 
possibility of going ‘beyond win-win’ and prioritising environmental performance 
even at an economic cost. Such ambitious cleaner innovation is unlikely to happen 
without regulatory pressure, since firms subordinate environmental considerations to 
economic ones.312
We have here set out a new model for understanding the environmental dimension of 
core technology innovation that avoids the pitfalls of reification (taking the 
environmental properties of ‘cleaner’ technologies for granted) and asymmetry 
(explaining only ‘best practice’ innovations). This has been achieved through a more 
carefully drawn distinction between technology and innovation, and through 
analysing intentions and outcomes as distinct phenomena in innovation processes.
9.2.2 The role of organisational politics
A part of the aim of this thesis is to study the role of environmental intentions in 
decision-making in the context of innovation processes. We have chosen a political 
approach to decision-making, and in this section and the next we shall explore the 
role of such organisational politics.
We have used the concept of the ‘company social constitution’ to capture the 
organisational structures evolving around potential conflicts of interest between the 
company and the regulator, as well as between engineers and environmental staff. 
This concept has been developed to suit the topic of this thesis, and proven useful in 
terms of analysing the integration or separation of these actors.
311 If it were, such voluntary action would already have solved the environmental problems, and there 
would have been no need for regulation.
312 Ambitious cleaner innovation is in this sense similar to end-of-pipe innovation.
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We have seen examples of championing behaviour by a category of managers. The 
analysis showed how we might explain this behaviour through the interaction of the 
structured company context and the interest-based action of these individuals, 
drawing on a categorisation of interests as stemming from private lives and careers as 
well as organisational positions. Below, we shall discuss in more detail the topics of 
the ‘company social constitution’ and ‘environmental championing’.
9.2.2.1 The ‘company social constitution’  
The concept of the ‘company social constitution’ has in the past been used to theorise 
mainly the conflict of interest between employers and employees/workers (for 
example, Koch 1997 and Kamp 2000). It has been given the meaning of those 
organisational arrangements and structures generated by these actors’ behaviour 
relating to this conflict. Since we have applied the concept here to a somewhat 
different topic, it has been necessary to adapt and develop it, but we have also been 
able to criticise earlier versions of the concept.
Firstly, we have here been studying situations with multiple lines of (potential) 
conflict. We have added a centre-periphery axis, to capture the horizontal conflict 
between engineers and environmental staff,313 to the original vertical axis of conflict 
between workers and employers. This enabled us to distinguish between 
‘integrating’ and ‘separating’ company social constitutions, reflecting circumstances 
where the organisational context enables or hinders cooperation between 
environmental staff and engineers.
Secondly, the company social constitution has previously been seen as fundamentally 
a compromise between conflicting interests. This appears to presuppose a situation 
where neither actor can afford to ignore the interests of the other. In the case of 
environmental staff, their position is sometimes so weak that other actors – engineers 
in particular – may well be able to ignore their interests without serious 
repercussions. We therefore need to re-interpret the concept of the ‘company social 
313 White (2006) has also use a centre-periphery model to theorise the role of environmental staff, but 
not in relation to innovation.
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constitution’ so as to encompass also those situations where the organisational 
arrangements and structures governing the relationships between actors are shaped 
more or less unilaterally. 
This adaptation became necessary when studying environmental staff, engineers and 
management, but we would suggest that it might apply also to the relationship 
between workers and employers. Previous studies using this concept have taken 
place in companies with a unionised workforce (as is probably more common in 
Denmark where most of these studies have been carried out, than in, say, the UK). If 
one were to study non-unionised workplaces, or workplaces where the labour force 
was in some other way in a weak bargaining position, the company social 
constitution may well not be shaped through compromise.
9.2.2.2 ‘Environmental championing’  
We have in this thesis been able to put forth a new theorisation of environmental 
championing that evades the opposite traps of essentialism and structuralism (as 
discussed in chapter 3). By linking environmental championing to the career histories 
and private lives of potential champions as well as to their current situations in the 
organisation, we have seen that both action and structure components are needed to 
account for environmental championing.
The main components of the model of environmental championing we propose are:
Career histories The career choices made, and the career opportunities offered 
by the organisation.
Hybrid expertise The bundling of different types of expertise achieved through 
a career. For environmental championing especially 
combinations of environmental and technological expertise are 
relevant.
Interests An individual’s (or group’s) interests in promoting his or her 
career, as well as environmental issues. Interests are here seen 
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as stemming from the individual’s current organisational 
position, his or her career plans and his or her private life 
commitments.
Opportunities The opportunities offered by the organisation to an individual 
(or group) of promoting careers and/or environmental issues. 
Such opportunities are, in turn, shaped by the priorities and 
agenda of the company at a specific point in time.
It is worth emphasising the temporal aspect of the model. It takes the history of both 
the individual (or group) and the organisation into account as important for current 
events.
We have thus produced a model of environmental championing that does not overly 
rely on the inherent qualities of a champion, but also emphasises that the 
organisational, structured context shapes championing. Moreover, this explanation 
does not make champions heroes in the sense of altruistic do-gooders, but also sees 
self-interest and career promotion as an intrinsic aspect of an explanation of who 
becomes involved in environmental championing.
The proposed model also avoids structural determination in two ways. Firstly, we 
have not reduced the champions to structurally determined products of the 
organisation, but also highlighted their own interests as a motivating factor. 
Secondly, this explanation of championing also highlights how the context of the 
individual – the career opportunities and rewards offered, and the company agenda – 
are structural aspects of the organisation from the point of view of the individual 
member of staff making a career and/or promoting environmental issues. At the same 
time, however, they are action aspects from the point of view of management setting 
policies on promotions and strategic priorities (assuming that management has, if not 
a monopoly on, then at least a dominating input in the setting of such policies). 
Structure and action is in this way co-produced, as is technology and organisation 
(Russell and Williams 2002:83).
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9.2.3 Bringing STS to bear on environmental management 
literature
We have now presented the most direct theoretical contributions of this thesis. As 
stated in the introduction chapter, a secondary aim – and a personal ‘intellectual 
project’ as it were – has also been to apply Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
insights to a topic that is usually studied in environmental management research. 
Here, we shall briefly comment on the progress made in this project.
First, however, we need to avoid defining STS too generously. This thesis has drawn 
on both STS and a political process perspective. These traditions intersect in, for 
example, in the work on company social constitutions. Some political process 
literature, especially Pettigrew (1985), should not be subsumed into STS though. 
Therefore, it is more correct to claim that we have applied both these schools of 
thought to the study of environmental aspects of innovation.
Whilst not being the first work in the STS tradition to deal with environmental 
aspects of innovations (see for example Green et al. 1994), this thesis has usefully 
and in new ways brought lessons from the STS tradition to bear on the study of this 
area. Firstly, a core insight of STS is that the relationship between intentions behind 
innovations and technological outcomes is a complex one, and that the ‘interpretative 
flexibility’ of technologies means that they are always more or less open to 
re-interpretation and change (Bijker 1995). Here, we have used this insight to avoid 
reifying environmental intentions into ‘environmental innovations’. By analysing 
how environmental and other motives were articulated in innovation processes we 
have been able to reach a more nuanced understanding of environmental aspects of 
process technology innovations.
Secondly, this thesis has used a political process approach, previously elaborated in 
STS by for example Clausen (1997), in the study of organisations and environmental 
aspects of innovation. By analysing the interests and relative power of relevant actors 
we have contributed to clarifying the relationship between engineers and 
environmental staff in the context of innovation processes, in a way that would not 
have been possible using an apolitical approach. Attention to the contributions of 
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multiple actors with varying interests (Burns and Stalker 1961), based on their 
positions, careers and private life commitments (Morgan 1997:161), has also allowed 
us to theorise environmental championing in a way that avoids essentialist 
conceptualisations of champions and encompasses both action and structure.
Moreover, the political process approach (Pettigrew 1985) has helped us avoid the 
‘environmental management determinist’ tendency found in the literature on 
environmental innovation (that is, a tendency to assume and build explanations that 
presume continued improvements in environmental management, as discussed in 
more detail in chapter 2). Having studied the construction, but sometimes also 
erosion, of organisational structures integrating environmental and technological 
work, we remain aware of the uncertain future of environmental work in firms and its 
impact on innovations.
9.2.4 Implications for ecological modernisation and green 
Marxism
Having discussed the main theoretical implication of this thesis, it is time to look at 
the wider picture and see what if anything this thesis may contribute to discussions 
with a society-wide scope. We have in chapter 1 introduced ecological modernisation 
and green Marxism as rival theorisations of the greening of society. Let us now 
return to the issues raised there.
As stated in chapter 1, ecological modernisation theory implies that ecological 
rationality can and will be integrated into existing societal institutions, and that new, 
more environmentally efficient technology314 will be an important part of the solution 
to our environmental problems (Spaargaren and Mol 1992). We have in this thesis 
seen evidence of such integration in the form of environmental motives, work and 
expertise being integrated into innovation processes. 
314 The theory especially emphasises the potential of generic technologies like IT, biotechnology and 
materials technology. Many of the technologies involved in the four cases studied involved IT, 
especially control systems adopted for automation, quality and resource efficiency purposes.
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Nevertheless, it would perhaps be more suitable to talk of ‘ecological moderation’, 
since there were clear limits to how environmental motives could be integrated, and 
to what roles environmental expertise could play in the processes. This result is 
particularly striking since we have studied countries where environmental concerns 
are relatively strongly articulated, and one industrial sector in particular - the 
chemical sector - that has been under fairly strong social pressure to improve its 
environmental performance for a comparatively long time.
We may also note that the theory appears to predict a rather steady process of 
improvement, in line with the tendency towards environmental determinism 
identified in chapter 2. As we have seen there is no reason to assume such automatic 
progress. Certainly at the company level, environmental-technological organisational 
structures may erode as well as be built up, depending on the circumstances.
We would suggest that the results of this thesis are more in line with green Marxism. 
Although there were win-win situations in the companies, there were also plenty of 
examples of conflicts between environmental and economic motives. The relative 
primacy of economic motives in the cases and the tendency to subordinate 
environmental concerns to economic ones, support a view of the irreconcilability of 
environmental concerns with the ‘business as usual’ of contemporary capitalist firms. 
Moreover, the importance of environmental regulation and virtual absence of 
voluntary environmental action lends further support for green Marxism rather than 
ecological modernisation theory.
9.3 Contributions to practice
We shall here set out the main practical contributions for policy-making, 
management and the governance of professional expertise. The section will first 
discuss implications for environmental policy, and in particular environmental 
regulation. Secondly, we shall discuss the formation of environmental-technological 
expertise, and, lastly, present considerations that may be useful for the management 
of environmental performance in companies.
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9.3.1 Innovation and environmental policy
The main lesson for policy from this research is that cleaner innovation is an activity 
in firms, and not a class of technologies. There is therefore no reason to wait for 
‘cleaner technology’ as a general category to mature, and to hope for greater uptake 
of it. 
At a sectoral level, at a given time, some technologies are more likely to be used for 
cleaner innovation than others. Pigging technology is an example of this, for at least 
some process industries, right now. Such technologies will, however, be adopted by 
firms more often for other reasons than environmental ones. The environmental 
promises of any technology will thus not necessarily matter to a firm in making the 
decision to adopt the technology. As a consequence, it is doubtful whether initiatives 
to stimulate the uptake in firms of particular ‘cleaner technologies’ (using ‘win-win’ 
arguments) will be successful. It is more likely that support for, for example, 
‘resource efficient technologies’ will be more effective. 
This is not to say that government should not encourage firms to consider their 
environmental impact. This is clearly useful, see the discussion about regulation 
below. Such considerations may also uncover opportunities to improve resource 
inefficiencies, and in this way lead to cleaner innovation. The point is, rather, that 
using environmental arguments is likely not to be the most effective way to 
encourage firms to adopt particular technologies.
In terms of research and development funding, it may still be useful to try to 
anticipate which new technologies are likely to be used in ways that improve the 
environmental performance of firm operations, although there will always be 
uncertainties as to how the technology will be used, and how it will be transformed 
in use. Most such new technologies will, however, need to offer other advantages to 
firms to be adopted.
This research confirms that ‘command and control’ regulation is still important, and 
that it does have an impact on innovation processes. Regulation mattered in the short 
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term for particular investments, but also in the long term with regard to stimulating 
integrative company social constitutions, and the formation of potential 
environmental champions. 
This result can be contrasted with the lack of proactivity in the companies studied. It 
was current and historical regulatory pressure that mattered rather than expectations 
of future regulation. Moreover, we saw very few examples of voluntary 
environmental action independent of regulation. Environmental considerations were 
subordinated to economic ones, unless regulatory requirements were unavoidable.
In terms of policies promoting the adoption of environmental management systems – 
and insofar as voluntarist accounts put faith in these to drive environmental 
innovation instead of regulation – we may note that all these companies had such 
systems,315 but that it was informal aspects of the organisations, rather than the 
formal management systems, that channelled environmental concerns (typically 
rooted in regulatory requirements) into the innovation processes. (See also discussion 
in next section.) It thus appears much more important to target the informal than the 
formal organisations, even though that is likely to be more difficult.
We have however seen limited if any impacts of regulation on core process 
technology. As Clayton et al. (1999) suggested, another option may be to provide 
stronger incentives for resource efficiency and quality, since there are good chances 
efforts motivated by such concerns will result in cleaner innovation. The relationship 
between health and safety and environmental performance is more ambiguous.
If it is judged that there is a need for what we have called ambitious cleaner 
innovation, regulation may have to be reformed to have such effects. This is a matter 
of giving higher priority to the environmental performance of core technology. The 
Environmental Impact Assessments and Environmental Technology Reviews 
required by the regulators in some of the cases are measures that would seem to be 
suited for this purpose, as they are explicitly about assessing planned investments 
and technological options. But they need to be made to matter, that is, have an 
impact on innovation processes, and this might not be easy to achieve. 
315 In most cases audited ones.
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Timing is one aspect of this (as we saw in the Dairy Sweden case, where the 
Environmental Technology Review happened too late to affect the investment 
project). A more fundamental problem is that ambitious cleaner innovation is likely 
to be costly to the companies. As we have seen, cleaner innovation is not necessarily 
economically advantageous, and ‘ambitious’ here means doing more than what the 
company could justify by economic concerns. It would seem that economic 
instruments are therefore well suited to change the balance of what is considered by 
firms to be acceptable measures. More stringent regulatory targets would be a more 
indirect way of influencing core technology, and there is a clear risk that the impact 
would be end-of-pipe innovations rather than cleaner innovation.
Regulators should also be aware of the possibility of ‘empty’ procedural compliance. 
It is tempting to say: apply pressure or do not regulate, but there are perhaps other 
advantages of such compliance in terms of preparing the companies for future 
regulatory requirements. Even if technology is not affected, environmental reporting 
for example may require measurements to be made and so add to the firm’s 
knowledge about its environmental impact. We have in this study also not studied 
non-technological compliance, in terms, for example, of changed operating 
procedures (although we would expect that also such changes require regulatory 
pressure).
Finally, regulators may benefit from being aware of the time it may take companies 
to develop environmental-technological capabilities (compare Hilliard 2001). This 
research has provided insight into the processes through which company 
organisations may over time develop routines, networks, etc. that will facilitate 
integration of environmental concerns into innovation processes, that is integrative 
company social constitutions. The process of bundling environmental with 
engineering expertise, that is, of becoming a potential environmental champion, may 
also be time consuming. We will discuss the formation of expertise more below.
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9.3.2 Managing environmental performance through innovation
For a company (or any actor in a company) that wants to gear innovation towards 
environmental performance, this study may provide some useful insights. We have 
seen how environmental promotion is both a matter of formal systems and (more 
importantly) informal networks, both systematic work and contingent championing, 
both one-off initiatives and well-established routines and practices.
A first point here is not to rely too much on formal management systems. Formal 
environmental management systems (or even technology management systems) 
appear to have little impact on innovations.316 No interviewee ever referred to the 
environmental management systems in explaining any of the decisions made in the 
projects. More important are environmental-technological routines integrated with 
engineering and environmental practice.
Secondly, networks may not be easy to put in place intentionally – just organising 
environmental staff and engineers together is, as we have seen, not enough for 
cooperation, for example. Networks will develop when staff have common interests, 
have a need for cooperation, etc.
Thirdly, rewarding engineers doing environmental work may well help short-term 
environmental performance. Interestingly it may also help developing skills and 
careers that will contribute to future environmental-technological capabilities. It may 
be less easy to promote the development of engineering skills for individuals with an 
environmental background. Continued recruitment of engineers into environmental 
staff positions will be necessary, at least until there is a supply of people with 
environmental degrees with a substantial engineering component.
Finally, it is important to be aware that it may take time to develop environmental-
technological capabilities, in the form of: established routines, informal networks and 
staff with hybrid skills – substantially longer time than it takes to propose a new 
316 Hilliard (2001:18) supports this result for Irish pharmaceutical companies. Richards et al. 
(2004:392, citing an article about the Environment Agency in ENDS Report) claim that environmental 
management systems do not even reliably indicate regulatory compliance.
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initiative, assemble a project team or hire a consultant. But once in place, such 
capabilities may be very effective.
9.3.3 The formation of environmental-technological expertise
This study also has interesting implications for anyone who has an interest in how 
technological and environmental professional expertise is formed (that is, not just the 
state, but also professionals, professional bodies, etc.). There may be ways to 
strengthen the kinds of hybrid environmental-technological expertise studied here, 
through changed structures of occupational formation.
With regard to higher education, and in both countries, this research supports the 
provision of environmental education for engineers. Also, and not least, it is 
important to provide environmental professionals with engineering skills, if they are 
to have good prospects for working in industry. It may be a good idea to review the 
relevant educational programmes for environmental degrees, to see how much 
technological content there is, and if needed augment this. To the degree that, in the 
UK more than in Sweden, individuals trained in science do engineering work, these 
considerations apply also to science education.
In the UK there is, as previously mentioned, an institute for environmental engineers, 
as well as a few other institutes for environmental professionals of different types 
(waste managers, environmental managers, etc.). It seems, however, that none of 
these institutes specifically targets manufacturing industry. Furthermore, and more 
importantly, they tend, insofar as they deal with technology at all, to be more 
focussed on end-of-pipe than core technology. There may be scope for an institute in 
the UK for ‘industrial environmental engineers’ that requires of their members skills 
relating to, among other things, core technology. The scope for this in Sweden is 
smaller, given the different structures there for occupational formation.
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9.4 The impact of the chosen methodology
In this section, we shall discuss the main advantages and disadvantages of the 
methodological choices made, and their impact on the results of the study. The 
choices discussed pertain to case studies and the comparative dimension of the 
analysis.
A choice was made to use case studies (based on interviews) rather than a survey. A 
survey would have provided data from which statistical generalisations could have 
been made. A survey would, however, have been less useful in capturing the 
contingencies of particular instances of innovation and would inevitably have 
generated a less rich understanding of the situated complexities of organisational 
dynamics.
A central choice made was that to undertake multiple case studies, which has proven 
very useful. (Further points are made below on comparison between cases.) There 
was, however, a trade-off to be made between a longitudinal study and multiple case 
studies. To some extent the cases have a longitudinal dimension, based on asking the 
interviewees about their and the companies’ history. But the time spent collecting 
data from each case was limited, and recall has its limitations in terms of, for 
example, accuracy and post hoc rationalisation. A deeper understanding of the 
political processes would perhaps have been possible using a ‘true’ longitudinal 
approach (Pettigrew 1985), but this would have come – within the constraints of this 
research project – at the price of the analytical leverage gained from multiple case 
studies.
A core strength of this thesis is the selection of other than just ‘best practice’ ones. 
The cases provide a range of levels of environmental ambition, and of environmental 
outcomes. This has allowed us to avoid environmental determinism, and no 
assumptions have been made that these cases represent future practice. Nor is the 
focus just on environmental practices in the companies. Instead we have tried to 
situate the design choices made in the broader context of both engineering and 
environmental practices and agendas, as well as the broad range of motives behind 
them. By avoiding using a ‘green lens’ that is studying only ‘best practice’ 
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environmental improvements, we have been able to see the impact, or the lack of an 
impact, of different environmental practices in context, further undermining common 
but weakly supported assumptions about the future usefulness of such practices.
A final point relating to the case studies is the choice to focus on core technology. 
The cases did include end-of-pipe technology innovations, but they have received 
somewhat less attention here, when they were organised in separate projects. The 
core technology focus ensured that we have studied projects that were economically 
important to the companies, and so helped us in studying how environmental motives 
fit or not with core company concerns. It also allowed a detailed analysis of cleaner 
technology, forming the basis of a central theoretical contribution of this thesis.
We chose in this project to compare cases in two industries and in two countries. 
This choice clearly paid off in terms of the clear sectoral differences we observed, 
not least in terms of the role of regulation, but also at the organisational level. The 
country dimension, however, gave us surprisingly little analytical leverage. It was 
expected to matter in several ways. Firstly, it mattered in terms of differences in 
regulatory structures. It would appear though that for core technology innovation (at 
least in these middle to large size companies), that what matters is the regulatory 
pressure applied, rather than formal differences in regulation (having one or several 
permits per site for example). 
To illustrate this we may compare the two dairy cases. The Swedish dairy company 
had an environmental permit, but not the Scottish one. The presence of a permit gave 
the local Environmental Coordinator at the Dairy Sweden site a role in the project, 
but little or no influence in the absence of strong regulatory pressure. The difference 
in the organisation of regulation was similarly superficial. In Scotland there is a 
central body (Scottish Water) and in Sweden a decentralised and fragmented system 
of local municipalities monitoring environmental performance. The member of staff 
at Scottish Water however had a local remit, and there was little obvious difference 
in the levels of expertise between him and the Swedish municipality staff member. 
Furthermore, Scottish Water has a dual role of being both regulator and effluent 
treatment service provider, but in the Swedish case the municipality also runs the 
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municipality effluent treatment plant. The end result was that similar compromises 
and judgements were made in the two cases.
Finally, we expected the generally somewhat higher levels of pro-environment 
attitudes in Sweden to make some difference. This does seem to have made a 
difference in terms of the motivations for environmental championing. All in all, we 
expected a stronger impact of national differences, but can conclude that the sectoral 
context and history were more important.
9.5 Further research
We shall here set out some ideas for further research: firstly, by following up on one 
of the points made in the previous section; thereafter by discussing alternative 
settings and contexts to the one chosen for this project; and, lastly, by developing a 
political theme (as in striving towards societal-level change as opposed to 
organisational politics, although these two meanings of ‘politics’ may interrelate) 
touched upon in this thesis.
As mentioned in the previous section, it might be worthwhile to add a more 
developed longitudinal component to this research. Further understanding of 
especially the political aspects of the organisational determinants of the integration of 
environmental concerns into technological change in companies, could be gained 
from returning to the case companies studied here in future projects.
To gain further insights into the integration of environmental rationality in 
technological change, there are also other settings and contexts than technology 
adoption in process industries that deserve attention. A first area is up-stream 
activities in the innovation processes, for example company technology development 
activities or academic research.
This issue of self-regulation could be explored by studying emerging technologies, 
which have yet to be adopted in routine use in companies. Marine energy 
technologies, for example, are interesting in this respect. Any future implemented 
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generating capacity would undoubtedly be subject to environmental regulation, and 
even though the shape of this future regulation is uncertain, developers and 
researchers may still have to take it into account in their work. This would perhaps 
provide a contrasting setting where we should see more environmental pro-activity 
than was the case in the manufacturing companies studied here.
In academia, environmental subjects and research areas have grown considerably 
over the last 30-40 years. It would be of interest to deepen our understanding of how 
environmental concerns have been integrated into engineering faculties in this period 
(see Jamison 2001 for a more general discussion of the uptake of environmental 
ideas in academia). Have environmental concerns had to be re-shaped to fit in with 
dominant frames of reference in academic engineering? Has the integration of 
environmental concerns had an impact on engineering research results? How have 
such concerns been received by researchers in other areas, which are perhaps less 
easily labelled political or activist?
A second interesting area would be the integration of environmental concerns into 
technology (science, research, innovation) policy. Were environmental concerns 
perhaps more prominent before technology policy was transformed into innovation 
policy, with its somewhat stronger focus on economic growth, during the last 25 or 
so years? If so, how could this policy shift happen simultaneously with the 
breakthrough in many countries of green parties? Is there a renewed interest in 
environmental – and other ‘societal’ concerns apart from economic growth – in 
innovation policy, as seems to be the case when looking at the most recent EU R&D 
framework programmes?
Apart from these different settings, there is also a political strand in the thesis that 
could be further developed in several ways. An area that could offer interesting 
comparisons to this research would be cases of technology-oriented cooperation 
between companies and environmental NGOs. In the cases studied the main external 
leverage for environmental staff and environmental champions was regulation. What 
would the effects on company organisational dynamics be from adding NGO 
activists and experts to the brew? Contrasting the company and NGO settings might 
also shed light on the role of different environmental ideologies in organisations. The 
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topic of company-NGO collaboration would give an opportunity to bridge the divide 
between organisational research and research on political (‘social’) movements. 
Pettigrew drew on social movement literature (1985:478) developing his political 
process approach to research on organisations, but the two areas of research appear 
still to be largely separate bodies of work.
A related aspect of the research undertaken that could be further analysed and 
developed is the private and professional identities of the people involved, and how 
they negotiate any private life environmental commitments in work places in 
industry. There appears to be a more or less common business culture of 
‘environmental pragmatism’ (even in companies with a high environmental profile, 
see Crane 2000) in the companies studied, and there are, as indicated peripherally in 
this study, different ways of negotiating the fit or tension between private and 
professional identities.
The logical conclusion of this topic of ‘environmental identities’ is perhaps to start 
with political activism rather than organisational life, and study what environmental 
activists do at work. Do they express their activism in the workplace, that is, outside 
the environmental movements they are involved with? And how do their 
environmental identities develop if they cease to be active in environmental 
movement organisations? The literature on social movements appears to have little 
(apart from a few exceptions like Meyerson and Scully 1995 and McAdam 1989) to 
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Appendix A  Interviewees 
The tables give the interviewees’ position in the company at the time of the projects. 
  
Table A.1  Interviewees Chemicals Sweden 
Position Main role in project Date 
Consultant Project leader 11/06/03 
Process Engineer, Service 
Unit Sweden 
Managed process engineering group 11/06/03; 
26/01/04 (tel.) 
Operator, plant Took part in consultations 18/06/03 
Maintenance Manager, plant Expert on maintenance and other 




Linking project with other 
environmental activities 
24/06/03 
Plant Manager Led pre-study, acted as internal 
customer 
05/09/03 
Environmental Engineer,  
HSE 
Linking project and HSE department 25/06/03 
Safety Engineer, HSE Risk analyses 24/06/03 
Manager, HSE Expert on environmental issues 13/06/03 (tel.) 
Shop Steward  * 03/09/03 
Official, County 
environmental division 
 * 05/09/03 
Manager, Municipality 
environmental division 
 * 18/06/03 
Manager, product stewardship  * 18/06/03 
Researcher/Sales  * 11/06/03 





Table A.2  Interviewees Chemicals Scotland 
Position Main role in project Date 
Process Engineer Project leader 6/3/03; 9/5/03 (tel.) 





Managed relations with 
regulator 
17/4/03 
Corporate Safety Advisor Led hazards studies 19/5/03 








* 22/8/02; 24/2/03 (tel.) 
Process Engineer * 12/2/03 
Notes:  
1) ‘*’ denotes interviewees who were not involved in the project, but who has provided useful 
background information. 
2) ‘#’ Was involved in project, but I have not talked to him about it, since I had not chosen the 
project at the time of the interview. 
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Table A.3  Interviewees Dairy Sweden 
Position Main role in project Date 
Technology Director (D) 
Internal customer 23/06/04 
Environmental Specialist (D) Permits 03/06/04 (tel.) 
Project Manager (D) 
From re-localisation investigation to 
implementation 
09/06/05 
Technology Manager (P) 





Environmental controlling 19/05/04 (tel.) 
Engineer (P) Project engineer 08/06/04 
Communication Officer & 
Chairman of white-collar 
union (P) 
Internal information dissemination, 
representing union 
28/06/05 (tel.) 
Operator & Chairman of 
blue-collar union (P) 
Representing union 28/06/05 (tel.) 
Consultant Engineer, Plant 
Tech 
Main project leader 13/05/04 
Consultant Engineer, Dairy 
Tech 
Design, led part of project 07/06/04 (tel.) 
Environmental Consultant 










1) ‘*’ these interviewees were not involved in the project, but have provided background 
information. 
2) (D) – Division, (P) – Plant 
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Table A.4  Interviewees Dairy Scotland 
Position Main role in project Date 
Technical Director Project manager 03/12/04 
Group Environmental Manager * 20/12/04 
Senior Project Manager (S) Project manager 11/03/05 
Senior Project Engineer (S) Managed mechanical side 11/03/05 
Senior Project Manager (S) Managed control system side 11/03/05 
Software Engineer (S) Designed the management 
information system 
11/03/05 
Software Engineer (S) Worked on the design of the 
control system 
11/03/05 




1) ‘*’ these interviewees were not directly involved in the project, but have provided relevant 
information. 
2) (S) – Supplier 
 
 
